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Current discourse on “agriculture for development” generally serves smallholders in 
developing countries poorly: their visibility in international development and policy 
processes is minimal and their exclusion from large-scale agricultural investments 
(LaSAIs) constructed as a “problem.” While LaSAIs have brought optimism around 
agriculture for development, identifying what more national actors can do in sub-
Saharan Africa requires further investigation. The dominant narrative is that LaSAIs, 
value-chain expansion and ensuing coordination schemes for smallholders are 
development-oriented and inclusive but these claims remain contentious in the context 
of national politics, power dynamics and institutional processes, and how they shape 
rural livelihoods and welfare. 
Grounded in an interdisciplinary case study strategy that integrates the Global Value 
Chain (GVC) framework and the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA), this thesis 
explores the extent to which LaSAIs impact local development and rural livelihoods 
among smallholder sugarcane growers in Zambia. Drawing on multiple frameworks of 
analysis at national, industry and local level, it takes a mixed methods approach drawing 
on interviews at multiple levels, together with participatory approaches and a survey at 
the community level to develop  case studies of  two structurally different smallholder 
outgrower schemes linked to Zambia Sugar Plc, a subsidiary of a multinational 
corporation Illovo Plc.. Connections are particulalry made between how LaSAIs are 
framed in the context of national institutional and governance dynamics, inclusionary 
and exclusionary dynamics, local livelihoods and response pathways among 
smallholders, and industry practices as they relate to an agribusiness power and 
influence.  
This study reveals four key processes that affect LaSAIs and structural transformation 
in Zambia. First is that possibilities for LaSAIs are created by state institutions but their 
potential is limited through competing policy developments and governance processes 
that heighten tensions between and among different institutions. Second is that 
emerging inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics reflect agribusiness-state-donor 
relations and that implementation of projects remains problematic for industry and local 
participation. Third, the livelihood analysis reveals that sugarcane cultivation does 
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enhance household incomes but this focus on financial capital neglects other forms of 
capital relevant in shaping livelihood response pathways. Schemes that enable access 
to natural capital such as land beside sugarcane provides greater livelihood impacts 
across finacial capital and other benefits, but these remain low quality, and fail to 
produce significant path-changing gains for households. Fourth is the way policy and 
governance dynamics at macro-level, patterns of inclusion and exclusion at meso-level, 
and livelihoods at micro-level play out reflect how an agribusiness’ power exploits 
national, regional and local domains to exert control over policy developments, industry 
governance and influence sustainable development – referred to as “power of 
presence.” Corporations limit smallholder participation through tight controls on 
production resources and structures which reflect the limits and importance of power 
dynamics, and domestic institutions in mediating corporate standards and practices.  
This thesis provides insight into the role of national institutional and governance 
dynamics in LaSAIs and agricultural expansion and how buyer-grower relations shape 
control over productive resources and influence at local level. In so doing, it makes 
visible the centrality of power, politics and institutional processes in LaSAIs and how 
they shape policy developments, rural social differentiation and agrarian change. The 
analysis links the implementation and coordination of investments to how mandates, 
overlaps and responsibilities among state agencies can be made clear and improve 
decisions around resources. It provides an understanding of how actors can participate 
in local spaces and closer to schemes to create suportive frameworks for local 
participants and poverty reduction. Recognition of macro-meso-micro 
interdependences should inform policies, institutions and investments to enhance rural 
livelihoods and development, specifically measures on resource availability, access and 
utilisation. Policy strategies should clarify the role of LaSAIs and their relationships 
with local participants and key politcal and economic instruments should be 
strengthened for this purpose. State institutions should advance a state-donor-
agribusiness collaboration for policy development, industry structure, and organisation 
of smallholder outgrower schemes. In particular, strategies and regulatory mechanisms 
need to be strenghthened to encourage cross-sector cooperation and coordination of 
policy developments, social and political efforts around “agriculture for development” 
in Zambia and elsewhere across sub Saharan Africa.
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Chapter 1 Characterising Large-scale Agricultural Investments 
1.1 Statement of Purpose   
This thesis explores the extent to which large-scale agricultural investments (LaSAIs) impact 
local development and livelihoods. After more than two decades, agriculture is back on the 
global agenda –including a global vision which connects and conflates foreign LaSAIs and 
local development (World Bank 2007; 2011). The post-2007 conjuncture in food-feed-fuel 
debate and the financial crises with resulting export restrictions and policy-induced supply 
shocks reinforced agriculture’s prominence in global development policy (Borras et al. 2011a). 
Agribusiness interest in agriculture has helped reframe global problems at national scale in 
poor countries such as those in sub-Saharan Africa but “these conditions alone do not guarantee 
the more successful use of agriculture for development” (World Bank 2007, p.23). One 
distinctive feature of LaSAIs is the demand among domestic and international actors for diverse 
productive land for food and energy crops predominantly for exports (Borras and Franco 2012). 
Concentrating on sub-Saharan Africa, drivers to LaSAIs include global demand growth, 
increased agricultural commodity price volatilities and profitability potential associated with 
such investments (Deininger 2013). Global commodity supply shortages have induced a belief 
among policy makers about the increasing risks in global food systems, raising the need for 
agriculture-oriented strategies that could guarantee global commodity supplies (World Bank 
2007). However, the merits of this policy advance are increasingly questioned particularly in 
terms of how they relate to the role of national states and in delivering the frequently quoted 
development imperatives in host countries as well as local livelihoods among smallholders 
(Spann 2017; Peters 2013; Peluso and Lund 2011). These have also been questioned in the 
context of national politics, power dynamics and institutional processes underpinning LaSAI 
implementation (Peters 2013; Arezki et al. 2013). 
The agriculture for development discourse as set out in the World Development Report of 
2008: “Agriculture for Development” brought forth a search for models that could increase 
production and link in to commercial value-chains whilst guaranteeing smallholders pathways 
out of poverty (World Bank 2007, p1). The World Development Report promoted corporate 
interests and LaSAIs in plantations, estates and outgrower schemes as large-scale farming 
models. This promotion emerges alongside the need for “accelerating smallholder entry into 
agricultural markets and raising smallholder innovation and competitiveness” (p.228). LaSAIs 
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in plantations and estates as contract farming have been touted as presenting inclusive business 
models and opportunity for smallholders to tap into global markets (Vicol 2017; Peluso and 
Lund 2011). Thus, linking smallholders as producers to Global Value Chains (GVCs) draws 
on economies of scale and concentration of land into larger holdings as opposed to small-scale 
(Spann 2017). Converting farmers into commercially oriented entrepreneurial smallholder 
farming integrated as outgrower schemes is encouraged in international policy as the only 
viable route. Whilst underpinning this are promises of job creation, market opportunities and 
other livelihood and development imperatives, models that can deliver greater livelihood 
benefits vary and have been a source of recent scholarly efforts (Hall et al. 2017a; Oya 2012; 
Vicol 2017).  
Contractual coordination arrangements in outgrower schemes are presented in recent reports 
as important forms of land control, e.g. Vicol (2017). Indeed, analyses of LaSAIs often point 
to large-scale land acquisitions by multi-level actors in commercial agriculture that involve the 
use or transfer of land ownership to investors through various processes (Borras et al. 2011a). 
What qualifies and gets folded as large-scale land acquisition or investment varies greatly with 
reports ranging from 200 to 1000 hectares sometimes 500,000ha (Cotula 2009) – what Edelman 
(2013) calls “hectare-centric alarmism of the land grabbing discussion” (p.488). This PhD goes 
beyond land aggregation in LaSAIs to include water resources, the level of sophistication and 
investments at farm level that departs from and alters pre-existing patterns of agricultural 
production. Corporate access to natural resources variously impacts rural livelihoods and 
households’ ability to cope with and respond to livelihood shocks (Maxwell and Wiebe 1999). 
Dubbed “land-grabbing” in the social justice literature, corporate expansion in African 
agriculture has been criticised as compromising resource rights necessary for defining local 
livelihoods as small-scale farmers (smallholders) make way for big farms (Hall et al. 2017b; 
Borras et al. 2011a). Dispossessions, loss of land and water as well as risks associated with 
participation in vaue-chains means that smallholders as well as small-scale farming face an 
uncertain future (Hall et al. 2017b). 
In sub-Saharan African, smallholders remain the backbone of agriculture accounting for 90% 
of its food production (Hall et al. 2017b). The connections between land and agriculture and 
livelihoods are strong for the majority poor people, and so are the labour dynamics. Rural 
poverty is high in many areas where land access and utilisation is not guaranteed (Maxwell and 
Wiebe 1999; World Bank 2011). Demographic, environmental and climate change pressures 
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mean that agriculture continues to occupy a central position in donor and public policy debate 
on the sub-continent. However, although agriculture employs about 65% of the labour force 
and accounts for 32% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), sectoral growth remains limited 
(3.8% per annum) with about 25% potential yields, which builds the case for increased agro-
investments (Word Bank 2011). While integration of smallholders into emerging value-chains 
is promoted as a pathway out of poverty (World Bank 2007), diversity in production and 
farming systems as well as related patterns of smallholder integration means the realities are 
more complex than are presented in the agriculture for development discourse (World Bank 
2008; 2011). For the global majority smallholders whose commercial viability and orientation 
is selling surplus produce in local geographies, LaSAIs channels can be exclusionary (Spann 
2017; Peters 2013). Yet, despite more than a decade of research, livelihood implications of 
LaSAIs and the models through which they unfold have not been fully understood, and in some 
cases, have simply been subsumed under economic impacts (Davis et al. 2014) and food 
security (Deininger 2013).  
Overreliance on NGO publications in academic reports, compounded by a lack of fresh 
empirical evidence further limits insights on how investments play out in local communities 
and what this means for sustainable rural livelihoods (Seaquist et al. 2014). How agro-
investments can be organised and structured to maximise benefits for smallholders, particularly 
that “inclusive development” is not necessarily bottom-up is an interesting area of resrarch. 
The frequently quoted but partial success in LaSAIs such as across employment, infrastructure 
and incomes (World Bank 2011) is itself ambiguous. For instance, the way LaSAIs help expand 
local choices and determine livelihood pathways remains under-researched. With agriculture 
at its core, understanding livelihood implications of LaSAIs and related models is essential for 
tackling poverty and addressing many of the development challenges facing sub-Saharan 
Africa. National and commodity focused studies that can integrate how LaSAIs play out within 
national contexts, value-chain organisation and inclusion, local development and livelihood 
outcomes as well as the way agribusiness as new actors in African agriculture shape 
smallholder-firm interactions and industry practices are urgently required.  
This thesis explores the extent to which LaSAIs impact local development and livelihoods. It 
presents a comprehensive and systematic connection of multi-level policy, institutional and 
governance processes, to industry and local dynamics within a specific country context. It 
places attention on how multi-level factors interplay, gives a fuller sense of the range of issues 
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that determine local outcomes within a framework which integrates policy and governance, 
value-chain, livelihood processes, and power dynamics. By drawing on multiple frameworks, 
the aim is achieved by focusing on the national policy developments and governance and 
institutional dynamics in LaSAIs in Zambia, integrating chain elements on the production-side 
(terms and conditions for smallholder integration), livelihoods and livelihood response 
pathways (elements that interrogate land and land-based resource access, and utilisation) and 
examining how these dynamics influence household welfare. These elements are then situated 
within sectoral configurations and how a dominant agribusiness deploys its power and 
influence to shape national governance dynamics, industry practices, and local outcomes. This 
study addresses these issues through the frames of the sugar sub-sector of Zambia. 
1.2 Large-scale Agricultural Investments and the Modernisation of the Zambian Sugar 
Industry  
Zambia is a LaSAI hotspot, experiencing a “two-wave land-grab” since 2000: 2003–2007 as 
first-wave, and post-2008 as second-wave (Land Matrix 2016). The country is dubbed resource 
abundant (World Bank 2011), yet it is one of the poorest in the world recording 76.6% rural 
poverty head count by 2015 (Merotto 2017, p7). Over the past decade, agriculture has gained 
a high priority in Zambia due to declining copper prices. However, the majority of poor 
Zambians (80%) are rural subsistence farmers raising potential conflicts between rural 
livelihoods and a national policy focus on foreign LaSAIs and value-chain commodities such 
as sugar (Merotto 2017, p7).  
Legal provisions such as the Land Conversion of Titles Act of 1975 which vests all land in the 
power of the President and the Lands Act of 1995 which allows conversion of customary land 
to leasehold have made it easier for non-Zambians to acquire land whilst enhancing political 
leverage in land deals (Taliarino 2016; Giles 2017). According to Schoneveld (2014), 12% of 
land in Zambia is held under LaSAIs that are larger than 2000ha. Almost 90% of smallholders 
work customary land and are without title, a majority of whom cultivate less than 2ha (70%) 
(Hichaambwa and Jayne 2014). Legal frameworks also enhanced medium-scale emergent 
farmers cultivating between 5 and 20 hectares and growing at a rate of 62.2% and 28% higher 
than that of total smallholder population (2001-2011) (Sitko and Jaye 2014). By 2014, this 
cohort accounted for 18% of the total farming population, controlling 57% of the total farmland 
in Zambia, highlighting ensuing structural transformations (Sipangule et al. 2016, p3).  
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Since 2001, various actors have driven land acquisition and investment. A study by Sipangule 
et al. (2016) placed local investors top (84%) compared to Zimbabwe (4.4%), UK (3.1%) and 
South Africa (2.9%) respectively. The Land Matrix (2016) reveal that 34 LaSAIs under 
contract represented 390,074ha or 1.6% of the total agricultural land in Zambia. However, the 
figure reaches 1,588,916ha when considering intended land acquisitions irrespective of 
negotiation status. Recently, a total of 17,800ha of new land were brought under irrigation as 
state (6,800ha) and private-sector investments (11,000ha) (GRZ 2017a, p62). Since 2010, the 
government has been keen to commercialise agriculture, marketing over two million hectares 
of agricultural land as farm blocks and other projects (Ahlerup and Tengstam 2015; Sitko and 
Chamberlin 2016). While the average land size under production is below 5% of the average 
size under contract, the country’s share of actualised concluded deals is higher than anywhere 
on the region – 65% (Land Matrix 2016) compared to 83% (562,312ha) reported by Sipangule 
and Lay (2015, p5). These processes have seriously eroded customary land from frequently 
quoted 94% in the mid-20th Century to 54% in 2016 (Sitko et al. 2016), providing a fertile 
ground for this study. 
Sugarcane has been promoted in different commodity markets as alternative to fosill fuel 
equivalents (e.g. biofuel, bioelectricity and bioplastics etc.). However, as one of the targeted 
crops for expansion, actions of the industry have increasingly under scrutiny (Hess et al. 2016). 
Since 2000, Zambia has witnessed a LaSAI-led global value-chain expansion and 
modernisation of its sugarcane industry. Preferential access to the EU markets and a supportive 
national policy and institutional framework encouraged export-oriented LaSAIs in sugar 
(Palerm et al. 2010). Domestically, donor-state collaborations have since the market reforms 
of the 1990s promoted free markets and reduced government involvement in agriculture for 
instance through the Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (ASIP). The ASIP promoted 
irrigation, farm power and mechanisation, agricultural finance and rural investment funds with 
one crucial success being “increased role of out-grower schemes and capacity enhancement 
in the ministry” (Zulu et al. 2015, p.15). State-donor efforts encouraged 
development/rehabilitation of infrastructure schemes, rural access roads, irrigation and market 
facilities, enhancing corporate participation in high value commodities such as sugarcane. 
State-led sugarcane cultivation is blamed as limiting the modernisation of sugar production and 
manufacturing in Zambia, with recent reports arguing that the real modernisation of the 
industry only began towards the later 1990s in response to a new wave of regional investments 
(Richardson 2010).  
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Foreign LaSAIs have led to an expansion of the area cultivated for sugarcane, increased supply 
chain actors including smallholders as well as expanded processing capacity (Section 3.3.2). 
The sugar sub-sector contributes 3-4% to GDP, 6% of total national exports and employs over 
11,000, highlighting its economic importance (Kalinda Chisanga 2014). Since 2000, expansion 
in the sugar value-chain responds directly to investments from the South African based 
multinational corporation Illovo Sugar Plc (Illovo) which operates as Zambia Sugar Plc 
(ZaSPlc), a former parastatal and largest sugar producer in the country. Despite a decade of 
research on the sub-sector, there is limited focus on the policy and governance processes at 
macro and meso levels, and their association to local livelihood dynamics remains weak. For 
instance, Kalinda and Chisanga (2014) focus on sugar value-chains, growth opportunities and 
challenges while Richardson (2010) explores contributions of sugar investments to rural 
development, wage labour opportunities and wealth distribution. Others such as Matenga 
(2017); Matenga and Hichaambwa (2017) and Hall et al. (2017a) examine rural livelihoods 
more generally than on how value-chain touch down and how institutional processes induce 
local responses. Livelihood dynamics as they relate to different outgrower models within the 
sugar sub-sector have remained less explored, and so are the livelihood pathways.   
Much research in Zambia has narrowly focused on impacts of LaSAIs and related land 
acquisitions. For instance, studies have focused on labour opportunities (FAO 2012; 
Richardson 2010); smallholder productivity (Sipangule and Lay 2015); incomes and 
employment (Ahlerup and Tengstam 2015); and agrarian relations, livelihoods and social 
relations more generally (Matenga 2017; Hall et al. 2017a; Matenga and Hichaambwa 2017; 
Kalinda and Chisanga 2014). This focus on micro-level impacts of LaSAIs has produced fewer 
insights into the wider policy and institutional dynamics that govern LaSAI processes. More 
widely, there have not been investigations into the way LaSAIs play out within the national 
context and how these processes shape smallholder-firm interactions and possibilities for 
sustainable local development. Divergences in policy and diversity in production systems and 
outrgower models within specific sub-sectors such as sugar require commodity-focused 
studies, including critical interrogations of national politics, power dynamics and institutional 
processes, and how they shape LaSAIs, value-chains prospects and local development and 
livelihoods.  
This PhD provides additional insights by delving into the national policy governance and 
institutional dynamics that govern LaSAIs processes. The commodity-focus on sugarcane 
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enable crucial insights into institutional processes, value-chain dynamics and livelihood 
impacts across different models including industry configurations as they relate to agribusiness 
power and influence. Recognition of the national and industry interdependences are crucial in 
informing policy, institutions and investments for enhanced livelihoods and rural development 
and is a focus for this country and product-specific study.  
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
The aim of this study is to explore the extent to which LaSAIs impact local development and 
livelihoods. This is addressed through a focus on Zambia’s national policies and institutions 
shaping LaSAIs and commercialisation of agriculture and industry practices as they relate to 
the sugar sub-sector. Although there is a fairly broad awareness that there is an agricultural 
expansion in Zambia and in Mazabuka which has emerged a ‘hot spot’ for sugarcane 
production (Lay et al.2018; Land Matrix 2016), literature has until now focused on broader 
processes in land acquisition and related legal frameworks (Nolte 2014; German et al. 2011). 
While state institutions facilitate land-use expansion by exploiting political, legal and 
bureaucratic extensions, policy developments and institutional provisions that govern these 
processes as well as how they shape industry practices continue to receive peripheral attention. 
Studies that examine the impacts of sugarcane and the role of outgrower schemes tend to be 
quite general (Matenga 2017; Matenga and Hichaambwa 2017; Hall et al. 2017; Richardson 
2010). Part of the challenge facing researchers has been the existence of diverse production 
systems and outgrower arrangements in the industry (e.g. companies, commercial and 
smallholder farmers), which are highly coordinated and vertically integrated (Chisanga 2012). 
Integrating these elements in a conceptually coherent manner is difficult but also warrants 
comparative assessments. Smallholder dependency on one commodity and then on one 
company in the district (ZaSPlc) raise questions for inclusion, market dynamcis and which 
outgrower arrangements guarantee sustainability of local livelihoods. It also raises potential 
tension between single commodity concentration and a focus on diversified livelihood practices 
(Barrett et al. 2001). Additionally, broader trade policy such as the EU, whilst stimulating 
production further raise uncertainties of smallholder market access, production and 
implications on grower livelihoods and welfare (Richardson and Richardson-Ngwenya 2014; 
Nolte et al. 2012).  
In Zambia, understanding how investments play out in rural geographies and customary 
communities (livelihood impacts) remains limited (Hall et al. 2017; Matenga 2017). There is a 
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lack of knowledge about LaSAIs which relates to historical state intervention that constrained 
private sector growth (Poulton et al. 2006) and is interlinked with a policy focus on copper as 
well as a concentration on traditional commodities such as maize (Zulu et al. 2015; Scott 2002; 
Saasa 1996). However, despite Zambia’s policy focus on maize, the structural context under 
which growers make strategic choices in majority traditional markets and agri-food chains 
differs from those associated with evolving agri-food systems that emerge as highly 
coordinated and vertically organised (Lee et al. 2012). These knowledge gaps present a 
particular urgent need for systematic country-based empirical evidence to explain factors, 
policy processes and institutions shaping LaSAIs and ensuing practices that integrate 
smallholders as growers in various outgrower models and unfolding value-chain expansions. 
Research is also needed on the specific implications for local development, the context and 
conditions influencing participation of small producers in agri-food chains, and the impacts of 
value-chain development and LaSAIs on community and household livelihoods. How national 
politics, institutional processes and power dynamics shape these elements is crucial in this 
study.  
1.4 Thesis Objectives and Key Questions  
This PhD aims to explore the extent to which LaSAIs impact local development and rural 
livelihoods among smallholder sugarcane growers in Zambia. This is addressed through four 
research objectives and twelve research questions couched within a multi-level focus and 
mixed-method study design.   
1.4.1 Objectives  
1. To identify drivers and actors shaping large-scale agricultural investments in Zambia 
and the policy developments and institutional processes that govern them 
1.1. Who are the key actors shaping LaSAIs in Zambia? 
1.2 What are the specific trends, patterns and dynamics surrounding LaSAIs in Zambia? 
1.3 What are the specific policy developments and institutional processes driving 
LaSAIs in Zambia? 
2. To identify and explore industry and local factors affecting smallholder participation 
in sugar value-chain as a livelihood enhancement strategy in rural Zambia.  
2.1 How and under what terms do farmers participate in sugar production as a livelihood 
enhancement strategy in rural Zambia?  
9 
 
2.2 What are the factors affecting smallholder engagement in sugar production in rural 
Zambia? 
2.3 How inclusive are sugar value-chains in Zambia?  
3. To explore how large-scale agricultural investments in sugarcane expansion contribute 
to and affect rural livelihoods in Zambia  
3.1 What are the household and community livelihood impacts associated with LaSAIs 
and participation in sugar value-chains in rural Zambia?    
3.2 What are the specific opportunities and barriers towards enhanced household and 
community livelihoods in sugar producing areas of rural Zambia?  
3.3 What response pathways do households pursue as a result of sugarcane adoption 
and expansion?  
4. To explore the current configuration of the sugar value-chain and how LaSAIs shape 
and influence governing processes in Zambia.  
4.1 How has the agricultural sugar sub-sector developed and how are value-chains 
currently organised?  
4.2 Who are the key actors in sugar value-chains in Zambia? 
4.3 In what ways do LaSAIs shape and influence industry and local dynamics in 
Zambia?  
1.5 Defining Thesis Key Terms  
For consistency, this thesis employs four key concepts and this section provides indicative 
working definitions.  
First, the concept large-scale agricultural investment (LaSAIs) is highly contested. Despite a 
decade of research, the equivocal nature of LaSAIs means studies variously pick from a wide-
range of concepts that describes the same phenomenon: foreignisation of land (Zoomers 2010), 
land acquisition (Margulis et al. 2013); off-shore farming and land export (Seaquist et al. 2010); 
agricultural commercialisation and large-scale land-based Investments (World Bank 2011). 
Varying concepts means that studies are premised on partial definitions which highlight both 
the multi-dimensional nature of the phenomenon and difficulties of defining it. One key feature 
is that various terms and choices tend to reflect possible outcomes of LaSAIs (Boamah 2014). 
Frequently used terms in critical literature such as “land-grabbing” are understood as being a 
tag-line for “describing and analysing the current explosion of large-scale (trans)national and 
commercial transactions” (Borras et al. 2011a, p2010). Land-grabbing is defined as the: 
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“capturing of control or relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources 
through a variety of mechanisms and forms, carried out through extra-economic 
coercion that involves large-scale capital, which often shifts resource use orientation 
into extraction, whether for international or domestic purposes” (Borras and Franco 
2013, p1725).  
In practice, the term highlights both appropriation of resources by foreign investors and 
criticisms for their potential impacts (Stephens 2011). The concepts ‘land grabbing’ is 
considered analytically narrow, suggesting an element of ‘force’ whilst ignoring consensual, 
sometimes voluntary and deals conducted under economic compulsion of deprivation and 
under the watchful eye of state actors (Holmes 2014). One major limitation of the concept land-
grabbing is its lack of clarity on not only the definition but also on whether any land purchase 
constitutes land-grabbing. 
This PhD seeks to explore and understand LaSAIs as broadly defined, not predicated on the 
assumptions of negatives outcomes. This suggests there is no necessary character to LaSAIs 
(neither necessarily win-win nor do they entail dispossession or deceit), framing investments 
“more broadly as embedded in complex multi-scale webs of relationships shaped by power, 
property, and production” (Wolford et al. 2013, p199). To widen the analytical scope, I use the 
term ‘large-scale agricultural investments’ understood as investments in commercial 
agriculture that involve use or transfer of land/ownership from local to investors 
directly/indirectly for various export-oriented commodities – for food and energy 
predominantly for export. This considers not only land aggregation but also level of 
investments as well as well as sophistication at farm level that ordinarily departs and alters pre-
existing patterns of agricultural production.  
Second is value-chain development, understood to be the full range of activities required to 
bring a product/service from conception, through the intermediary phases of production, 
delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use (Kaplinsky 2000). National, sub-
sectoral and community level dynamics remain crucial in livelihood analyses that aim to 
understand firm-practices and how these shape outcomes for participating smallholders and 
indeed livelihoods in rural communities. This study focuses on terms of engagement as well as 
elements of representation, governance, knowledge exchange, firm/buying arrangements, trust 
and mutual respect at production-end of the chain and considers how this shapes livelihood 
outcomes for participating smallholders (Bolwig et al. 2010).  
11 
 
Third is outgrower schemes understood as the development of processing facilities with a core 
commercially operated estate, “through which small producers are incorporated into 
commercial value-chains” (Hall et al. 2017a, p5). Here contractual arrangements, terms and 
conditions provide crucial links between foreign capital and outgrowers, as conduit for local 
accumulation by smallholders (Oya 2012). In this study, outgrowers are linked to a processing 
firm which holds a nucleus estate and augments its supply from outgrowers who supply their 
sugarcane under different land ownership, institutional and production arrangements.    
Finally, a livelihood is understood as a means of gaining a living which entails combining 
various resources and activities comprising capabilities and assets (material and social 
resources) crucial for a means of living (Chambers 1995). A livelihood is thus sustainable when 
it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and 
assets, while not undermining the natural resource base (Chambers and Conway 1992; Scoones 
2009). This study examines how these elements are impacted, as well as diverse smallholder 
experiences because of LaSAIs and smallholder integration in value-chains, paying attention 
to micro-meso-macro processes and how they influence livelihood outcomes for smallholders.  
1.6 The Case for Interdisciplinary Approach  
The push for LaSAIs and rapid expansion in sugar value-chains in sub-Saharan Africa has 
created complex environments within which local people pursue their livelihoods (Pritchard et 
al. 2017). These environments mean that local livelihoods and prospects for local development 
cannot be understood in isolation. These require integrated research to understand various 
contributing elements such as drivers to agricultural expansion, value-chain development, 
industry practices that determine local inclusion and the extent to which these shape livelihoods 
and pathways (Bolwig et al. 2008; Challies and Murray 2011) and of mixed methods that 
deploy both quantitive assessments as well as qualitative approaches in data collection 
(Johnson et al. 2007). Two key frameworks are applied for this purpose. First is the global 
value-chain approach/construct that considers the integration of a group of smallholder sugar 
producers, and second is the sustainable rural livelihoods as social-economic and 
environmental impacts that together shape prospects of poverty reduction and sustainability 
(Bolwig et al. 2010). By drawing on these frameworks, this study enables a comprehensive 
understanding of dynamics in one particular setting that cuts across multiple levels. In 
particular, this includes how policy and governance dynamics at macro and meso level shape 
socio-economic dynamics at micro level. Scanty existing literature on sugarcane expansion and 
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industry dynamics and how this relates to local development and poverty reduction raises an 
urgent need for integrative research which can explore multi-level interdependences and 
outcomes (Miller et al. 2008).  
1.7 Thesis Structure  
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on the literature review. The 
chapter situates the study within wider theoretical debates of LaSAIs and impacts at local level, 
and associates these to the Global Value-chain and Sustainable Livelihood frameworks.    
Chapter 3 is the research design and methodology. This chapter introduces the research design 
and methods employed in addressing the research aim, questions and objectives. It considers 
the overal conceptual framework development that underpins this study and delves into specific 
processes of data collection and analysis.  
Chapter 4 focuses on national policy developments and institutional frameworks and processes 
that govern LaSAIs in Zambia. 
Chapter 5  is a meso-level analysis on inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics for smallholders 
in the sugar industry, including terms and conditions for participation. Meanwhile, chapter 6 
explores micro-level impacts of LaSAIs on livelihoods and local response pathways.  
Chapter 7 is the final empirical chapter that places chapters 1-3 within the wider structure and 
organisation of the industry and the role, power and influence of a dominant agribusiness. This 
chapter demonstrates how corporations deploy the ‘power of presence’ to influence national 
policies (Chapter 4), industry and local practices as they relate to inclusion and exclusion 
(Chapter 5), and impact local livelihoods (Chapter 6).  
Chapter 8 brings together insights from result chapters 4-7 and attempts to revist and associate 
each chapter to theoretical and/or methodological implications of the study.  
The final chapter presents overall conclusions of the study (Chapter 9), summarising main 
contributions of the study and future research prioritises. 
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Chapter 2 Large-scale Agricultural Investments, Rural 
Transformation and Development 
 
2.1 Introduction   
The rise of large-scale agricultural investments (LaSAIs) in the post-2007/2008 food-feed-fuel 
crises has brought forth an ongoing debate about how incursion of foreign capital in rural 
spheres shapes land and labour dynamics – a somewhat reformulation of the Agrarian 
Question. Driven by rural displacements and dispossession, the centrality of land (struggles 
over access, how it is to be worked, how it is owned) and the politics of labour (emergent 
dynamics of rural social differentiation and class formation) are once again at the fore of 
contemporary agrarian political economy debates as well as policy-making interventions. 
Contested debates about LaSAIs across sub-Saharan Africa mean that asking about the nature, 
character and interpretations of these processes and how they are assumed to play out and 
operate is important if the “agriculture for development” imperatives are to be realised.  
Growing global interest in corporate agriculture and food security; new global, regional and 
national commitments to investment in the agricultural sector; and the emergence of new actors 
in this expanding policy and research sector raise the need for systematic studies that can ask 
how LaSAIs, and the politics of land and labour play out within national contexts. Crucial also 
is the need to look critically at which, and whose narratives are being advanced, and why? 
Debates on elements of the agrarin questions such as land and labour is highly relevant to rural 
Zambia, where livelihoods for agricultural communities such as those in the sugar sub-sector 
have been shaped by changes driven by LaSAIs. This chapter provides a context to the study 
by situating the current research within the agrarian political economy literature.  
2.2 Land, Labour and the Agrarian Political Economy  
Despite theoretical tensions, and complexities in its reformulation and application, much of 
classic agrarian political economy literature resonates with, and remain useful for, looking into 
the current surge in corporate agriculture. Recent studies such as those by Akram-Lodhi and 
Kay (2010) suggest engaging debates around LaSAIs as they relate to land and labour requires 
rigorous and flexible frameworks that permit country-specific analyses of the “material 
conditions governing rural production, reproduction and the process of agrarian accumulation 
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or its lack thereof, a process that is located within the law of value and market imperatives that 
operate on a world scale” (p.255). This call necessitates a focus on capitalism and its 
development. Capitalism points to a system of production and reproduction anchored firmly in 
social relation between capital and labour. Whilst capital exploits labour for profit and 
accumulation, labour works for capital for a means of subsistence, which in the agrarian 
political economy points to “the social relations and dynamics of production and reproduction, 
property and power in agrarian formations and their processes of change, both historical and 
contemporary” (Bernstein 2010, p.1). In classic political economy literature, the centrality of 
Marx’s Capital, Polanyi’s Great Transformation, or Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful points to 
struggles over land, alongside questions about fragmented classes of rural labour. Linked to 
these are arguments that capitalist agrarian changes proceed by class differentiation in the 
country side (Lenin 1973); dispossession or displacement of people from the land ensues from 
capitalist intrusion into the country side, which in turn provokes political reactions and counter 
movements (Polanyi 1944); primitive accumulation is an ongoing, uneven process that 
accompanies capitalist development; and that part of social outcomes of land deals point to 
dispossessed peasants who become surplus people (Li 2011). Clearly, original translation of 
the agrarian question concerned itself with how the transition of capitalism shapes pre-capitalist 
agrarian social formations and transforms, displaces or eliminates them, by the emergence of 
capitalist social relations of production – the basis for the development of productive forces in 
farming (Bernstein 2006). This PhD draws on these perspectives as gateway to asking what is 
happening in the world of LaSAIs within the national context.  
Contemporary development policy and practice has tended to translate classic views into 
doctrines of development as strategies for modernisation and accumulation (agrarian transition 
and industrialisation). For instance, the 1950s/1960s witnessed state interventions aimed at 
expanding domestic markets and boosting domestic demand for improved income distribution 
and poverty reduction. As Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2010) notes, this view on expanding 
domestic markets has been stretched into promotion of “agricultural export-led strategy for 
rural accumulation, deepening agricultural integration into global economic flows and agro-
food value chains” (p.257). Underpinning these processes are policy conditionalities of the 
international development institutions which point to private-sector development, access to 
foreign exchange, and a boost to rural productivity and non-traditional agricultural exports 
(NTAEs). LaSAIs have thus been argued to be effective in enhancing agricultural profitability 
in rural economies, but these processes have been subject to theoretical tensions, and political 
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complexities (World Bank 2007). For instance, globalisation processes have implications on 
land tenure systems and labour regimes some of which might be less capable of maintaining a 
sustainable livelihood. The suggestion in critical perspectives which is now dominating the 
land grab debate is that expansion in agricultural exports (NTAEs) alter land, labour and capital 
intensity of production, reconfiguring rural production processes, including cropping patterns 
in ways that produce a variety of farming and social relations (Watts 2012; Akram-Lodhi and 
Kay 2010). 
In extension, rather than an agrarian question of capital, Bernstein (2006) suggest an existence 
of an agrarian question of labour – the former believed to subsume the interests of the latter. 
Evident in this body of literature is the centrality of the population, production and political 
power (e.g. in the formation of classes of agrarian capital and labour) (Lenin 1899; Kautsky 
1899) on the one hand, and how agrarian transition shapes accumulation for industrialisation. 
However, regulation of global commodity chains, agribusiness expansion, and agricultural 
trade and its regulation mean that any incursion of foreign capital in agrarian regions would 
not only intensify these processes but also produce unevenness and variations in the very land 
and labour relations than is assumed in classic agrarian question. As Bernstein 2006) notes:  
“Agriculture in capitalism today is not synonymous with, nor reducible to, farming, nor 
is it constituted simply as a set of relations between agrarian classes (landed property, 
agrarian capital labour), as in the ‘classic agrarian question. Rather, agriculture is 
increasingly, if unevenly, integrated, organised, and regulated by the relations between 
agrarian classes and types of farms, on one hand, and (often highly concentrated) 
capital upstream and downstream of farming on the other (p.454).”     
I draw on these views to understand how contemporary LaSAIs produce struggles over land 
on the one hand, and processes of class differentiation and their reproduction on the other. In 
exploring land and labour processes as they relate to rural livelihoods, four key issues remain 
central: 1) social relations of property (who gets what?); 2) social divisions/organisation of 
labour/work (who does what?); 3) social distribution of the product of labour (or income) (who 
gets what?); and 4) reproduction of producers and non-producers (social relations of 
consumption, reproduction and accumulation) (what do they do with it?). As Borras and Franco 
(2012) note, land-based social relations vary from one agrarian setting to another, which raises 
challenges for conceptual and empirical mapping of the nature and direction of land use change 
– which raises the need for cross-scale analyses that point to local pathways (Section 2.6 
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extended in Section 8.4). This produces diversity in the dynamics of land use changes and 
implications for different social groups. Development researchers face challenges of how to 
narrate these contradictory changes in a conceptually coherent fashion and in increasingly 
heterogenous rural populations.  
Borras and Franco (2012) have raised concerns that what is folded into differentiation processes 
of dispossession that form part of everyday dynamics of accumulation on the one hand, and 
those that reflect new forms of land grabs remains unclear, raising the need for more nuanced 
empirical research and advocacy. Indeed, a focus on land and how power relations shapes and 
fragments political struggles of labour are only part of the many processes of agrarian 
transformation – and they matter differently in different areas. However, of important concern 
is how and the extent to which smallholders and their political struggles over land and labour 
are or have been reconfigured in the era of LaSAIs and neoliberal globalisation (Akram-Lodhi 
and Kay 2010). While it is necessary to critically explore and understand how production, 
politics and processes of accumulation contribute or constrain agrarian transitions, attention in 
the analysis of the development of capitalism in agriculture, the way it plays out and its 
implications on local agriculture development such as in sub-Saharan Africa has been thin. 
This PhD attempts to close this gap.     
2.3 Agri-food globalisation and Smallholders in Developing Countries  
The past decade witnessed intensified commercial pressures on land in sub-Saharan Africa in 
areas such as tourism, national parks and extractive industries (Cotula 2012). This PhD goes 
beyond binaries of land-grabbing and commercial agriculture to investigate diverse realities of 
LaSAIs including: agrarian and tenure relations, history, geography, agro-ecology specificities 
(Hall et al. 2017a). These are crucial in exploring emerging political struggles over land and 
labour, sustainable and inclusive pathways of commercialisation in their entirety.  
International food production, trade and consumption have been considered within specific 
institutionalised world historical conjunctures, i.e agri-food globalisation and food regimes 
(McMichael 2009). There is more that can be said here but suffice to say that the rise of global 
(and industrial) agriculture point to not only industrial basis for technical change, and formation 
and growth of global agriculture markets, but also changes in the agrarian sector as an object 
of national and international policy including agricultural modernisation alongside series of 
food regimes (Watts 2012; McMichael 2009). For instance, the post-1954 era saw agricultural 
modernisation in the global south, intersecting technical innovation and state-centered 
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development strategies (e.g. the Green Revolution political and geopolitical movements). 
Reardon et al (2009) argues two key economic processes have strengthened this transition.  
First is investments in various agri-food industry segments, enabling a shift from traditional 
small-scale informal agri-food industry to formal sector larger farms (Reardon et al. 2009). 
Second, includes structural transformations shaped by trade liberalisation, private-sector 
investments in, and consolidation of, processing and retail, leading to the so-called 
“supermarket revolution” and the expansion of fast food chains (Reardon et al. 2009, p.1717). 
The centrality of this neoliberal corporate food regime points to agro-export expansion, 
institutionalisation of markets and property relations under the guise of free trade, food security 
and production efficiencies (see McMichael 2012). Studies show structural transformations 
induced organisational and institutional changes via the rise of vertical coordination (e.g. 
contracts and market-linkages) and private grades/standards in which smallholders participate 
(Swinnen 2007; Reardon and Barret 2000). Landmark studies such as those by McMichael 
(2012) and Baglioni and Gibbon (2013) interpret these global events as “symptomatic of a 
crisis of accumulation in the neoliberal globalisation project” (p. 681). Financial power and its 
articulation in new productive investments (agricultural lands), they argue, highlight direct 
expressions of wider economic crises with important consequences across sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, rising global food prices, demand growth, environmental and social concerns 
associated with LaSAIs means what gets folded into contemporary neoliberal corporate 
agriculture debate is variegated, producing a multiplicity of research areas. How, and what 
changes in land use and property relations emerge because of LaSAIs and adoption of NTAE 
crops such as sugarcane remain poorly understood, particularly that what constitutes a land 
grab is unclear and that these do not always lead to smallholder expulsion from their land. 
Borras and Franco (2012) note that what seems to matter in political economy literature include 
the international and transnational character of land deals, crops being farmed, terms of the 
new relations of property, division of labour, distribution of incomes and patterns of capital 
investments (Borras and Franco 2012). However, how the politics of changes in land use, 
property relations and how labour relations unfold under a variery of conditions as well as links 
between them remains an area of research interest (Borass and Franco 2012; Watts 2012; 
Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010).      
Decades of research however say more about wider industry transformation than the 
transmission effects of these changes on smallholders and local economies (Lee et al. 2012). 
18 
 
For instance, despite being central to classical agrarian studies, contemporary application in 
international political economy literature has largely ignored land and its transformation. These 
dynamics present important consequences particularly that companies tend to source from 
smallholders in the contexts where the latter dominate agrarian structures (Reardon et al. 2009). 
In this regard, social, political, cultural and economic contradictions underpinning global 
capitalism have opened opportunities to multinational corporations to create large-scale 
industrialised farms in sub-Saharan Africa, and thereby disrupting rural labour and land 
practices. However, a focus on global consumption, trade, labour, land, and future directions 
witnesses in recent literature makes it hard to see social relations on the ground. As Fukinish 
(2014) alludes to, overlooked are the impacts of modernisation of agriculture, incomes or 
technological diffusion and innovation in local spaces and how growth in demand for local 
products lead to changes in the smallholder economy. This PhD evaluates these knowledge 
gaps and informs the debate on agricultural expansion, value-chain integration and local 
welfare. Since inclusion or exclusion in value-chains by local communities might neither be 
desirable nor guarantee prosperity (McCarthy 2010), a focus on national dynamics advanced 
in this PhD provides insight on smallholder experiences, their role and position including 
prospects for local development in the transforming land and labour relations. 
2.4 The Rise of Contemporary Large-scale Agricultural Investments  
2.4.1 Contextualising Land Rushes: Evidence of the Past?  
Past research shows the extent to which the current surge in LaSAIs reveals historical 
continuities and conjures violent enclosures of commons as capitalist expansion (Cotula 2012; 
McMichael 2012). However, little is known about how the current land rush differs from 
historical forms of land enclosures, or how the latter sets the stage and shape the character of 
the former. There is a growing interest among international development institutions, policy 
makers and scholars about contemporary LaSAIs and impacts on local development. A focus 
on impact and outcome assessments as well as processes of land acquisition (Vermeulen and 
Cotula 2010; Schoneveld 2017) is dominant in literature given persistent underdevelopment 
and low sector investments across sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2008). However, to many 
social commentators, the main pessimism in the contemporary ‘land rush’ concerns lies in the 
evidence of the past.  
In sub-Saharan Africa, a large set of literature exist on colonial enclaves and land enclosures 
in indigenous people’s lands, but spatial dynamics and experiences vary. For instance, despite 
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being a huge territory with better agro-ecological conditions, Zambia avoided serious uptake 
of its land during colonialism on scales experienced elsewhere (e.g. Zimbabwe). Potts (2013) 
relates this to Zambia’s geographical location and its vast size. This feature was to have a 
bearing on subsequent spatial dynamics in land rush and the Zambia’s land abundancy narrative 
frequently quoted in political and economic commentary (World Bank 2011). It is thus less 
surprising that the contemporary land-grab centres on sub-Saharan Africa (Deininger 2011) 
despite variations in investment intensity (Schoneveld 2014). 
The post-independence era witnessed another twist in land expansion through state-driven 
commercialisation schemes (Cotula 2012). For instance, millions of hectares were converted 
into schemes between 1965 and 1990 in commodities such as cotton and groundnuts (Niger 
basin); Sesame and Sorghum (Sudan) wheat (Tanzania) and privatised ranching schemes 
(Kenya and Botswana), together with forest and mining concessions (Congo basin) (see Alden-
Wily 2013). Driven by enhanced unionisation and labour legislation in the 1960s (Tiffen and 
Mortimore 1990), agribusinesses veered away from plantation models to long-term contractual 
relationships with local suppliers (UNCTAD 2009). Schemes and ventures however have not 
significantly transformed local production or create sufficient jobs (Alden-Wily 2013; Potts 
2013). These concerns endure through to today and this study aims to explore some of these 
realities.  
One enduring legacy of these changing land tenure processes in Africa is how historical land 
arrangements shape current legal pluralism in tenure relations with one outcome being the 
relegation of vast customary land claims in favour of statutory tenure (Jayne et al. 2014; Arezki 
et al. 2013). Current developments suggest a new shift towards greater agribusiness 
involvement in agriculture through direct land accumulation, the so-called “contemporary 
land-grab phenomenon” in Africa but this has important consequences on local livelihoods and 
welfare including land and labour relations as will be shown in this study.  
2.4.2 Understanding Contemporary Land Grabbing  
2.4.2.1 Data and Methodological Challenges  
Plenty of claims with increasingly high and contradictory statistics about LaSAIs and land deals 
are being communicated in academia and elsewhere, mounting fears of exaggeration as well as 
under-reporting (Edelman 2013; Oya 2013). Recent research shows that methodological and 
data deficits means accurate quantification of land acquisition is difficult, leading to duplication 
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of statistics (Oya 2013). Similar and questionable figures have frequently been quoted in the 
literature, making new outcome assessments difficult (Schoneveld 2017) with others arguing 
that these entrench simplistic and counter-productive narratives (Schoneveld 2014). Data 
sources such as the Land Matrix are also said to face similar challenges (Schoneveld 2014; 
Nolte et al. 2016). Oya (2013) report that opacity and unreliable publicly accessible information 
and subsequent reliance on media blogs/reports raise selection biases, with others reporting 
that these face disaggregation challenges which relate to where planned deals, under 
negotiations, unknown or failed are insufficiently distinguished (Schoneveld 2014).  
One outcome has been that claims are premised on partial analyses which either narrowly 
define what land-grabbing is or assumes holistic approaches that point to global shifts in 
economic and geographical relations. Many studies have been based on self-reported 
quantitative data analyses, which raises questions about what is being measured with limited 
potential to provide insights into the nature and dynamics of LaSAIs. To Edelman (2013), the 
use of area-based aggregation is even problematic in that it conceals essential elements such as 
capital investments, supply-chain control, land and labour relations. Frequently, evidence from 
national and project inventories, interviews with third-party sources, and other government 
records online, media reports and blogs continue to be quoted in academia (Table 2.1). Reliable 
inferences such as on size of land deals, investment volume and social-economic impacts 
remain missing (Arezki et al. 2013). Continued negative publicity and counter-movements 
against LaSAIs means national data tend to be conservative. Divergences in what is being 
reported from past studies have revealed more about the methodological challenges of 
researching a complex phenomenon shaped by diverse multi-level actors (Oya 2013; Edelman 
2013). This study explores national trends and patterns in LaSAIs within the national context, 
with an analytical focus on much marginalised land and labour dynamics.  
2.4.2.2 Investment Scope, Trends and Patterns 
Little remains known about actual scope, trends and patterns of farmland investments in sub-
Saharan Africa. The analytic focus in many studies has been on social-economic impact and 
less often environmental implications of LaSAIs than on wider dynamics in trends and status 
of investments (Borras et al. 2011a). Furthermore, little scholarly attention is placed on how 
value-chain commodities interplayswith LaSAIs in different social contexts. Over-reliance on 
media, NGO and government reports as well as incomplete global database such as the global 
observatory Land Matrix has led to limited insights on actual scope and trends of LaSAIs in 
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Africa (Table 2.1). More widely and as Baglioni and Gibbon (2013) observe, there appears a 
tendency to equate investment scale merely to land size as opposed to the level of investments 
and farm sophistication.  
Studies have reported on land-based investments in extractive industries, tourism including 
national parks but these have been subordinated to investments in farmlands. Land-based 
investments whether long-term leases or outright purchases generate different pressures and 
raise varying issues from those happening elsewhere. For instance, investments in farmland 
targets land itself as opposed to sub-soil resources (e.g. mining) which partly explains the 
intensified LaSAI focus in literature (Schoneveld 2014; World Bank 2011). This study builds 
on and contributes to work in land-based investments within the national context. Knowledge 
on investment practices in production spaces is vital to avoid marginalisation of various social 
groups and account for the various socio-economic trajectories of investment outcomes.  
Table 2.1: Land acquisition claims in sub-Saharan Africa (Author’s compilation).   






2001-2011 41 External data sources from the World 
Bank and internet sources 
IFPRI 2006-2009 9.1 Media reports 
Land Matrix 
(2012) 




2008-2010 51-63 International Land Coalition (ILC) 
media reports and blogs 
World Bank 
(2010) 
2008-2009 39.2 Country project inventories, media 
reports on GRAIN blogs 
Cotula et al. 
(2009) 






2005-2014 22.73 Government records, media reports 
and research publications 







10.0 Media reports, company sources, 
research papers, policy reports, 
government sources and personal 
information (concluded deals) 
 
Many studies on LaSAIs and related local tenure dynamics face numerous challenges including 
legibility problems. Differences have emerged between studies that consider deals over 1000ha 
(Cotula et al. 2009), over 2000ha (Schoneveld 2014); and those interested in land demanded 
(Georgen et al. 2009) and land allocations (Deininger et al. 2011). More widely and to Cotula 
(2012), investments outside agriculture continue to receive low media and scholarly attention, 
with possible under-reporting. He suggests that the much-touted regional distribution and focus 
on Africa might actually stem from this media and scholarly interest. Most studies however 
agree that an accelerated process of land acquisition is evidently in motion as Nolte (2014) 
asserts: “[e]ven if we assume that figures are blown up and that the implementation of these 
deals is slow, we can assert that we are talking about a real phenomenon” (p.698). A wider 
agreement in literature however is that sub-Saharan Africa, including Zambia, is a key 
investment destination (World Bank 2011). LaSAIs in Zambian sugar sub-sector represents an 
important case for a study for a number of reasons. As it is across some of the sugar producing 
countries in southern Africa such as Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, including 
Swaziland – as footprints of Illovo Sugar Plc – sugarcane has particularly gained policy and 
investor attention as a successful and profitable NTAE crop for smallholders. Massive 
investments into the region dubbed ‘Big Sugar’ have generated a somewhat of a regional 
concentration of foreign capital (Richardson 2010), sometimes even for unpopular reasons 
(ActionAid 2011). Dubbed land abundant and an important investment destination, Zambia is 
fittingly relevant for a study interested in asking what is happening on the world of LaSAIs and 
global value chain commodties such as sugarcane.   
2.4.2.3 Drivers to the Contemporary Land Rush   
Literature on land grabbing frequently cites changes in global supply and demand growth for 
agricultural commodities (market forces) as key drivers to LaSAIs (World Bank 2011a). A 
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wide-range of studies report the heightening demand for agricultural land and surge in agro-
investments stems from the recent 2007-2008 global fuel-feed-food crises (Borras et al. 2011; 
World Bank 2011). Emerging prospects in global food and energy markets is further reported 
to have driven investors to seek alternative cheap fertile land for industrial food and biofuel 
feedstock plantations (Schoneveld 2017). Whilst government concerns about long-term food 
and energy security (supply constraints) has seen investments aimed at securing land and water 
resources in the event of global commodity crises, corporate actors arguably perceive 
profitability potential (World Bank 2011). The latter is seen to relate to financialisation of 
agriculture as actors respond to transformations in global supply and demand of agricultural 
commodities (FAO 2010).  
Demographic changes, growth in incomes, changing diets as well as price volatilities 
associated with food and energy commodities have presented land as a desirable asset for 
investment whilst acting as stressors (Deininger 2013; Barret 2013). Studies such as those by 
Scheidel and Sorman (2012) point to declining fossil fuel stocks and a global transition towards 
renewable energies as key driver to land acquisition (Scheidel and Sorman 2012). In response, 
national as well as diverse international actors (e.g. agribusinesses, investment funds, and 
government agencies) have targeted investments in the so-called ‘empty,’ ‘underutilised,’ or 
‘unproductive’ land as alternative agricultural production zones (Deininger 2011). Prospects 
for capital formation that can possibly support national agricultural modernisation and rural 
poverty reduction have created a prospective optimism among national governments. 
According to Wolford et al. (2013) ‘the state’ is a key player on LaSAIs but never operates 
with one voice. However, missing strong and clear industrial policies in most host economies 
adds to the wider challenges of LaSAIs (Fukinish 2015). This case study develops an approach 
that focuses on national institutional and stakeholder interaction with LaSAIs and related 
coordination as well as implications on sectoral practices and local experiences.   
2.4.2.4 Who is Investing in African Farmlands and in what? 
Literature on land-grabbing draws attention to international government-backed entities such 
as those from the Gulf, Asia and western investment funds. Reports also include private actors 
(e.g. agribusinesses, agri-food companies), soverign wealth funds, and private institutional 
investors (e.g. banks, pension, hedge and private equity funds) (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013; 
Zoomers 2010; OECD 2010). A study by Schoneveld (2014) finds that of 520 projects, 102 
(13.9%) of the total area acquired had a local operator which he says is “highlighting the 
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critical enabling role of international capital in driving large-scale farmaland investments” 
(p.40). other investors are said to emerge from traditional investor countries such as those from 
Europe, Asia and North America. Despite clear international imperatives to who is investing 
in sub-Saharan Africa, a number focusing on intra-regional dynamics have reported interesting 
trends (Hall 2011; Cotual et al. 2009; World Bank 2011), providing a foundation for this study.   
The nature and complexity of land transactions and a lack of readily available public data have 
made it difficult to accurately understand who really is involved in LaSAIs in sub-Saharan 
Africa. To Cotula (2009, p.659), “implementation of large land deals typically involves a range 
of players (e.g. possibly lenders, insurers, contractors and suppliers) who may be located 
elsewhere or headquarted in one country but receiving capital from other countries.” Studies 
such as those by the World Bank (2011) and Cotual et al. (2009) report the predominance of 
private agribusiness deals, but go further to say that the difference from state and non-state 
enterprises may be blurred. Continued lack of data on equity structures makes it difficult to 
provide evidence of ownership structures. In Zambia, the Land Matrix (2016) notes significant 
differences in the scope of land acqusition where domestic investors participated as opposed to 
international (Section 1.2).    
While investment focus in LaSAIs varries but broadly falling into production, investments, 
speculation or preservation, many studies focus on investments (Wolford 2012).  Some of these 
relate to establishment of agricultural production in diverse value-chain commodities (Baglioni 
and Gibbon 2013). Driven by corporate agro-export industry and complex global value and 
supply chains, the focus has largely been on the production of food and biofuels and less of 
forestry (Schoneveld 2014). This PhD focuses on large-scale land-based investments in 
agriculture and within an industry setting, the latter linked to the ‘Big Sugar’ investment waves 
that underpined sugarcane expansion in sub-Saharan Africa in the past decade. 
2.5 Debates in Contemporary Land-based Agriculural Investments  
2.5.1 LaSAIs, Views and Unifying Narratives   
Narratives on LaSAIs are largely contested between the social justice (protecting localised 
livelihood/food systems and sustainable resource exploitation) and private sector perspectives 
(advancing yield expansion and opportunities associated with agricultural modernisation) with 
diverse intermediary positions. Land tenure and how national governance systems interplay to 
safeguard against negative consequences of LaSAIs feature prominently in the ‘resource-grab’ 
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literature. Some of these examine customary property regimes as they relate to legal status 
(Amanor 2012; German et al. 2013); the role of the state (Lavers 2012) and domestic elites and 
power dynamics (Fairbairn 2013; Boamah 2014); and local counter movements (Moreda 2015) 
and outcome determinants (Schoneveld 2017).  
Value-chain development and market approaches seeking to overcome barriers and exclusion 
of smallholders in agriculture is probably one key development shift in the past few decades. 
The dominant perspectives about LaSAIs point to opportunities for increased yield growth 
under enduring technological advancements, reflective of the neo-classical/growth models 
(Harris 2000). Emphasis has been placed on agro-expansion, growth and smallholder 
integration into supply chains believed to lead to poverty reduction (Schmindhuber et al. 2009; 
Veltmeyer 2011). This view justifies itself in persistent poor agricultural yields in sub-Saharan 
Africa alongside food security concerns (World Bank 2010). A key concern among researchers 
and policy actors however is that LaSAIs rarely engage into food crops and where they do the 
focus has been on export markets (Schoneveld 2014). However, given sustainability 
challenges, studies within this perspective have highlighted implications of entropic limits of 
economic systems (Gerogescu-Roegen 1971), and the impracticality of unlimited growth (Daly 
1991; 1996). An ecological-economics perspective has thus been adapted to agricultural 
production and biophysical elements of agro-expansions which presents a less ambitious 
approach to agricultural expansion and resource exploitation.  
Contrasting perspectives such as the ecological perspective argue that anthropogenic 
production and consumption are bounded, and agricultural expansion subject to biophysical 
principles. LaSAIs arguably strains eco-systems through widespread soil degradation, water 
depletion, and bio-diversity loss etcetera (Hobbs and Harris 2001). Of concern is the 
sustainability of LaSAIs and impacts on future development and livelihood prospects. 
However, researchers have challenged the feasibility of an ecologically sustainable agriculture 
and how it can be made to support a growing population such as in sub-Saharan Africa (Harris 
2000).   
Crucial in resource-dependent communities such as those in sub-Saharan Africa is how natural 
capital feeds into commodity production with international value rather than local, sparkling 
displacements, resource dispossessions and sustainability concerns (Alden-Wily 2012). 
Exploitation of natural capital affects sustainable claims of social justice. The way assets are 
combined or interchanged as well as relationships between different capitals is a candidate for 
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multiple explanatory angles in the literature on sustainable livelihoods (Bebbington 1999; 
Scoones 2009). Studies such as Bebbington (1999, p.2012) emphasise livelihood assets as 
“vehicles for instrumental action (making a living), hermeneutic actions (making living 
meaningful) and emancipatory action (challenging structures under which one makes a 
living).” However, the argument is that natural capital cannot be substituted for any increase 
in other forms of capital with LaSAIs often reported as negatively affecting biodiversity and 
ecosystem services including depletion of freshwater and soil nutrients which affects 
livelihoods and development (Voget-Kleschin 2013).  
Furthermore, LaSAIs reportedly destroy local livelihood systems and affect adaptive capacity. 
Suggestions are that LaSAIs necessitate opening-up of marginal and new dwelling and 
production lands for subsistence, which raises potential for social tensions (Guttal et al. 2011). 
Comprehensive understanding of the impacts of LaSAIs requires going beyond simply 
classifying diverse livelihood strategies, assets and portfolios at household disposal, seen as 
weaknesses at the centre of livelihood discussions. As Scoones (2009) notes, it requires 
engagement with markets, political and power processes; climate change as well as long-term 
shifts in rural economies, including macro-processes which bear on land and labour processes 
for rural livelihoods (Scoones 2009). While responses such as the social justice and food 
sovereignty agenda (e.g. La Via Campesina) promulgate small-scale production as sustainable 
agricultural systems, dealing with livelihood impacts of LaSAIs requires not only a conceptual 
bridge that can inform macro-theoretical analyses – some sort of a middle ground (Doward et 
al. 2009) but also an understanding of the institutional environment within which they play out 
(Bolwig et al. 2010). In Section 2.6 I discuss the importance and novelty of this cross-scale 
analysis, which I further assess in Section 8.4. 
The centrality of the land-grabbing debate thus points to land as a right, a productive, and rights 
fulfilling asset whose exploitation arguably unlocks other rights. It also points to how land is 
worked to improve the well-being of the majority poor connected to natural resources (De 
Schutter 2011). This necessitates a departure from the instrumentalist view of LaSAIs in favour 
of small-scale production. Food sovereignty is thus considered a right, and access to land is 
core (Murphy 2012). LaSAIs reportedly threaten land rights and hampering social welfare 
particularly where governance systems are weak and welfare schemes inexistent (Golay and 
Biglino 2013). This perspective considers the importance of a legal institutional framework in 
upholding the rights, under the assumption that there are clear bearers of rights that can pursue 
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their fulfilment and the need to respect and protect these rights. In sub-Saharan Africa where 
institutions are characterised as weak, an understanding of the way national frameworks play 
out becomes crucial to grasp and predict investment outcomes. Drawing on this background, 
this PhD considers terms and conditions under which growers participate in sugarcane 
production and how agribusiness power and influence within the same industry setting shapes 
sector and local practices including gains to local participants. A focus on land and labour 
relations necessitates power analyses on how they shape production and distribution of value.   
There are arguments that LaSAIs and associated development outcomes largely depend on 
domestic institutional and legal frameworks that shape outcomes (Wolford et al. 2013a; World 
Bank 2010; Kirsten and Sartorius 2002), including models within which foreign capital unfolds 
(Hall et al. 2017a). Thus, where state capacity is weak and property rights ill-defined, LaSAIs 
are more likely to lead to negative environmental and livelihood outcomes. Weak legal and 
institutional frameworks have been identified as one of the key explanations why land grabbing 
concentrates in poor countries such as in sub-Saharan Africa (Arezki and Byree 2011). As such, 
recent studies such as those by Hules and Singh (2017) echoe the need for institutional analysis, 
as provided in this study to illuminate the way LaSAIs play out. Institutional processes consider 
how prospects for rural livelihoods depend on relations of participation and indeed non-
participation in value-chains at local level (Kaplinsky 2000; Challies and Murray 2011). Chains 
deliver risks and opportunities whilst participants tend to be caught differently. The way 
participants are incorporated and integrated greatly influences labour relations and livelihood 
outcomes but vary greatly. This PhD offers holistic insights into these elements by examining 
interdependences between national policy developments and institutional processes, industry 
practices as they relate to the sectoral configurations, inclusion and exclusion, livelihoods and 
welfare as they relate to land and labour dynamics. The way these reflect wider policy and 
institutional dynamics relate to the role of the state, and how the ‘agriculture for development’ 
agenda has been articulated within the national context. The following section begins to 
describe how agriculture has been folded back into national development agenda to shape 
approaches and narratives of agriculture.   
2.5.2 Reinserting Agriculture Back on the Development Agenda  
Since the mid-2000, agriculture has been promoted in international development (World Bank 
2008). Driven under the auspices of “Agriculture for Development” and from a “land 
development” perspective, international financial institutions such the World Bank including 
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institutional and philanthropic organisations (e.g. Gates Foundation’s Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa/AGRA) variously support agribusinesses. The leading argument is that 
more agro-FDI present African states possibilities to ‘modernise’ agriculture and empower 
smallholders through diverse value-chain opportunities (World Bank 2008).  
In the dominant agriculture for development discourse, “[t]he emerging new agriculture is led 
by private entrepreneurs in extensive value-chains linking producers to consumers and 
including many entrepreneurial smallholders supported by their organizations” (World Bank 
2007, p8). National states are urged to promote “competitiveness in the agribusiness sector 
and support the greater inclusion of smallholders” (p8). A key concern in agribusiness 
expansion has been land concentration into larger land-holdings, driving industrial actors. The 
argument for smallholders is that powerful agribusinesses can be exclusionary rather than 
inclusive (Akram-Lodhi 2013). Whilst value-chain participation shows some positive 
contributions for a few (Bolwig et al. 2009), evidence remains mixed with some studies 
highlighting social security concerns (Pegler 2015). Studies such as those by Sexsmith and 
McMichael (2015) argue that incorporating smallholders into agribusiness supply chains as 
contract labour or where they are compelled to migrate out of farming reflect enduring legacies 
of depeasantisation (see Section 2.2 for classic formulations of peasants and capital 
development). Agribusiness power and influence that shape micro-level agriculture and 
development dynamics remains a key concern in critical agrarian literature (Bernstein 2006; 
2010; Franco and Kay 2010; Rutten et al. 2017; Hall et al. 2015; Gingembre 2015). And how 
agribusinesses influence, and shape sectoral and industry practices and local-level experiences 
thus requires urgent attention.  
Insufficient integration of smallholders into global markets has been problematised and 
increasingly tied persistent rural poverty in poor countries (Kirsten and Sartorious 2010; World 
Bank 2008). This Private Sector Development perspective emphasises an agriculture and rural 
poverty reduction agenda directed by private entrepreneurs in extensive value-chains that link 
poor producers to GVC markets (World Bank 2008). Organisational arrangements such as 
contract farming in general and out-grower schemes are thus becoming familiar features in sub-
Saharan Africa (Dubb 2016). In these development accounts, smallholder inclusion is 
presented as desirable, and realities on the global-local value-chain intersection somewhat 
inconsequential (Deininger 2011). While efforts are now being made to explore grower 
experiences, evidence remains mixed (Reardon et al. 2009; Barret et al. 2012). A major 
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weakness in many past studies on value-chain expansion has been the treatment of participants 
as homogenous. An emphasis on macro-expansion compounded by a crucial disconnect 
between sectors in national policy means micro-level smallholder experiences in agriculture 
remain largely ignored. Existing literature suffers from its focus on resource access and 
utilisation under broader narratives of ‘resource-grabbing’ (Hess et al. 2016; Matavel et al. 
2016) and transforming political-economy of the industry (Dubb 2016). Industry organisation 
and practices, which affect production resources and forms of smallholder inclusion remain 
less understood. Complexity in production systems, outgrower arrangements including 
diversity in national contexts challenges generalisations about prospects and experiences for 
smallholder inclusion or exclusion including potential outcomes.  
While there are some exceptions, specific country policy and institutional dynamics which 
might have profound effect on the outcomes of LaSAIs remain insufficiently accounted for in 
literature (see Schoneveld 2017). Studies are either disjointed and/or narrowly premised on 
partial analyses of LaSAIs which again insufficiently account for diverse multi-level factors 
that shape investments outcomes. Some of these relate to legal/institutional governance of land 
access in local areas (Burnod et al. 2013); employment potential (World Bank 2011); impacts 
of land acquisition on indigenous communities in the context of livelihoods and environment 
(Kusiluka et al. 2011); and in rare occasions implications on gender/inequalities (Behrman et 
al. 2012). Once again, for the global majority smallholders whose ‘commercial viability’ and 
orientation is selling surplus produce in local geographies, these channels are said to have 
exclusionary effects (Spann 2017). However, micro-level processes cannot be understood in 
isolation of meso and macro dynamics.  
Past studies have reported that chain requirements (e.g. quality standards) are not always 
beneficial. There are challenges associated with smallholder participation (Maertens and 
Swinnen 2009; Gibbon 2003), suggesting a need for more commodity-specific research to 
examine the nature and dynamics of chain participation as well as implications on livelihoods. 
Although much is theorised about market mechanisms/institutions (Kruger et al. 1991) and 
coordinating mechanisms at macro-level (World Bank 2009), research connecting how 
national/sectoral policy processes and institutions influence chain dynamics and implications 
for smallholder livelihoods remains thin. Whilst emphasis has been placed on commitment to 
corporate social responsibility (van Lieshout et al. 2010), little empirical evidence exists on 
how firm practices (e.g. quality standards, buying arrangements) shape welfare gains and 
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distribution. For example, there are few qualified examples of the nature and processes that 
shape not only non-participation but also terms of smallholder chain participation (Bolwig et 
al. 2010; Hickey and du Toit 2007). In rural livelihoods and production spaces, the connection 
between integration, commodities and benefits of inclusion can be strong. The materiality of 
commodities and their compatibility with pre-existing livelihood activities (e.g. across labour, 
investment and production requirements) greatly affects any benefits of inclusion (e.g. see 
Favretto et al. 2014 with reference to Jatropha). Thus, market conditions and structure of 
rewards associated with specific crops and the way they shape livelihoods, chain interaction 
including influence on resource use for participants in local spaces requires urgent attention. 
This study considers these elements by exploring patterns of smallholder inclusion and 
exclusion in sugarcane value-chains and implications for land and labour processes, and 
smallholder gains.   
Previous studies reveal how participation in value-chains can be dominated by powerful and 
economically advantaged groups, raising risks of elite capture (Adams et al. 2018; Phillips 
2014). Yet, little is known why this is the case and the processes that shape such outcomes. 
Efforts aimed at integrating livelihood elements in value-chain development literature are now 
emerging (e.g. Bolwig et al. 2010), but poverty implications of LaSAIs and chain participation 
for poor smallholders remain difficult to predict. Poverty outcomes remain inconsistent, with 
reported local exclusions and elite capture (Tobin et al. 2016; Phillips 2014) or reversals/pull-
outs and fearful concerns that integration exposed smallholders to even greater livelihood risks 
(White 1997; Sivrankrisha and Jyotish 2008; Barret et al. 2012). Although past studies within 
value-chain perspective have reported on household income (Bolwig et al. 2009; Maertens and 
Swinnen 2009), gendered perspective in relation to ethical trading (Tallontire et al. 2005) as 
well as environmental labels, certification and implications (Ponte 2008); and fair trade 
(Raynolds et al. 2007; Dalgaard et al. 2007), livelihood changes as they relate to LaSAIs and 
integration remain under-researched. Related socio-economic processes and relations remain 
unaccounted. 
Whilst certain sections of literature see favourable public policy and spending on smallholders 
as central to reducing rural poverty and enhance livelihoods (Lipton 2006), others believe 
LaSAIs in commercial farming are better placed to transform agricultural and rural sectors in 
developing countries (Collier and Dercon 2013). In sub-Saharan Africa, patterns of agricultural 
expansion are mixed, with national states placing varying emphasis on different approaches 
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which makes predictions complex and difficult. LaSAIs arguably increase smallholder 
productivity (e.g. incomes, employment, access to inputs and markets) (World Bank 2010), but 
their association with livelihood disruptions (e.g. displacements, dispossessions and 
environmental degradation) continues to attract criticisms (Anseeuw et al. 2012; Schoneveld 
2017). This study offers insights into how these investments impact pre-existing resource and 
land-based relations by bringing together locally held forms of knowledge and experiences of 
LaSAIs from their own natural settings. In so doing, it illuminates national policy and 
institutional processes that govern these processes and their socio-economic impacts in 
production spaces.   
Similarly, other studies are concerned nevertheless that LaSAIs tend to displace local people 
leaving them worse-off without rights to land and natural resources leading to loss of 
livelihoods (Anseeuw et al. 2012; D’Odorical and Rulli 2013). Drawing on the World Bank’s 
own data, Li (2011) shows that LaSAIs produce only a fraction of the promised employment 
opportunities (World Bank 2011). Other studies such as those by Davis et al. (2014) find 
minimal employment creation potential of LaSAIs representing income losses for local 
communities arguing: “since communities in these areas rely on agriculture for income, loss 
of access to land and water resources because of land deals represent an inability to produce 
household income” (p181). Elsewhere Cotula (2011) bemoans vagueness in local employment 
contracts rendering participants to casualisation. It seems that even where LaSAIs incentives 
exist (e.g. employment), loss of land often led to greater livelihood struggles among 
smallholders than anticipated. This study builds on this background but goes beyond narrow 
employment and income perspectives to provide micro-evidence on livelihood impacts across 
differentiated groups and how smallholders change with expansion in commodity value-chains. 
It addresses these issues by demonstrating how agribusiness expansion and dominance shapes 
land and labour dynamics, determine gains and distribution for participants.  
In response to somewhat regulatory vacuum in most poor countries, market-based governance 
mechanisms have emerged, what Schoneveld describes as “representing a global governance 
shift involving the privatisation of corporate regulation” (2017, p.121). Some of this relates to 
3rd party voluntary certification systems, international social and environmental performance 
standards etcetera. In practice, however, these have advanced corporate self-regulation and 
possibilities of “win-win” situations which according to Schoneveld (2017, p.121) “facilitate 
land-grabbing and help greenwash unsustainable business practices.” Literature reveals poor 
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adherence to voluntary guidelines by investors, suggesting limitations in shaping corporate 
behaviour (Cotula 2012). As Schoneveld (2017, p.121) notes, “host country policies, 
regulations and institutions remain the primary mechanisms through which investment 
sustainability can be achieved.” Interestingly, critical reflections on regulatory 
regimes/institutions in host countries remains absent in analyses of global governance 
processes. The analytic focus on national institutions advanced in this PhD enables a 
contribution towards filling this gap.  
There seems a wide acknowledgement among policy actors that the widely-touted development 
contributions of LaSAIs are complex than previously thought. Some scholars believe that “the 
economic, political and bureaucratic complexity of establishing appropriate governance 
arrangements has frustrated efforts to enhance investment sustainability” (Schoneveld 2017, 
p.119). To date, however, much of the scholarly debate around the governance of LaSAIs says 
more about global (land and investment) governance processes (e.g. non-state mechanisms, 
voluntary codes and certifications) whilst host country governance dynamics have in contrast 
remained an unexplored theme, despite lying centrally in facilitating and legitimising farmland 
investments (Schoneveld 2017, p.119). At an intermediate level, consequences of LaSAIs are 
presented pre-eminently as a governance and investment rather than a resource issue (Table 
2.2). By emphasising global governance options and guidelines, a mutually beneficial position 
of LaSAIs is advanced, buoyed by guidelines, principles and Codes of Conduct (CoC) as 
guiding frameworks but these have met scepticisms (Borras and Franco 2010).1
                                                          
1 Guidelines broadly touch on Human Rights, voluntary international guidelines, international investment treaties, 
international water governance regimes, voluntary private standards (See Bruntrup et al. 2014).  
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Table 2.2 Global and regional LaSAIs related frameworks  
Framework  Key actors Selected principles/focus 
Global initiatives 
Principles for responsible contracts integrating the 
management of Human Rights risks into state—
Investor contract negotiations (2015) 
UN Human Rights Commission   
 
General guidelines for negotiators  
Principles for responsible investments in 
agriculture and food systems (2014)  
Committee on World Food Security (CFS) Promote and guide investments in agriculture in relation to food 
security and nutrition  
Principles for Responsible Investments in 
Farmland (PRI) (2014) 
Private-sector initiative – pensions and hedge 
funds 
1. Promote environmental sustainability  
2. Respect existing land/resource rights  
3. Uphold high business/ethical standards 
   
Policy Framework for investment in Agriculture 
(2013) 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) 
1. Investment and trade policy  
2. Sustainable use of natural resources and environmental 
management  
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests (2012) 




1. Improve tenure governance 
2. Contribute to the improvement/development of frameworks 
for regulating tenure rights  












World Bank, UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), FAO, 








1. Recognising/respecting existing rights to land/natural 
resources  
2. Processes relating to investment in agriculture are transparent, 
monitored, and ensure accountability by all stakeholders, 
within a proper business/legal/regulatory environment. 
3. Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect 
industry best practice, are viable economically, and result in 
durable shared value. 
4. Environmental impacts of a project are quantified, and 
measures taken to encourage sustainable resource use, while 
minimizing the risk/magnitude of negative impacts and 
mitigating them. 
Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases: A set of 
minimum principles and measures to address the 
human rights challenge (2009) 
UN Human Rights Council  1. Transparency in negotiations that involve local communities  
2. States should adopt legislation protecting local communities, 
specifying conditions according to which shifts in land use, or 
evictions, may take place 
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3. Host states and investors should ensure that agricultural 
production does not accelerate climate change, soil depletion, 
or exhaust fresh water reserves  
Regional initiatives 
Guiding principles on large-scale land-based 
investments in Africa (2014) 
African Union, UN Economic omission for 





Guidelines for African countries on LaSAIs and how to deal with 
land issues, ensuring improved land governance, and framework 
for investor engagement with national and local actors   
Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in 
Africa: A Framework to Strengthen Land Rights, 
Enhance Productivity and Secure Livelihoods 
(2010) 
Promotes Africa’s socioeconomic development, through inter alia, 
agricultural transformation and modernisation, strengthens land 






One of the prominent generic guidelines is the ‘Principles of Responsible Agricultural 
Investments’ (RAI) (see Table 2.2). The RAI arguably presents an opportunity to distribute and 
balance risks with gains but the Code of Conduct has been criticised for its presupposition that 
agro-investments generally present development opportunities for poor countries and 
smallholders (Voget-Kleschin and Stephan 2013). Introducing social and environmental 
safeguards as advanced in generic guidelines arguably necessitate structural reforms to national 
land, environmental and investment regulations (De Schutter 2011; German et al. 2013; 
Schoneveld 2017). However, this contrasts with state formation in Africa in that the wave of 
liberalisation of investment regimes including land markets that eroded sector intervention 
capacity forged “new dependence structures that are incentivised to accommodate rather than 
excessively regulate private sector investment inflows” (Schoneveld 2017, p.119). How these 
frameworks trickle-down to national spaces and how they are deployed at local level remains 
a key challenge. Less explored is how agribusinesses as new agro-actors deploy their power to 
shape and influence policy developments, industry dynamics and prospects for rural 
development.  
It is within this broader context that power analyses have been introduced but with variations 
in analytical positions. While studies incorporate power analysis in their approaches, these 
either focus on the power dimensions in bargaining processes (Rutten et al. 2017); power 
inequalities that underpin land acqusitions (Fairbairn 2013); and power dynamics as they relate 
to domestic entities and relationships in land governance (Burnod et al. 2013). The losers 
and/or winners from agriculture cannot be understood in isolation from the way local industries 
are structured and organised and how different actors deploy their power and influence. Yet, 
power analyses remain less applied to the agribusiness practices and agriculture for 
development discourses. Diversity in groups affected by LaSAIs and their rights as they relate 
to power relations in rural areas suggest that there are variations in outcomes between and 
within participating farmer groups (Bruntrup et al. 2014). A preliminary critique of this 
response to LaSAIs by Borras and Franco (2010, p.510) notes that the proposed guidelines are: 
“not essentially pro-poor in the sense of proceeding from a social-justice driven analysis of 
the causes of (rural) poverty and the need to protect and advance (rural) poor people’s land 
access and property interest.” Defended as useful in weakly governed economies, the 
voluntary nature of the principles present challenges of enforcement whilst veering away from 
fundamental resource-based questions (see critical perspectives by Voget-Kleschin and 
Stephan 2013; and Borras and Saturnino 2014). The central criticism is the advancement of the 
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idea that the problem facing poor countries today is the investment rather than the land and 
resource question, implicitly arguing as De Shutter (2010) asserted that the destruction of the 
smallholder economy can be accomplished responsibly. Apart from being vague on land, 
various frameworks have been criticised for subordinating water, and for treating it as a 
subsidiary component of land rights (Bruntland et al. 2014). It is less surprising that an 
institutional and governance perspective is advanced within a neoliberal framework and as best 
alternative for reconciling dynamics of resource access and utilisation in poor countries. The 
equivocal nature of studies and findings in the dominant narratives say more about agriculture 
as the ‘magic-bullet- to development than about what sets land-grabbers apart: varying 
intentions driven by the bottom-line in view of the external community which at another level 
only serves to exacerbate economic and social inequalities in host communities (Wolford 
2013).  
Overall, a focus on global (land) governance systems and the reformulations of the agrarian 
question (often around agrarian political economy or political ecology, conceptual and 
paradigmatic) has tended to provide limited insights and practical relevance to national state 
actors as hosts, governance dynamics and how they can better align agricultural investment 
strategies to sector objectives.  
2.5.3 Reinserting National States in the LaSAIs Debate   
LaSAIs and resource scarcity concerns have made visible the role of national states and 
relationships to investors and the local population, raising the need for an analytic focus on 
legal and bureaucratic mechanisms, formal and informal bundles of power exerted by different 
actors (Wolford et al. 2013). Transparent and effective land rights and good governance cannot 
be secured in isolation. This requires that we explore and understand the nature and motivations 
of state and non-state actors themselves, their interactions as well as power and influence they 
exert in LaSAIs (Burnod et a. 2013; Fairbain 2013). Rather than being passive, state actors are 
active, shaping key LaSAIs decision-making. For analysis of LaSAIs within the national 
context to be accurate, analysis must highlight legal extensions of state power on the ground – 
territory; rulers and their control of the conditions of their own reproduction(e.g. formal bodies) 
– sovereignty; actors, multiple scale governance and relationships within outlined principles 
and rules in political hierarchy and legal practices – authority; and participants in the state 
making, changing property relationships and how they make claims on the state – subjects and 
subjectivities (Wolford et al. 2013, p.194).  
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National and sub-national actors interact in multifaceted forms of relationships, shaping state 
discourses of LaSAIs, the materiality of production and social reproduction in relation to local 
producers (see Fairbain 2013 with reference to Mozambique). The state never operates with a 
collective voice as agencies articulate different kinds of power to shape access to land, driving 
‘ideological legitimation’ (Wolford et al. 2013, p.196). LaSAIs depend on competences of state 
bureaucracies, their embeddedness in society and their territorial area – state capacity (Lavers 
and Boamah 2016). Effective governance of land entails state capacity, projected in 
bureaucratic competences, state authority and how it links to land and water (Lavers and 
Boamah 2016). State capacity is a product of state-societal relationships as well as relationships 
within state agencies, and state territorial reach reflects capacity and choice.  
Integrating macro-level practices and interactions with micro-level experiences through power 
and politics makes visible the constitution of territories for LaSAIs and elements of 
sovereignty, authority and subjects. However, the way in which states channel market forces, 
authority, and influence vary, more so in relation to majority social groups such as 
smallholders. Host countries are thus sites where various expressions of power and authority, 
sovereignty rights and hegemonies face “new enclosures, property regimes, and 
territorialisations, producing …new actors, subjects, and networks connecting them and new 
legal… and practical investments means of challenging previous land control” (Peluso and 
Lund 2011, p.667-668). Land control highlights how state and non-state actors can hold on to 
land and institutional and political extensions on access, claims and exclusions (ibidi.). This 
links to territoriality which draws boundaries around “objects” (resources) and people 
(subjects). However, these claims are not always related to claims made on the state, raising 
competition between state and non-state actors (Peluso and Lund 2011). Relationships between 
state and non-state actors are important in shaping land access and control particularly on 
contexts of legal plurality such as in sub-Saharan Africa (German et al. 2011). These processes 
are context-specific, contingent upon historical patterns and processes of state formation, the 
changing balance of power between competing sources of authority and strategies of 
negotiations and conflict employed by social actors to enhance their positions of power (Lavers 
and Boamah 2016, p.102). Thus, a national level analysis of actors, their interaction and 
expressions of power, authority and influence in the creation of new frontiers of land control 
is crucial in highlighting national experiences of LaSAIs. This PhD draws from an 
understanding of state dynamics to illuminate policy developments and institutional 
frameworks shaping LaSAIs in Zambia. 
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2.6 Large-scale Agricultural Investments and Cross-scale Analysis 
2.6.1 Globalisation, Value-Chain Development, and Agricultural Transformation   
Investments, trade exchanges and individual or enterprise contracts provide the basis on which 
Africa integrates into the world economy, underpinned by agri-food commodities (Gibbon and 
Ponte 2005). Exchanges stemming from global developments such as LaSAIs on the one hand 
and national dynamics on the other have shaped scholarly interests in global value-chain 
analyses and what this means for smallholder producers (Lee et al. 2012). These research 
efforts are informed by the fact that different value-chain structures generate divergent 
outcomes in the well-being of smallholders (ibidi.).  
The GVC perspective can be traced to Global Commodity Chains (GCC). As a paradigm for 
thinking about how global industries work, the GCC is one among several popular networks or 
chain-based approaches to the study of economic globalisation (Coe et al. 2004). A lot can be 
said here but suffice to say that other constructs include international production networks 
(Borrus et al. 2000); and the Global production networks (Ernst 1999; Henderson et al. 2002); 
Global production systems (Milberg 2003); and French Filiere (Raikes et al. 2000). Diverse 
frameworks make theorising, researching and framing of global processes in relation to local 
land and labour processes particularly difficult. The concept of a commodity chain dates to 
1977 and to Hopkins and Wallerstein whose argument departed from the sequential views of 
the global economy and development where national markets evolve in the direction of 
expanded trade geared to an international market.   
“Let us conceive of something...commodity chains…take an ultimate consumable item 
and trace back the set of inputs that culminated in this item – the prior transformations, 
the raw materials, the transportation mechanisms, the labour input into each of the 
material processes, the food inputs into the labour...” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1977, 
p.128).  
This view shaped the understanding of the capitalist expansion as an historical social system 
defined by commodification in production, distribution and investment processes that had 
previously been conducted aside markets (Bair 2005). A commodity chain thus refers to a 
“network of labour and production processes whose result is a finished commodity” (Hopkins 
and Wallerstein 1986, p.159). The framework focuses on inter-firm networks connecting 
manufacturers, suppliers and sub-contractors in global industries and international markets, 
asking how participation in the commodity chains can facilitate industrial upgrading for 
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developing country exporters (Bair 2005). The global commodity chains (GCC) approach is 
useful in exploring international division of labour, organisational forms related to economic 
integration more broadly – as producer-driven and buyer-driven commodity chains (Gereffi 
1996). The GCC is a historically-focused framework which considers patterns of global trade 
and analyses “production systems explicitly outside of the realm of national economic 
boundaries” (Nelson and Pritchard 2009, p.38). One key feature about the GCC analysis that 
differentiates it from the GVC is its lack of focus on national economies as arenas for analysis 
which limits the range of subjects and scope for investigation. The GCC approach faces 
limitations of how to capture a wide range of products, some of which lack commodity features. 
Studies oriented towards firm practices at meso and micro levels and national institutional 
dynamics can greatly benefit from alternative approaches such as the GVC, as discussed below 
(Nelson and Pritchard 2009).  
As earlier noted, over the course of 1980s and 1990s, the shift from the so-called “development 
project” to “globalisation project” induced export-oriented development strategies across the 
global south (Nelson and Pritchard 2009). Accelerated by technology change, enhanced capital 
mobility, and inter-regional competition for investment (Coe et al. 2004), processes of 
globalisation highlighted in the increasing degree of fragmentation of global trade enhanced 
the significance of regions as sub-national spaces and locations of economic activities (Bair 
2005). The way these activities touch down and enable smallholders to tap into global markets 
require national-focused approaches more so with respect to individual sectors.   
The GVC approach brings together scholars on global networks, capturing a wide variety of 
products including those that lack commodity features (Gereffi 1994). To Gibbon and Ponte 
(2005, p.77), GVCs are a “configuration of coordinated activities that are divided among firms 
and that have a global geographical scale.” The GVCs’ focus on meso-level organisational 
forms across sectors is considered inclusive of a full range of possible chain activities and end 
products in the study of international production networks than is provided by the GCCs 
(Nelson and Pritchard 2009; Bair 2005). The framework permits questions about contemporary 
development issues that are not handled by previous paradigms, adequately forging macro-
micro links between processes in global, national, and local units of analysis (Gereffi et al. 
1994). Its pronounced interest in institutional and policy implications of chain research adds to 
the strengths (Bair 2005). Its compelling characteristics point to the possibilities of 
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understanding industry systems, opportunities and constraints for different actors and 
geographies. 
In the GVC literature, four key dimensions of value-chains are emphasised. First is spatial 
dispersion of production and distribution networks including enterprises 
(territoriality/geography). Second, is the sequence of value-adding activities and how they link 
to product, services and resources (input-output structure). Combined, the two descriptively 
map what is produced, consumed and where (Nelson and Pritchard 2009). Third, is power 
dynamics shaping financial, material and resource allocation and flow within a chain 
(governance). Fourth is multi-level norms, policies and regulatory practices that shape inter-
firm relationships, and how these influence firm configurations and outcomes (institutional 
context). Together, these two arguably causal and abstract ask: how is production and 
consumption organised and in what context? (Nelson and Pritchard 2009; Challies 2010). 
Depending on functional positions within value-chains, firms can shape who does what, at what 
price, based on which standards, and to which specifications, defining inter-firm relationships 
and institutional mechanisms for smallholder inclusion in supply chains (Gibbon and Ponte 
2005; Lee et al. 2012). This PhD draws on governance and institutional dynamics of the GVC 
by examining patterns of smallholder participation and how market channels impact local 
distribution of gains. It also considers how firms exert power and influence on industry 
structures, production requirements, terms and conditions for grower integration.   
The GVC’s major contribution lies in understanding how global processes interact with local 
dynamics within wider context of agriculture globalisation. Recent literature has begun to delve 
into the importance of local processes (horizontal networks), cultural and institutional 
dimensions (Bolwig et al. 2010). This PhD focuses on elements surrounding governance and 
institutional context as they relate to LaSAIs and expansion in NTAE commodities such as 
sugar at national level. Studies to date say little about how firms within LaSAIs set, measure 
and enforce parameters under which those on the primary production end operate (Lee et al. 
2012; Barret et al. 2012). This PhD considers power relationships within GVCs as they apply 
to national industry and local processes and how these shape rural development and welfare. 
Studies such as Bolwig et al. (2010) which have related history, social relations and 
environmental factors to value-chain restructuring, and to impacts on poverty are some of the 
studies that provide an important foundation to this study. However, the following section 
highlights how the vertical GVC framework can benefit from horizontal sustainable livelihood 
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approach, and how the latter might be combined with somewhat micro-level constructs (as 
middle ground) in order to enhance understanding on local livelihood changes.   
2.6.2 Negotiating macro and micro frameworks for analysing rural livelihoods in the era 
of LaSAIs   
Section 2.5 has shown that the connections between land and rural livelihoods are strong in the 
contemporary land-grabbing debate. It has shown how recent scholarly efforts have grappled 
to explain these processes by attempting to reformulate the Agrarian Question (Bernstein 2010, 
2006; McMichael 2009). As noted earlier, in the original proposal, Kautsky ([1899]1988) 
argues about how the peasantry under capitalism would become increasingly occupied with 
market dynamics, leading to a deepening social differentiation and intensified process of class 
formation. The politics of how incursion of capital into agrarian areas would produce capitalist 
social relations of new class relations and land is the central thrust of Kautsky’s articulation 
(Kautsky [1899]1988; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009; McMichael 2013). In resolving this 
problem, the argument is that the agrarian household class (the peasantry) would be 
disintegrated and differentiated, with emerging social arrangements recomposed to fittingly 
reflect the imperatives of capitalism. Whilst some peasants would become efficient producers, 
using land to upscale into capitalist farmers, others would be drawn into emerging capitalist 
agricultural sectors as wage labour (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009).  
Crucially, some of these relate to unequal access to agricultural land. However, as Pritchard et 
al. (2017) shows, the reality is more complex than this especially in the advent of LaSAIs and 
extensive livelihood diversification. Central to these shifts has been how the politics of land 
and politics of labour play out within the local context as vital livelihood assets, shaping who 
benefits or not (Bernstein 2006). The foregoing connects debates associated with the Agrarian 
Question as it relates to capitalist social relations, more broadly, and the household-scale 
framework of sustainable livelihoods analysis (SLA). Drawing from Bernstein (2010), the 
Agrarian Question lurches into four key dimensions:  
1. Who owns what, which points to social relations of property and ownership of 
livelihood assets and resources;  
2. Who does what, which relates to social divisions of labour such as those across gender. 
This also makes distinctions between those employing and employed;  
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3. Who gets what, which relates to social distribution of the product of labour. This points 
to questions of income and assets, patterns of accumulation over time which leads to 
processes of socil and economic differentiation, and;  
4. What do they do with it, which relates to reproduction of producers and non-producers 
– livelihood strategies and their consequences as patterns of consumption, soicl 
reproduction, savings and investments.   
In addition to these four dimensions, Scoones (2015) extends and adds another: how do social 
classes and groups in society and within the state interact with each other? To Scoones, this 
focuses on the “social relations, institutions and forms of domination in society and between 
citizens and the state as they affect livelihoods (p.82).” Combined, these questions provide not 
only the starting point for any livelihood study linked yo the agrarian political economy but 
also provides an opportunity for critical analysis of wider agrarian change dynamics.   
Contemporary debates have tended to explore the nature and character of these dynamics and 
interpretations in the face of intensified LaSAIs, asking how these processes operate in reality. 
Increasingly, broad agrarian questions around land and labour have been connected to 
household dynamics such as decision making through new approaches that seek to bridge 
macro-SLA-type analyses and micro approaches characterised as middle-ground. 
Recent developments in the field of critical agrarian studies have challenged these original 
formulations of the agrarian question and its application. Rather than being on the decline, 
evidence shows persistent smallholder farming despite reported disintegration and 
differentiation within rural landholding communities (Brookfield 2008). Studies allude this to 
how capitalism operates in uneven and indirect manner – the so-called subsumption thesis. 
Citing Bananji (1990), Prichard et al. (2017, p.43) argue that “the incursion of capitalist 
relations tends to occur via processes of formal subsumption, which is the provisioning of 
landholders with rural credit, farm supplies, etc., via contractual means that are nominally 
arm’s length from credit farm ownership.” This means intensified capitalist relations in rural 
economies will continue to make land as a physical livelihood asset central to rural 
communities. Thus, as McMichael (2012; 2013) and van der Ploeg (2010) note, the politics of 
the global south as they relate to globalisation and land-grabbing should be viewed in the 
context of land and labour dynamics. This view however is problematic in that it assumes 
widespread and outright dispossession of the peasantry across the global south. And as 
Bernstein (2006) notes, a focus on land has tended to divert attention away from political and 
43 
 
social struggles over labour, what he considers important asset for rural dwellers. Interesting, 
this view asserts rural dwellers are dynamic, and have varying engagements and reliance on 
agricultural production, with some suggestions rural livelihoods are becoming delinked from 
agriculture, and hence land – deagrarianisation as proposed by Bryceson (1996; 2000); Rigg 
(2006); and Ellis (2000). Recent debates have focused on social differentiation, class formation 
and rural livelihoods, with land remaining central to these processes (Hall et al. 2017; Pritchard 
et al. 2017).  
These broad brushstroke efforts can conceal emergent dynamics of rural social differentiation 
and class formation, and how they link to the politics of labour. As Pritchard et al. (2017, p.44) 
notes, “how do we unpack the problem of why some households can devise upward livelihood 
trajectories, while others remain mired in disadvantage and/or descend into more intense 
poverty?” A central concern of SLA is what comprises rural livelihood assets and how they 
matter for different households and circumstances (Pritchard et al. 2017). Rather than frame 
rural livelihood circumstances and activities in terms of the dynamics of capitalism – top-down 
formulaic of viewing rural development –  the SLA presents the subjectivities of rural social 
life as embedded and context-dependent realities about how poor people sustain their lives. 
This is important in this PhD in order to unveil rich knowledge about not only assets but also 
livelihood pathways for specific social groups, as opposed to concentrating on livelihood 
processes within the broad lens of the agrarian question.  
It is this view that opens possibilities for a middle ground conceptualisation: “the construction 
of frameworks in which dense and detailed narrative accounts of livelihood pathways are 
inductively worked into classifications that speak to microanalytical explanatory models” 
(Pritchard et al. 2017, p.45). Andrew Dorward’s simple tripartite schema of ‘hanging in,’ 
‘stepping up’ and ‘stepping out’ arguably offers an opportunity to classify the livelihood 
pathways of rural households into specific categories relevant in informing debates around 
deagrarianisation – bridging somewhat macroanalytical explanatory SLA-type models framed 
in terms of the dynamics of capitalism and microanalytical middle-ground approaches 
foregrounding processes of rural social differentiation. To Pritchard et al. (2017):  
“This is achieved through the analytical tactic of viewing households as possessing an 
initial bundles of assets, which households are assumed to deploy in particular ways in 
light of present circumstances and in preparation for future exigencies, and then, 
depending on the outcomes from these actions and events, households end up with a 
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differently shape asset bundle that in turn, positions them differently with regard to 
future livelihood landscapes” (p.45). 
This thesis delves into the role of land and labour under intensified LaSAI conditions in rural 
Zambia. It explores social categories and livelihood pathways as expressions of social 
differentiation. This horizontal integration of theoretical frameworks is important in this thesis 
in order to show how rural actors conceive future events, how they think these may turn out 
and what they in reality do – somewhat departing from the instrumentalist imperatives in 
traditional sustainable livelihood analyses. Here land is rendered fluid as a crucial part in rural 
livelihood transformation (Pritchard et al. 2017). I deploy these horizontal frameworks to 
illuminate vertical constructs, the GVC approach.  
2.7 Conclusion  
Addressing current debates on LaSAIs and understanding the national context within which 
investments play out and their association to local livelihoods requires holistic and multi-
disciplinary approaches that departs from a global focus. This is important in generating 
narratives that reflect, more fittingly, local smallholder land and labour relations, circumstances 
and experiences of LaSAIs. This background chapter revealed key research needs around 
investments, value-chain and development narratives important to inform debates on 
agricultural expansion and local development. It showed that perspectives on LaSAIs and 
smallholders are diverse and unpacking policy processes and institutions that drive national 
and sectoral chain configurations is difficult but crucial in understanding development and 
livelihood changes in local communities. Attention has particularly been drawn to the need to 
explore national policy and institutional processes that govern LaSAIs. This includes industry 
configurations and practices that determine inclusion and exclusion. Attention has also been 
drawn to the need to consider how interdependencies at macro and meso levels shape local 
livelihood dynamics across land and labour and welfare across structurally different outgrower 
arrangements. Recognition of how LaSAI and agribusiness power and influence shapes 
practices in national and industry context and their impacts on local outcomes has also been 
highlighted to inform smallholder-firm interactions, and sustainable local development. A 
multi-level and holistic understanding of LaSAIs and the way they play out within the same 
setting is thus important in providing empirical evidence that can inform and strengthen 
policies, institutions and investments for enhancing resource governance, local welfare, and a 
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more successful use of agriculture for development. A conceptual framework for this analysis 
is set out in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3 Research Design and Frameworks 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The overall objective and sub-research objectives of this research requires a research 
design and methological framework that can: explore how key policies and institutions 
shape LaSAIs within the national context, and what this means for industry governance 
processes and local development prospects; industry dynamics shaping stallholder 
integration in sugar value-chains; local livelihoods as they relate to how land and labour 
relations are implicated in sugar values chains and what this means for livelihood 
strategies, pathways, and rural social differentiation; and industry politics, power and 
institutions that govern and shape these processes. The previous chapter outlined the 
wider literature within which this analysis situates, pointing to theoretical and 
methodological elements, fittingly relevant to this study. This suggests multi-level and 
cross-scale integration of theoretical frameworks within a participatory perspective.  
This approach requires data to be collected at national level (in relation to policies and 
institutional processes governing LaSAIs); industry level (industry actors and processes 
shaping smallholder participation); at local level (in relation to livelihood dynamics); 
and across these levels combined (to explore agribusiness power dynamics). In this 
research design and framework chapter, the methodological approach of the research is 
explained, and justification given. The chapter introduces the design and methods 
employed to address the research aim, questions and objectives (Table 3.1). A 
description of the case study area and sites, participant selection, including data 
collection processes are also provided. The final part reflects on the composition of the 
research team, data organisation and analysis including aspects of positionality, ethical 
considerations, and limitations. 
47 
 
Table 3. 1: Summary of research objectives, questions, sample population and methods 
Objectives Guiding Questions  Level/Population   Methods 
1. To identify drivers and actors 
shaping large-scale agricultural 
investments in Zambia and the 
policy developments and 
institutional processes that 
govern them 
1.1 Who are the key actors shaping LaSAIs in Zambia? 
1.2 What are the specific trends, patterns and dynamics 
surrounding LaSAIs in Zambia?  
1.3 What are the specific policy developments and 
institutional processes driving LaSAIs in Zambia? 
National-level:  
1.1 National policy experts 
1.2 Bilateral and multilateral institutions 






2. To identify and explore 
industry and local factors 
affecting smallholder 
participation in sugar value-
chain as a livelihood 
enhancement strategy in rural 
Zambia 
2.1 How and under what terms do farmers participate in 
sugar production as a livelihood enhancement strategy in 
rural Zambia?  
2.2 What are the factors affecting smallholder engagement 
in sugar production in rural Zambia? 
2.3 How inclusive are sugar value-chains in Zambia? 
District/Community-level:  
a. District/sub-district (e.g. government 
departments, NGOs, private-sector 
players)  
b. Community (e.g. farmer groups)  






▪ Household surveys 
 
▪ Household case study 
interviews 
 
▪ Focus Group 
Discussions 
3. To explore how large-scale 
agricultural investments and 
value-chain in sugarcane 
contributes to and affect rural 
livelihoods in Zambia 
3.1 What are the household and community livelihood 
impacts associated with LaSAIs and participation in sugar 
value-chains in rural Zambia?    
3.2 What are the specific opportunities and barriers towards 
enhanced household and community livelihoods in sugar 
producing areas of rural Zambia?  
3.3 What response pathways do households pursue as a result 
of sugarcane uptake and expansion?  
District/Community-level:  
4.1 District/sub-district (e.g. government 
departments, NGOs, private-sector 
players)  
4.2 Community (e.g. farmer groups) 
4.3 Smallholders (e.g. cane and non-cane 
growing) 
4. To explore the current 
configuration of the sugar 
value-chain and how LaSAIs 
shape and influence governing 
processes in Zambia 
4.1 How has the agricultural sugar sub-sector developed and 
how are value-chains currently organised?  
4.2 Who are the key actors in sugar value-chains in Zambia? 
4.3 In what ways do LaSAIs shape and influence industry 
and local dynamics in Zambia?   
Sub-national level:  
4.1 National-level actors  
4.2 Sugar Sub-sector experts 








3.2 Conceptual Framework Development 
3.2.1 Global Value-Chain Framework and Sustainable Livelihoods Approach 
The GVC is an important framework for understanding national institutions, industry 
and firm-level dynamics (Section 2.3). Although criticised for insufficiently 
considering micro-level processes that shape livelihoods, its ability to provide a meso 
construct, institutional and organisational structure important in understanding terms 
and conditions under which smallholders integrated in the chains operate adds to its 
relevance for a study of this nature. In this research, national and industry institutions 
and practices and the input and production chain-side analysis were considered relevant 
in a multi-level analysis of links within Zambia. This allowed exploration of 
smallholder livelihood experiences, including national policy processes and institutions 
that shape sectoral/commodity dynamics. By recognising the importance of national 
and industry dynamics, the GVC illuminates livelihood possibilities and constraints at 
local level. The way value-chains are organised nationally, configured at industry level, 
coordinated and touch down to local levels has important consequences on 
opportunities and livelihood outcomes for smallholders (Lee et al. 2012; World Bank 
2010). Livelihood outcomes for smallholders cannot comprehensively be understood 
through an exclusive focus on institutional and organisational structures and interplay 
at national and industry levels. The livelihood approach is a micro-level constructs 
which brings horizontality to the study often lacking in the firm-centric GVC approach 
which is contrastingly enshrined in top-down analyses of lead firms (Hughes et al. 
2008) and around interstices and struggles of labour. 
A livelihood can be defined as “the capabilities, assets (material or social) and 
activities required for a means of living” (Scoones 1998, p.5). It is much more than just 
a set of activities undertaken to subsist or gain an income, and therefore 
multidimensional. A livelihood is sustainable when “it can cope with and recover from 
stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not 
undermining natural base” (ibidi.). Livelihood assets promote choices, but households 
combine assets in diverse activities (livelihood strategies) that shape outcomes (outputs 
of livelihood strategies). LaSAIs and related potential changes in natural resource 
access which might restrict livelihood activities can be considered a ‘shock’ for 
smallholders. As advanced in this study, SLA enabled analysis of how diverse factors 
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influence farmer’s strategies (Scoones 2000). Asking what, given context (e.g. policy, 
agro-ecological), combination of assets leads to what outcomes is important in 
understanding how asset availability, claims, access and utilisation are defined. Farmer 
responses to LaSAIs help assess investment overall impacts at local level. The 
assumption is that livelihood response pathways due to LaSAIs and sugarcane 
expansion highlight narrowing or diversifying livelihoods, the latter being desirable and 
resilient.  
The SLA has been criticised for being static with little ability to explain macro-
processes and structural shifts which bear on rural livelihoods (Scoones 2009; Challies 
and Murray 2011; O’Laughlin 2008). Driven by the need to add theoretical depth, and 
to depart from traditional application of the sustainable livelihood analyses that focus 
on rural assets and how they matter for different households and circumstances, this 
study incorporates elements of livelihood response pathways understood to arise from 
a combination of factors including: what a person/household has; what they can do with 
what they have; and how they think about what they have and can do. It includes 
resources they can command, what they think they can achieve with that (goals, needs), 
and the meaning they give to these goals (McGregor 2007).  
Driven by the proposition that people aspire to maintain their current welfare and 
advance it, the latter leading to efforts to expand existing activities or move into new 
ones, Dorward et al. (2009) introduced the concepts of “hanging in” (when assets are 
held and activities are engaged in order to maintain livelihood levels), “stepping up” 
(when current activities are engaged in, with investments in assets to expand these 
activities, in order to increase production and income), and “stepping out” (when 
existing activities are engaged in accumulating assets which can then provide a ‘launch 
pad’ for moving into different activities leading to higher and/or more stable returns). 
Thus, as Pritchard et al. (2017) allude to, I aim to build a framework that categorises 
households in terms of their classes/social positions and livelihood strategies/pathways 
– therefore expressing social differentiation via politics of land and labour and 
institutions – and explore the ways in which different assets are insinuated within these 
dynamics. In revealing diverse livelihood circumstances, aspirations and strategies 
related to household categories, this framework necessitates bridging micro and macro 
approaches, foregrounding processes of rural differentiation. With reference to LaSAIs 
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in sugarcane, examining temporal trajectories of livelihoods and outcomes allows a 
better understanding of assets as dynamic and as part of wider livelihood transformation 
(Pritchard et al. 2017).  
This study asks how LaSAIs and sugarcane contributes to local patterns of livelihoods, 
response pathways that consequently arise, and what new risks and vulnerabilities 
emerge for growers. Dynamic and diverse possibilities of household strategies related 
to social and institutional context also require empirical understanding of the wider 
factors – trends, hazards and seasonal aspects – beyond production spaces (Zoomers 
and Otsuki 2017).  This study draws on household strategies to illuminate livelihood 
pathways for different farmer categories as well as consider factors that shape 
vulnerabilities (i.e. trends, seasonality and trends) within a broader transforming 
structures and processes (i.e. institutions, policies) (Ellis 2000). In so doing, outcomes 
of LaSAIs and livelihoods are presented as dependent upon ability to benefit from 
resources, helping unpack relations between global investment commodity markets and 
local development – only from an actor perspective (De Haan and Zoomers 2003; 
Zoomers and Otsuki 2017). Smallholder’s roles, how they explore opportunities and 
cope with stress is important in understanding globalisation and local development 
realities, including challenges and vulnerabilities that come alongside sugarcane and 
configurations around resource control.  
Integrating livelihoods in the LaSAI debate permits dialogue into intra-household 
decisions and how they shape livelihood prospects (Zoomers and Otsuki 2017). The 
middle-ground perspective used in this study is relevant for incorporating individual, 
household and community lessons, and experiences, elements insufficiently covered in 
SLA-type microanalytical frameworks. 
3.2.2 Conceptual Application  
This study advances an understanding that livelihood assets can enhance livelihoods 
and present pathways through which households or communities cope with impacts of 
LaSAIs. At one level, households require assets to cope with impacts of LaSAIs. At 
another level, LaSAIs and VCD for sugarcane can enhance household asset 
endowment, affecting what a household can do – which in turn is shaped by value-chain 
organisation, institutional processes and dynamics of industry participation. However, 
where livelihood assets are available, they may not be accessible; where they are 
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accessible they might not be utilised; and where they are utilised, they may not lead to 
intra-household wellbeing and meaningful livelihood pathways. This affects what 
people think they can do with what they have within their market positioning (Murphy 
2012).  
As Figure 3.1 shows, whilst GVC adds verticality (e.g., value-chain opportunities, 
market dynamics, smallholder terms for participation as they relate to intermediaries, 
industry and institutional processes), the SLA (e.g., asset dynamics and responses) and 
the middle-ground perspectives enriches horizontal depth responses. While outcomes 
for LaSAIs are in part shaped by institutional and governance structures, i.e. chain 
dynamics, and livelihoods as they relate to asset availability, access and utilisation by 
firm practices (SLA), actual intra-household dynamics on diversification can greatly 
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Whilst chain analysis adds to the processes of integration at meso-level, the use of SLA helps 
add the horizontality that lacks in GVC analyses (Challies and Murray 2011). From this focus 
and in poverty analysis, social exclusion and adverse inclusion straddle in overlapping 
territories, which can be understood in relation to integration and market processes (Bernstein 
et al. 1992; Hickey and du Toit 2007). While ‘inclusion’ is important, the local context that 
shapes terms of localised producer participation or ‘exclusion’ are crucial in influencing 
opportunities and risks delivered via value-chains. These binaries can however limit analyses, 
raising the need to understand and explain the role played by intermediate chain governance 
structures that shape relations with growers. However, this conceptualisation is important in 
understanding intermediate chain governance structures, varied sets of behavioural responses 
(e.g. labour, consumption, production, and land-use patterns) and local people’s priorities and 
reasons why they choose to follow certain livelihood pathways.  
Research that looks at livelihood impacts of LaSAIs can greatly benefit from detailed empirical 
investigations that point to structural, commodity, institutional and organisational 
arrangements. While the GVC framework is employed for its usefulness in conceptualising 
sectoral governance dynamics, institutions and organisational arrangements that tend to 
integrate smallholders into sugar production in Zambia, the SLA on the other hand is employed 
to understand household implications of LaSAIs and value-chain development for sugar. By 
combining national policy and institutional processes, sub-sectoral farmer organisation and 
processes shaping participation and community livelihood dynamics, this study can be 
considered novel and emerges as one of the first studies to conceptually integrate disparate 
elements in empirical analysis of livelihood implications of LaSAIs.  
3.3 Case Study Research Design 
Livelihood impacts of LaSAIs can comprehensively be understood in their own setting and 
within their real-world context – a fitting feature for case study research (Yin 2014; Gerring 
2004). A case study is “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation 
of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its life context using multiple sources of 
evidence” (Robson 1993, p.146). Case studies are useful in asking the ‘what’ ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions pragmatically compatible with the investigatory framework (Yin 2009) (Section 3.2). 
A case study recognises that the phenomenon under investigation and the context might have 
unclear boundaries (Yin 2013). Negotiating this continuum to access real-time data on the way 
LaSAIs play-out is difficult. In this case, support from national level actors, interest in the 
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findings from sugar corporations and their intermediaries and local people’s availability and 
willingness to participate played an important role in gathering real-time and valuable data.  
One critique of case study approaches is that they cannot be deployed to generate generalisable 
results (Gerring 2007). This has been an issue in livelihood studies, with a resulting promotion 
of large sample, quantitative methods as alternatives (Tsang 2015). However, large-scale data 
on the impacts of LaSAIs such as advanced by Davis et al. (2014) often conceal essential 
elements such as the way certain impacts emerge, and the socio-economic, cultural and political 
processes that underpin them. In this study, the case study approach enables in-depth 
understanding of how LaSAIs play out at national level, and local perceptions of agribusiness 
expansion, experiences and impacts on local development and livelihoods – allowing 
comparisons between and within communities. Data validity is crucial in scientifical 
investigations. This connects both to the extent to which observations should be generalised to 
other settings (facilitating external validity); and local repreentations of various groups – a 
feature for qualitative data approaches – (facilitating internal validity) (Gibbert et al. 2008).  
This study adopted a four-stage case study strategy, allowing consideration of multiple 
elements and deep analysis. Study methods overlapped and cut across multiple research 
objectives as summarised in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Data collection processes and linkages 
The study concentrated on Mazabuka district as the area for fieldwork and two sugarcane 
communities as sites for data collection (Figure 3.3).  Southern province and Mazabuka have 
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been targeted for LaSAIs and have emerged top investment destination in Zambia (Sipangule 
and Lay 2015). Whilst placing value on participatory approaches and historical analyses, this 
design presented an opportunity for in depth investigation that produced rich and detailed 
information about lived livelihood experiences, justified through multi-level analyses and 
mixed methods.  
This design was based on the need for a quantifiable household asset profile and qualitative 
national, industry and local level experiences of LaSAIs and rural livelihoods (Johnson and 
Onwugbuzie 2004). Case studies provide flexibility of combining different data collection 
techniques and collection of deeper insights and evidence than can be achieved in a single 
methodological approach (Tsang 2014). The mixed method strategy involved collecting, 
analysing and interpreting quantitative and qualitative forms of data within the single study 
(Creswell 2003). Triangulating data sources was important in departing from mono-sided 
quantitative assessments of livelihood impacts of LaSAIs (Davis et al. 2014), allowing for an 
intense and rigorous analysis at local level. This four-stage mixed method data collection 
strategy collected qualitative data on one stage, and quantitative data at another and then 
reflecting on the former sequentially, allowing one form of data collection to feed into the other 
(Driscoll et al. 2007).     
3.3.1 Case Study Selection  
The past decade saw rapid expansion in sugarcane LaSAIs and in southern province of 




Figure 3.3: Zambia and main regions (Arc GIS 10.1). 
Specifically, the sugar industry is one important destination for foreign investments in the 
country particularly with the entry of Illovo Sugar Plc in 2001 which has led to an intensified 
financialisation and agribusiness expansion in Mazabuka, entrenching outgrower arrangements 
(Figure 3.4). The industry has at least doubled in (physical) sugar production within the last 
decade and continues to be relentless (Richardson et al. 2010). Sugar area increased from 
15,000ha in 2000 to 33,000ha in 2010 through to 41,695ha in 2016 (178% increase in area 
harvested for sugarcane) (FAOSTAT 2018). This has ignited debates about the merits of 
LaSAIs and outgrower schemes in Zambia. Mazabuka thus presents an opportunity to explore 
how an agribusiness with outgrower schemes shapes policy developments and influence 
industry governance as well as how livelihood dynamics play out.  
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Figure 3. 4: LaSAIs and sugarcane expansion in Zambia (interview data and 
ZaSPlc Annual Reports 2016; 2010)  
New powerful actors further necessitated the potential for sugarcane and bioethanol 
expansion. Three key characteristics of LaSAIs are true to the sugar industry in Zambia: 
1) the emergence of new types of investors, 2) large-scale and long-term land 
acquisitions, and 3) increasing land-use towards mono-culture farming for fungible 
crops used for biofuels such as biofuels (e.g. sugarcane) (Richardson et al. 2012; 
Richardson 2010). Institutional, legal and market opportunities for investments 
including plentiful land and water availability adds to this context (Watson 2011; Nolte 
2014). Integration of smallholders as sugarcane producers permits growers to tap into 
value-chain markets thereby necessitating a micro-level analysis of livelihood impacts 
and possible response pathways (Section 3.2).  
Study areas and sites were selected based on their integration into sugarcane value-
chain through different outgrower arrangements. This considered the presence of 
smallholder production within the same social-economic and environmental as well as 
local institutional and market context, highlighting smallholder-firm-industry 
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Firm       Direct production Outgrower production Production (MT)              Market share 
ZaSPlc  17,954   7,734       424,000                          92.5% 
Kafue Sugar 6,000                   Nil       30,000              7.2% 
58 
interactions. Thus, LaSAIs with outgrower schemes is the focus of this country-specific 
study.  
Most fieldwork concentrated in Mazabuka district in Southern province of Zambia 
(Figure 3.5). Mazabuka lies about 135 km from capital city Lusaka, with a population 
of about 261,907 (CSO 2010). The district is one of the poorest in Zambia (74%) whilst 
subsistence agriculture dominates (LCM 2012). Land-holding mixes private and 
customary land, the latter being dominant among rural dwellers and sugarcane growers. 
Mazabuka is dominated by the people of the Tonga tribe. Sugarcane schemes however 
exhibit a mixture of different tribes reflective of migration and past government policies 
on resettlement. Within the rural setting and in the sugarcane communities, dwellers 
are closely attached to traditions, customs and beliefs which affects production relations 
and asset ownership by gender. Land and property ownership is linked to marriage and 
the man. Female land and property holding is thus uncommon (Mizinga 1990) but with 
some exceptions in areas such as cattle production (Lubungu et al. 2015).  
Livestock production, dairy farming, alongside subsistence production in maize play 
an important role in rural livelihoods. Driven in part by cultural motivations, southern 
province holds the largest share of livestock in the country. According to Lubungu et 
al. (2015), over 50% of households in the province own cattle with the region ranking 
second highest percentage cattle share of productive assets by province among cattle 
owners of 60.8% (p.13). The share of the national distribution of cattle stood at 28.8% 
and 39.7% in 2001 and 2012 respectively, the highest in Zambia (Lubungu et al. 2015, 
p.12). Crucially, in matrilineal societies such as the Tongas, women frequently own 
cattle independently of their husbands. As a bulk crop which requires vast tracts of land, 
sugarcane expansion potentially affects herd sizes which discourages smallholders 
from converting livestock to cash as fall-back strategy. Sugarcane production also 
potentially affect household participation in subsistence production (e.g. maize) and 
cash crops (e.g. cotton and sunflower). Thus, the way LaSAIs and sugarcane production 
plays out within the regional setting is crucial in understanding livelihood dynamics 
and responses among rural dwellers.  
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Figure 3.5: Map showing location of the study area and the case study 
communities (ArcMap). 
The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, uncertainties in the post-apartheid South Africa 
and regional politics such as the land reforms of Zimbabwe saw Zambia witness 
massive investments in the post-2000. Dubbed the ‘Sweetest Town’ for being the 
largest sugar producing district in the country, Mazabuka produces about 93% of total 
national output (Table 3.2), under varying arrangements: estates (the largest proportion 
under one agricultural estate), independent commercial farmers, outgrower companies, 
and collectively by smallholders in outgrower schemes. This concentration of 
agriculture, sugar and value-chain activities in the district presents a fittingly relevant 
setting for exploring livelihood transformation because of LaSAIs among smallholders.   
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Zambia Sugar 17,025 7,734 424,000 92.5% Southern 
Kafue Sugar 6,000 Nil  30,000 7.2% Lusaka 
Kalungwishi 
Sugar 
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To ensure throughput and shaped by institutional arrangements, ZaSPlc connects to two 
key intermediary companies in the district – Kaleya Smallholder Company Limited and 
Nanga Farms. Control over intermediaries ensures transmission of production, markets 




Figure 3. 6 Institutional and organisation structure of sugar production in Mazabuka. Dotted upward arrows:product flow. Solid 
downward arrows: market signals, buyer/production specifications. Double arrows: influence and representation.  
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Key features instigating sugar expansion in Zambia include government’s objective to 
empower rural communities and transform agriculture. In addition, donors have been keen on 
sugar value-chain development for rural development. These processes have driven expansion 
in production and area harvested for sugarcane (Figure 3.7).  
 
Figure 3. 7 Sugarcane expansion in Zambia (FAOSTAT 2017). 
As Figure 3.7 shows, there has been limited spread of sugar value-chains in Zambia. Outgrower 
models have not been replicated elsewhere in other sugar-producing districts such as in Kafue 
and Kasama, presenting Mazabuka as the only site for analysing LaSAIs, sugar expansion and 
local livelihood experiences among smallholders (Table 3.3). 
3.4 Study Sites 
Table 3.3 shows that Mazabuka has three smallholder outgrower schemes: Kaleya, Magobbo 
and Manyonyo. To appreciate the institutional and production dynamics in the schemes, 
preliminary field assessment was undertaken during which a decision to focus on two projects 
was made. Manyonyo scheme was excluded because sugarcane production had only just 
commenced (2014 as its inaugural cane harvest) despite the scheme being initiated in 2009. 
However, I draw on the experiences of Manyonyo specifically to illuminate regional 











































































































































Table 3. 3: Outgrower schemes in Mazabuka linked to ZaSPlc.  










Operates via an integrated limited company (KaSCOL), which provides extension 
services to smallholders (e.g. inputs, managerial, marketing, commercial services 
etc). Farmers directly cultivate sugarcane on household plots whilst using an 
additional half-hectare for subsistence crop production. Farmers focus land 
preparation, irrigation, weeding, fertiliser application, etc. All land belongs to 




















Operating as Trust, Magobbo is a a block-farm which amalgamates individual 
farmer plots of land. Magobbo leases the block-farm to ZaSPlc’s subsidiary Nanga 
Farms Plc. Its formation responds to the European Commission’s 60% financing 
agreement, with the balance being covered by ZaSPlc as farmer loans. Nanga 
Farms runs a centralised system that allows parties to conduct joint activities such 
as bulk supply of production materials. Production and commercial aspects are all 
controlled by Nanga Farms and farmers receive a share of profits made on their 


















Manyonyo is considered a state project co-funded by the Finnish government and 
the African Development Bank. Manyonyo is a clustered scheme with multiple 
crops under consideration such as maize, bananas and other horticultural crops, 
but only sugarcane is currently grown. Here, farmers formed a farmer-based 
company (Manyonyo Irrigation Company), but all production/management 












This study focuses largely on Kaleya and Magobbo outgrower schemes under KaSCOL and 
Nanga Farms as management entities/intermediaries respectively (Figure 3.8). Diversity in 
production systems and tenure relations makes Kaleya and Magobbo interesting cases of 
inquiry. These two projects represent two main sugarcane growing communities in 
Mazabuka/Zambia, emerging under two-time periods and both in the rural setting. They offered 
organisationally different schemes: scheme management and lengths of operation, permitting 
generation of rich comparable data and insights from varying experiences. Given heterogeneity 
of rural households and farmers in Zambian and that being rural-based is not synonymous with 
being small-scale, the focus on outgrower schemes – that cultivate 4-6 ha on average – closely 
links to the definition of small-scale farmers (i.e. land aggregation) in Zambia, permitting the 
use of government representative data. Smallholders in Zambia broadly combine small-scale 
farmers – defined as cultivating less than 5 ha of land and emergent farmers cultivating 5-20 
hectares (Sitko and Jayne 2014). Selection of the two schemes necessitated investigations of 
livelihood experiences under varying institutional set-ups and production systems, allowing 
analyses of processes and dynamics under which livelihoods change and how they change in a 
more comprehensive manner.   
Kaleya and Magobbo share similar geographic, demographic and agricultural environment and 
are associated with similar traditional and cultural settings (as predominatly Tonga), including 
policy processes and institutional influences. They are also linked albeit variously to one 
buyer/processor, allowing for an enriched scope and experiences form the varying scheme 




Figure 3.8: Institutional structure and organisation of Kaleya and Magobbo sugar 
projects 
One key issue in smallholder outgrower schemes surrounds land ownership, access and 
utilisation arrangements and how it links to wider production system. The case study 
communities presented two sets of land ownerships. As highlighted in Table with 3.3, in 
Magobbo, the land for sugarcane production is communal – a contiguous block-farm of land 
title leased out to Nanga Farms. Farmers here are lessors, leasing land to ZaSPlc through Nanga 
Farms and receiving a share of proceeds. In Kaleya, the management company owns all the 
cane and dwelling land areas. As tenants, smallholders also pay a small fee as rent strictly under 
the cane farmers agreement with the scheme growing from 8 farmers in 1984 to 147 in 1987 
and 160 farmers currently. I return to specific outgrower arrangements in Chapter 5.   
KaSCOL is widely considered a pioneering example of smallholder engagement in sugarcane 
as a non-traditional agricultural export crop and smallholder empowerment in Zambia. The 
scheme had an international seal of approval as a Fairtrade Certified organisation till its 
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practices’ and how this compares with emerging schemes such as Maggobo. KaSCOL’s long 
establishment provided a rich context for analysing livelihood transformation from an 
organisation that emerged in a somewhat different policy and institutional context. Magobbo 
on the other hand provided an opportunity to explore livelihood transformation in a scheme 
that emerged in the era of land-grabbing, driven by the corporation and shaped by an unrelated 
scheme management structure and strategy. 
Sugarcane growers in Mazabuka are vertically integrated, centrally located between upstream 
and downstream nodes in the value-chain. The former relates to the “vertical” interaction 
between growers, intermediaries and the processor while the latter points to interactions and 
relationships “horizontally” within grower associations and committees (Figure 3.6). 
The Selection of Magobbo allowed access to non-sugarcane cane growers within a 3-5-
kilometre radius, in and around the scheme. Non-cane growers were important in exploring 
varying poverty dynamics, livelihood pathways and actual barriers to entry in sugar value-
chains, and particularly that there can necessarily be no ‘goodness in inclusion’ where the terms 
for participation are disempowering (McCarthy 2010). By contrasting views, opinions and 
experiences of cane and non-cane growers, the study provides a comprehensive analysis of 
livelihoods and poverty pathways facing rural households. A key claim here is that not all 
community members necessarily benefit from expansion of sugar, both amongst those 
households integrated in the sugar chain and those who are not (Vicol 2017; McCarthy 2010).  
3.4.1 Research Team  
The need to oscillate between national level interviews on the one hand and district and 
community data collection on the other required that I engage research assistants. Availability 
and access to additional funding for fieldwork from the University of Zambia allowed me to 
employ five assistants, combining national and district level assistants.  To recruit assistants, I 
drew on contacts at University of Zambia – where I previously worked – to recommend 
potential researchers, and my own contacts from previous work with Rural-net Associates (a 
local NGO) and Institute of Development Studies (IDS). I was able to select from a pool of 
potential assistants with previous knowledge in research and within our case study province 
and district, which allowed me to immediately obviate cultural and language barriers. 
A combination of 2 males and 3 females were engaged. One female and two male recruits were 
national research assistants from Lusaka and of the Tonga tribe. These were recruited from the 
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University of Zambia having completed their undergraduate programs in education, humanities 
and social sciences with one an MA student. Theoretical background in research enabled 
assistants to participate in national interviews alongside the principal investigator as well as 
being involved in multi-level data collection that requires a balanced team with varying 
research strengths. These were familiar with complex and dynamic nature of interview 
processes that require quick judgement and probing skills on the part of researchers. The 
balance two assistants were female district assistants from southern province. One had 
background in Social Work (Diploma) and had worked with me on a RuralNet and IDS project. 
The other was a Masters student at UNZA with education background and based in Mazabuka. 
These were familiar with the local language, culture and traditional values and knowledge 
about research in rural settings. They were important in negotiating access to district 
stakeholders including chiefs. Training was conducted to generate a common understanding of 
aims of the research, ensure consistency as well as cover ethical consideration.        
3.4.2 Identification of Participants 
Selection of participants was largely purposive with an aim of incorporating as many 
stakeholders as possible at nodes closer to the production space – where impacts of sugarcane 
expansion are felt most (Richardson 2010). Given the materiality of sugarcane which leads to 
concentration of production and processing activities within local geographical areas, it was 
expected that important nodes for analysis would be located either in the capital city Lusaka or 
Mazabuka district.  
First, a comprehensive review of literature was conducted around LaSAIs, value-chains and 
livelihoods in Zambia. This helped define axes and background to the study as well as draw an 
initial stakeholder list. An internet search was also important for selecting policy and strategic 
documents. The preliminary stakeholder list enabled a visit to Zambia between June and July 
2015 for scoping (Section 3.4.1). Scoping activities strengthened data collection tools as well 
as helped appreciate the context under which LaSAIs and sugarcane expansion took place. 
Preliminary interviews were conducted with national-level actors including government 
departments, NGOs, donors and research think-tanks. Interviews also involved sugar industry 
experts and consultants including sugar companies.  
District level activities on the other hand focused on development issues among government, 
NGOs and private sector actors, including relationships with the sugar agribusiness. At sub-
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district level, interviews with sugar companies, and key local people such as scheme leaders, 
initial interviews and group discussions were conducted in selected communities (Section 3.4). 
Qualitative household interviews and surveys were also conducted to appreciate the quality 
and sort of data the study tools were capturing in relation to the research aims and purpose.  
In conducting these activities, other relevant stakeholders were identified through snowballing. 
This enabled identification of previously unknown actors. In some cases, some stakeholders 
appeared less relevant and were immediately dropped/replaced. While the snowball technique 
was important, such recommendations helped build trust with potential interviewees thereby 
enhancing quality responses (Chohen and Ariali 2011). This feature particularly proved helpful 
in sugarcane communities where farmers operating under an intermediary company and under 
tight sugarcane agreements (Section 5.5.5) became more willing to participate in the study due 
to prior communication from the company or scheme leaders. Recommendations from 
intermediary officers helped farmers to be at ease with the researchers, enabling cooperation. 
This enabled the study to draw on diverse and multi-level actors thereby enriching the quality 
of data.         
3.5 Data Collection and Methods  
Collection of empirical data started with preliminary assessments (June-July 2015) followed 
by the main fieldwork (November 2015 to March 2016). However, beyond this period, data 
collection extended with phone interviews and emails where the need for clarification and 
additional insights was required. Semi-structured interviews and policy analysis were 
conducted at national and industry level in relation to research objectives 1 and 4 while district 
and sub-district approaches pointed to household surveys, interviews and participatory 
methods in relation to objectives 2 and 3. In what follows, processes of data collection are 
detailed.    
3.5.1 Stage I: Preliminary Assessments  
a. Policy analysis and Expert Interviews 
Preliminary analysis of over 20 policy documents and expert interviews were conducted to 
appreciate the broader study context. Selection of policy documents and preliminary analysis 
emerged from a scoping exercise to identify key stakeholders, ascertain priority areas as well 
as elicit stakeholder views on the key policies and strategies shaping LaSAIs and sugarcane 
expansion. Stakeholders helped filter the preliminary list of documents to 12 on which policy 
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analysis was conducted. Expert interviews considered opinions and insights on the influence 
of policies on LaSAIs, coordination and collaborations among state institutions. Different 
opinions from different experts enabled an initial understanding of policy dynamics around 
LaSAIs, relevant actors as well as practices (Objective 1).  
b. Social and Resource Mapping 
Social and resource mapping drew on an understanding that local people possess rich 
knowledge about their surrounding and ways of life as opposed to outsiders. Social and 
resource maps were created with selected community and scheme leaders familiar with 
sugarcane growing areas (Rocheleau 1995). These considered social structures and institutions 
local people drew on in support of their livelihoods, highlighting whether these were new or 
had changed with LaSAIs. Maps presented initial community conceptualisation of livelihood 
resources (e.g. natural capital), spatial locations, availability, distribution, access and utilisation 
within communities; and existing relationships (e.g. how different groups exert power 
influences and implications). Social and resource maps also provided understanding into the 
study area, participants, priorities and thought processes (Mascarenhas and Kumar 1991). 
c. Exploratory Household Questionnaires   
To check timing, clarity of questions and their relevance to research objectives 2 and 3, 
exploratory questionnaires were piloted in 6 purposively selected households – 2 non-cane 
growers and 2 sugarcane growers in Magobbo and 2 in sugarcane growing households in 
Kaleya. Exploratory questionnaires helped establish initial asset and livelihood profiles for 
households as well as refine the list of assets. The questionnaire was designed to ensure that 
data were collected on household characteristics, composition and knowledge and experiences 
in sugarcane production or otherwise. Questionnaires covered food and income sources as well 
as challenges and coping strategies for households. Combining open and closed questions 
enabled a balance between statistical data on livelihood assets and household experiences in 
sugarcane businesses. The latter allowed for inclusion of previously less but relevant issues 
(Robinson 2014).  
Piloting questionnaires between June and July 2015 – a period when farmers were harvesting 
sugarcane – guaranteed their availability. Any adult member of the family could complete the 
questionnaire together with the research team although this was always the head of the 
household with any other person present, ensuring reliability of the responses. The research 
team was introduced by either a farmer association representative (as was the case in Kaleya) 
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or a committee representative (as was the case in Magobbo) providing initial entry into farmer’s 
households. Questionnaires were introduced to respondents by explaining in local language 
that the study involved asking questions about their way of life as sugarcane producers. 
Respondents were informed that the study was interested in understanding how sugarcane 
production and agribusiness expansion in the area contributed to the household well-being.  
Questionnaires were for various reasons not translated to Tonga. Some of this related to the 
research team’s familiarity with local culture and language (Section 3.7), resource and time 
constraints. Pre-study training and daily de-briefings allowed for consistency in probes and 
capturing of the data. Daily de-briefings reduced discrepancies and interpretations in data 
collection, enhancing coherence and consistence in the field. District research assistants had 
good knowledge of sugarcane communities and production allowing for an understanding of 
complex issues within the field. Proximity to two communities allowed the principal 
investigator to fluctuate between the two communities, ensuring control and quality in data 
collection particularly on household questionnaires.  
Interviews were held anywhere the respondent felt comfortable, e.g., sitting on the floor, on 
chairs offered by households, farmer offices (in Kaleya) or whilst respondents proceeded with 
their daily chores (Field Photo 3.1).  
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Figure 3.9: Research assistant conducting household interviews in Kaleya (2016). 
3.5.2 Stage II Data Collection   
Objective 1: To identify drivers and actors surrounding large-scale agricultural investments in 
Zambia and the policy and institutional processes that govern them. 
Objective 4: To explore the current configuration of the sugar value-chain and how LaSAIs 
shape and influence governing processes in Zambia. 
Collection of data at national level focused on broader drivers, institutional governance and co-
ordination issues surrounding LaSAIs on the other one hand, and the current configuration of 
the sugar value-chain on the other. Objective 1 required data to be gathered on broader policy 
and institutional processes that drive LaSAIs in Zambia. Objective 4 required data on 
perceptions of how LaSAIs deploy their power to shape and influence governance processes 
and industry practices in Zambia. It further required data on key actors shaping LaSAIs, sector, 
firm practices and how these are defined and their influence on local livelihoods and rural 
development. Assessment of these elements combined policy analysis and multi-level semi-
structured key informant interviews as outlined in the following sections. 
a. Policy Analysis  
This study analysed selected policy and strategic documents, considering how LaSAIs were 
covered in government documents. A total of 12 national policies and strategies were 
purposively selected and analysed for content including national economic development plans 
as outlined in Table 3.4. National economic development plans helped understand the country’s 
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current and future direction and how these implicate LaSAIs, land and water resources for 
agricultural expansion. Next, qualitative coding, manually and then using NVivo, enabled 
examination of dominant narratives in each document and the identification and categorisation 
of key drivers of LaSAIs in Zambia (Bazeley 2007). This involved drawing a comprehensive 
list of key themes and headings during reading stage, collapsing similar/overlapping headings 
into tight categories (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Analysis involved examining dominant 
narratives in the documents, highlighting emphasised, less emphasised or missing aspects. 
Analysis paid attention to content, isolating enhancing or constraining factors to LaSAIs 
(Cresswell 1998). Through an inductive grounded theory, stressors and policy shifts and 
implications for LaSAIs were examined within the national context (Strauss and Corbin 1990). 
Identification of emphasised, less emphasised or side-stepped aspects, by whom and why 
formed the core part of policy analysis.  
Table 3.4: Key policy documentation  
Document  Description 
Vision 2030 (V2030)  Long-term development plan 
National Agricultural Policy (NAP)   Agricultural policy   
National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) – 2014-2018  Investment plan 
Strategy for Industrialisation and Job Creation (IS)  Industrialisation strategy  
National Irrigation Policy and Strategy (NIPS)  Irrigation policy/strategy 
Fifth National Development Plan (5thNDP)  Development plan 
National Energy Policy (NEP)  Energy policy 
National Water Policy (NWP)  Water policy 
Sixth National Development Plan (6thNDP)  Development plan 
Revised Sixth National Development Plan (R6thNDP)  Development plan 
National Resettlement Policy (NRP)  Resettlement policy 
Seventh National Development Plan (7thNDP)  Development plan 
    
b. Semi-structured Interviews 
Interviews across different sectors and governance scales were conducted with policy and 
development actors (n=57) (Table 3.5). As expert source of information, interviews helped 
contextualise the study and answer questions related to LaSAI drivers, patterns and processes 
that govern these elements. Interviews considered sugar value-chain expansion, industry 
practices, agribusiness power and influence and how they shape prospects for national and local 
development (Marshall 1996). An initial comprehensive review of public and NGO documents 
and preliminary interviews allowed for selection of key stakeholders. Based on this initial list 
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and combined with a snowballing technique, the study deployed purposive sampling, allowing 
for identification of “cases of interest from people who know people who know people who 
know what cases are information-rich” (Patton 1990, p.175). In practice, an interview guide 
was used, enabling flexibility and coverage of wide-ranging topics taking the form of 
discussions. The interviewer guided the direction of the topics within wider research obecjtives 
1 and 4 (Babbie and Mouton 2001).  
Table 3.5: Summary of semi-structured expert interviews 




Various government departments and agencies (e.g. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Energy, Lands and Natural 





Multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and Africa 
Development Bank and bilateral agencies such as the 
Finnish Mission  
4 
Academics, research 
think tanks and 
industry experts 
Researchers from local research organisations (e.g. 
IAPRI and Musika) and universities (e.g. UNZA) in 





Local and international NGOs working agriculture, 
sugar sub-sector and other broad issues such as natural 




National and industry farmer membership organisations  2 
District and sub-
district interviews  
Various government departments, including NGOs, 





companies and service 
providers 






Interviews further investigated policy implementation and practice to understand actors, 
policies and potential implications, including which policy levers were in place, prioritized or, 
neglected and why. Interviews considered actors involved in LaSAIs, national drivers, trends 
and patterns as well as coordination and governance elements in foreign investments. 
Interviews were also relevant in scene setting and locating key actors with initial probes 
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developed around: policy processes and institutional coordination of LaSAIs, key players and 
firm practices and how these are defined to influence local development. At the meso-level, 
interviews concentrated on how the dominant agribusiness deployed its power and influence 
to shape national policies, industry practices and local development including smallholder-firm 
interaction.   
Interviews were conducted in English except for sub-district level interviews, which used 
Tonga and Nyanja. Given unwillingness to have discussions recorded, interviews were mainly 
documented using handwritten notes except on a few occasions in which these were recorded 
and transcribed.   
3.5.3: Stage III Data Collection  
Objective 2: To identify and explore industry and local factors affecting smallholder 
participation in sugar value-chain as a livelihood enhancement strategy in rural Zambia 
Objective 3: To explore how large-scale agricultural investments and value-chain expansion in 
sugarcane contributes and affect rural livelihoods in Zambia 
a. Household Questionnaire Surveys  
Objectives 2 and 3 required quantifiable household data on asset and livelihood profile as well 
as insights on smallholder-firm interaction and integration into sugar value-chains. The 
sampling frame was all sugarcane growing households in Kaleya (160) and Magobbo (80). 
Questionnaires also considered farmer livelihood experiences and possibilities. Questions 
considered crop production, diversification, asset acquisition, farming patterns and marketing 
including land access and utilisation. Apart from historical aspects of farmer experiences, 
specific data as they relate to net incomes, land access and utilisation as well as production 
dynamics as reported by households focused on the past three seasons (2014-2016). This 
related to availability of farmer records (e.g. tonnes of sugarcane ouput) and recall period for 
elements such as commodity prices, hazards, shocks and trends (Objective 3). Flexibility in the 
questionnaire allowed for probes around smallholder-firm interactions, factors affecting 
grower integration in sugar value-chains as well as terms and condition for this participation 
(Objective 2). Within wider experiences, these processes involved exploring which processes 
of participation were emphasied, by whom, how and why.  
Questionnaires provided an effective approach to tease out household asset and wealth 
endowment. Questionnaires collected quantifiable demographic, crop and land-use as well as 
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farming pattern data. This included crop diversity, income sources, coping strategies as well as 
food and labour availability. Understanding the meaning of questions in questionnaire surveys 
is difficult especially for the rural population (Bourai et al. 1997). Some of the challenges 
related to low levels of education making it difficult to converse or read in English. However, 
all questionnaires were administered by the researchers in face-to-face interviews. This 
provided opportunities for probes, cross-checks and validation of survey responses 
(Denscombe 2010; Bourai et al. 1997).  
Questionnaires were also administered to non-cane growers in Magobbo (n=30) to understand 
dynamics of exclusion as well as livelihood patterns among those excluded from sugar value-
chains. Magobbo was the only community where non-cane growers were accessible within 3-
5-kilometre radius deployed in this study.  Non- cane growers were further away in Kaleya of 
distances between 8-10 kilometres, raising logistics and resource challenges. Questions for 
instance included livelihood portfolio and impacts of agribusiness presence in the area on 
livelihood activities, opportunities and challenges related to sugarcane expansion in the region. 
After completing all the questionnaires (n=80 in Kaleya; n=70 in Magobbo; and n=30 non-
cane growers in Magobbo), a preliminary analysis was undertaken to feed into household 
interviews and community participatory approaches. Research probing and a focus on accurate 
responses meant that some questionnaires went beyond planned 50 minutes averaging 60 
minutes. Preliminary survey analysis during fieldwork meant that household questionnaires 
provided a crucial launch pad for subsequent national level round two interviews and most 
importantly sub-district participatory data collection. It allowed initial insights from the 
questionnaires to build into subsequent qualitative data collection processes. Preliminary 
analyses considered households’ views and experiences of LaSAIs, markets and purchasing 
arrangements, governance elements, and participation in sugar value-chains – key elements for 
focus group discussions.  
b. Qualitative Household Interviews 
The second main district and sub-district field visit focused on qualitative data collection. To 
capture various categories of households for the qualitative household interviews, households 
were stratified by locally defined wealth categories. A participatory wealth ranking was 
conducted with community and association/committee leaders and key persons to generate a 
deeper understanding of farmer livelihood characteristics as well as to contribute to the 
selection of household interview participants. Entrusting local people to categorise and assign 
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households this way ensured accuracy in the local descriptions of wealth and what it means to 
live well or to be poor (Hill 1986). 
Three household categories emerged from the participatory wealth ranking: ‘poor,’ ‘medium,’ 
and ‘better-off’, forming the basis for cluster analyses. The procedure for selecting 12 
households for household interviews was guided by the desire to use the sample as a vehicle to 
purposively selecte a range of households that exhibit diverse livelihood circumstances and 
potential strategies/pathways. In both sugarcane communities, scheme leaders and key local 
people identified during preliminary assessment (n=6-8), were asked to categorise households 
in the scheme, and then assign these to locally acceptable codes and descriptions of wealth. 
During scoping, I asked respondents (in group discussions) what it meant to live well and then 
noting key characteristics for wellbeing. Based on this preliminary list, the research team 
together with local particpants developed criteria for assigning households into wealth 
categories, which included asset ownership, access to schools and health services, livestock, 
land and ownership of businesses, perceived levels of debt and savings (Appendix 6.6). These 
further formed the basis for analysing livelihood pathways for different category households. 
Two households were randomly selected from each cluster, with more being added where the 
need for collaborative evidence and clarity on certain issues became necessary. This ensured 
collection of precise and statistically robust descriptions of the wider population (Babbie 2005). 
Interviews followed oral histories which delved into livelihood decisions and opportunities, 
interrogating references to land and labour relations and other assets as they relate to a 
household means of earning a living. 
One outcome was collection of rich and comparable household data not only around livelihoods 
and livelihood response pathways but also sensitive elements such as expenditure decisions on 
acquisition of assets, offering a greater understanding in Objectives 3 and 4. At least 14 
households were incorporated in household interviews: Kaleya (n=6); Magobbo (n=6); 
including purposively selected non-cane growing households in Magobbo (n=2). Preliminary 
analyses of household interviews built into participatory approaches, allowing room for debate 
and clarification of emerging narratives.             
c. Participatory Approaches 
Participatory discussions aimed to present as much as possible how many respondents referred 
to what issue to add to the local importance and consideration of issues. This allowed the 
discussion to remain in the qualitative domain, maintaining local interpretations and narratives 
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of events and experiences. As outlined below, this considered focus group meetings and 
transect walks.  
❖ Focus Group Meetings  
A focus group involves the “use of in-depth group interviews in which participants are selected 
because they are a purposive, although not necessarily representative, sampling of a specific 
population, this group being ‘focused’ on a given topic” (Rabiee 2004, p655). Focus group 
discussions explored wide-ranging issues around inclusion and exclusion in sugarcane 
production (Objective 2), livelihoods and pathways (Objective 3). Using topic guides, focus 
groups discussed historical perspectives (e.g. instigating factors), drivers to sugarcane adoption 
and experiences on livelihood as well as scheme governance and management (Appendix 5). 
Discussions focused on wider community issues and most importantly on oral histories, 
constructing timelines of events which led to the adoption of sugarcane and the sort of crops 
and livelihood practices before sugarcane. Facilitation and probes ensured that all participants 
were encouraged to speak during discussions. Discussions also acted as ice-breakers, helping 
to deal with power and cultural barriers among participants and with the research team (Binns 
et al. 1997). Giving participants (n=6-8) an opportunity to discuss issues among themselves in 
their local language ensured clarity and collaboration of evidence (Kitzinger and Barbour 
1999). Group meetings enabled clarification on issues raised in household questionnaire 
surveys and interviews, permitting collection of rich background data. Whereas non-cane 
growing farmers explored factors behind non-participation (barriers to entry) and wider 
impacts of LaSAIs and sugarcane expansion, cane growers focused on experiences of 
sugarcane production, including patterns and gains of participation. Dynamics of participation 
included production dynamics, market and price mechanisms as they relate to smallholder-firm 
interaction. 
The use of FGDs as a follow-up to surveys generated understanding of emerging issues from 
surveys, highlighting underlying local explanations on specific livelihood elements, inclusion 
and exclusion. In answering the ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions, FGDs presented value for 
triangulation (Lambert and Loiselle 2007). Discussions started out with a question and answer 
session and then breaking into participatory activities. Questions for discussion focused on 
factors affecting smallholder engagement in sugar production, actors and relationships. 
Questions also focused on livelihood impacts of LaSAIs as well as views and opinions on 
opportunities and barriers towards enhanced livelihoods and smallholder participation in sugar 
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production. Group meetings further explored local organisational forms and what this meant 
for smallholder participation such as scheme management styles, patterns of incorporation and 
market arrangements. This included smallholder motivations and what growers had to do or 
enter to gain participation (e.g. eligibility, requirements) including determination spaces (e.g. 
grievance mechanisms). Participants were purposively selected based on participation or non-
participation in sugarcane production, gender, age, social standing etc. (Table 3.6).  
Table 3.6: Summary focus group meetings 
Participants  Community  Community  
Group discussion Kaleya Magobbo  
Combined key community leaders/persons 1 1 
Scheme representatives  1 1 
Women  1 1 
Youths 1 1 
Non-cane growers 0 1 
Total  n=4 n=5 
 
Separating group meetings as shown in Table 3.6 proved effective in collecting sensitive cluster 
specific data, difficult to obtain in combined group discussions. This presented an opportunity 
to discuss varying group perceptions and views around inclusion/exclusion and livelihoods, 
enabling clarity and tapping into local insights and knowledge. However, power relations in 
participatory approaches are complex. An absence of a coherent theory of participation that 
seeks to explain and articulate the role of agency within development processes means that 
participation maybe be deployed to achieve the objectives of the project, as opposed to 
strengthening and building consciousness of participants thereby being mechanistic (Penderis 
2012). Integrating and harnessing local knowledge into policy may not be widespread (Stringer 
and Reed 2006). Methodological and conceptual concerns by various commentators point to 
dangers of unquestioningly accepting local knowledge leading to failure to appreciate the 
multi-faceted nature of challenges (Reed et al. 2007). In some instances, this has been cited to 
reinforce “existing privileges and group dynamics which discourages minority perspectives 
from being expressed,” leading to unverified local assumptions (Reed et al. 2007, p250). Where 
powerful participants dominated discussions, the research team encouraged the passive 
members to make contributions by soliciting their opinions directly thereby widening 
perspectives and collaboration in evidence (Kothari and Cooke 2001). Participants frequently 
diverted from the topic, mostly focusing on sugarcane markets, challenges of pricing and costs 
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of production. The research team reminded the participants about the key issues under 
discussions and promised to return to what they felt was pressing towards the end of the 
discussions where time allowed. Group discussions were recorded through note taking and 
were textual. Recorded discussions were transcribed and typed for analysis.  
❖ Transect Walks 
Focus groups were preceded by transect walks through sugarcane fields and wider community. 
Transect walks were conducted with scheme leaders together with key local persons in 
communities as participants to group discussions and having prior understanding of the nature 
of the research project. The walks helped develop an understanding of local communities as 
sugarcane production areas on one hand and as spaces where smallholder livelihoods (farming, 
access to natural capital) are negotiated. Rather than being passively observational (Ahmed et 
al. 2008), walks were deployed to generate discussions around observations with local persons 
and talking to whoever we met and had time to talk to us (Chambers 1997). In household 
interviews, this included exploring the land surrounding participating households and its use 
(e.g. presence of fruit trees, gardens or major land investments). Walks allowed the researchers 
to tour wider community areas whilst observing, listening to local explanations and asking key 
questions about anything of interest including issues surrounding land, water and local ways 
of life (Figure 3.10).  
 
Figure 3.10: A sugarcane grower explains how land was converted to sugarcane and 
how farmers dealt with memories of graveyards (Magobbo 2015). 
The walks were important in understanding community location and distribution of resources, 
features and land-uses in relation to different social groups (Chambers 1997). Transect walks 
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provided a quick way of gaining insights into sugarcane communities, local livelihood situation 
and socioeconomic conditions for smallholders (Figure 3.11).  
 
Figure 3.11: A young boy from cutting grass to feed cattle. Sugarcane fields restricts 
livestock movements (Magobbo 2015).   
Regarding sugarcane, transect walks enabled understanding of production dynamics (e.g. water 
sources, land, input supply etc.). In relation to livelihoods, walks enabled insights into crop 
diversity, access to natural capital, areas and spatial locations of sugarcane fields in relation to 
households and their production. Combined, walks were useful in gaining understanding of the 
wider livelihoods and vulnerability context whilst acting as icebreaker (Chambers 1997). 
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Figure 3.12: Checking harvested sugarcane in Magobbo (2015). 
That sugarcane is a bulk crop and high land user, it was expected that knowing the complete 
study area would involve covering long distances. An open van was used to traverse a cross 
section of the study communities, stopping whenever a discussion ensued whilst some areas 
were covered on foot (Figure 3.11). Walks raised key issues around sugarcane production and 
local livelihoods particularly that they were conducted during sugarcane harvest period (June-
July). The group walks also reflected on the ease of local way of life in relation to sugarcane 
expansion, enabling corroborative evidence with other sources. For instance, this allowed 
cross-checks such as on land and land-use emerging from questionnaires whilst providing 
valuable topics of further group discussions. 
d. District and sub-District Interviews  
At district level, interviews considered wider development opportunities and challenges as they 
relate to regional planning. Participants included government departments, NGOs, businesses 
actors, input suppliers to sugarcane companies including district sugar related associations 
(Table 3.2). The study focused on district and regional development impacts of LaSAIs and 
wider business relationships. Some of these included regional planning, resource dynamics 
(land and water) and wider poverty reduction impacts. Interviews also considered how the 
presence of an agribusiness, its power and influence shaped capacity in local authorities and 
impacted prospects for local and regional development. At sub-district level, interviews 
considered the way sugarcane expansion plays out at local scales, pointing to resource use and 
management, livelihoods and pathways. These included wider social impacts in health, 
education, infrastructure and market mechanisms.  Participants included local teachers, 
traditional leaders and key community persons (Table 3.2).    
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3.6 Data Organisation and Analysis 
Choices of data organisation and analysis were mainly influenced by the desire to retain depth 
in the original data, permitting themes to emerge from the data itself in a more grounded 
manner (Thomas 2006; Starks and Trinidad 2007). Various approaches were used in data 
collection, organisation and analyses (Figure 3.13).  
 
Figure 3.13: Data organisation and approaches to analysis  
The approach to data organisation and thematic analyses was hierarchical, connecting national 
LaSAIs trends and patterns to sugarcane industry practices and to district and sub-district agro-
industry transformation and livelihoods (Saunders et al. 2012). Organising data and connecting 
themes this way allowed new themes to emerge whilst collapsing less relevant ones but 
adapting to the broader research objectives. One key motivation about this approach to 
organising data was flexibility, permitting concepts grounded within the data to speak for 
themselves (Bowen 2006). A focus on specific set of questions within the study design (Section 
3.2) meant making a crucial decision about what sort of data was applicable and relevant to the 
study. Multi-level themes were not self-contained. Findings at one level were deployed 
elsewhere to enhance findings and conclusions. The study focused on local constructions of 
knowledge, what the respondents said they do, how and why, drawing on quotes as much as 
possible. The centrality of this approach pointed to “how do people make sense of what 
happened” (Bryman 2004, p.412).  
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Qualitative data analysis started during fieldwork, documenting recurring elements and why. 
An important feature for consideration in qualitative analysis was how to present local 
constructs of social processes and accounts of livelihood changes and experiences within their 
local grounded setting. Debriefings allowed the research team to reflect on the texts, narratives 
and field observations. Initial data analyses did not only inform further data collection but also 
reduced duplications, inconsistencies and misinterpretations (Chiovitti and Piran 2003).  
Qualitative data was organised and analysed manually and then entered into the qualitative data 
analysis Software NVivo 10 for additional scrutiny, interrogation, links and comparative 
patterns (Wash 2003; Welsh 2002). Interview and FGD notes were manually cleaned, reviewed 
and thematically coded, paying attention to links to study questions, and emerging meaningful 
categories. In identifying specific textual links and meanings emerging in relation to each 
question, analysis ensured that accounts of themes and their constructs reflected diverse local 
narratives and settings. Attempts were made to ground analysis in community and household 
perspectives on participation or non-participation, livelihood responses, asset dynamics and 
how changes in these domains affected relationships.  
Group discussions, calendars (e.g. food, income, labour and cropping), rankings and other 
community data were manipulated manually and through NVivo where possible to create 
summaries and matrices, allowing comparisons and relationships. Household surveys on the 
other hand were analysed using SPSS 16 but focusing largely on asset profile, crop and land-
use dynamics. A focus on quantifiable household attributes such as income, land-use, coping 
strategies and asset profiles meant that responses (both closed and open) were coded in such a 
way as to limit sets of attributes around a variable (Babbie and Mouton 2001). Frequency and 
descriptive data analysis were the main statistical analyses in the manipulation of the data. Data 
analysis and display thus reflected an on-going dialogue between qualitative and quantitative 
data integration. 
3.7 Positionality 
Positionality is about where one stands in relation to the other, the social stand a researcher 
takes in relation to the researched, shaped by various factors including education, gender and 
class (Merriam et al. 2001). Conducting research in a contextual, relational and politicised 
environment demands that attention be given to the “reflexivity, positionality and power 
relations in the field in order ensure an ethical and participatory research” (Sultana 2007, 
p.374). Through their interaction, researchers and the researched shape the quality and 
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reliability of data collected. Positionality of the research shapes and influences participant’s 
responses, raising questions about reliability of the data collected (Mather 1996).  
For the rural settings where complex interactions and relationships, cultural and traditions 
interplay, recognising one’s positionality becomes very important (Twyman et al. 1999). In 
this study, one concern was determining how and in what ways these elements mattered for the 
research (Rose 1997). 
Having grown up in Zambia and being familiar with the general culture and traditions, building 
trust and relationships with local communities was easier. However, being a Chewa, born and 
bred from the eastern region of the country enabled me to ask critical questions whilst 
maintaining relative cultural distance and being non-aligned (Merriam et al. 2001). I realized 
that I needed constant awareness of this fluctuation within myself. 
During fieldwork, I introduced myself as a member of staff at the University of Zambia and 
that I was, at that time, pursing PhD studies at the University of Leeds. At various levels of 
data collection, association with the two Universities gave participants an idea about the 
potential use of the data and findings (academic purposes and knowledge generation), a feature 
that seemed important to some sensitive participants including ZaSPlc which still was 
recovering from recent negative publicity (ActionAid 2011). At district level, a courtesy call 
on the District Commissioner enabled access to state departments who were always willing to 
talk to me. At sub-district level, permission was sought from ZaSPlc and their intermediaries 
verbally. I constantly iterated that I was independent despite gaining access to sugarcane 
communities and households through ZaSPlc, intermediaries and local leaders. Consent was 
sought from ZaSPlc’s Smallholder Development Office as well as smallholder management 
companies – KaSCOL and Nanga Farms. The research team also talked to Chiefs and 
community leaders about the research as well as elicit their perspectives. In the rural field site, 
the absence of company officials and other key figures during actual data collection gave a 
sense of comfort to farmers and other respondents. In building trust and honest responses, the 
research team aimed at creating a rapport with respondents such as those that were afraid of 
losing sugarcane farms for speaking to us or those that feared victimisation. Some of these 
were talked to privately in the comfort of their homes.   
The selection of the research team ensured that each member was familiar with the language 
and culture of the Tongas including other languages such as Chewa. Thus, interviews, group 
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discussions and questionnaires were conducted in either Tonga or Chewa as widely spoken 
languages in the sugarcane communities. This was important in the translation and 
interpretation of questions. Training of research assistants prior to data collection ensured 
familiarity and awareness issues of positionality. Constant and daily de-briefings enabled me 
to immediately deal with emerging issues. Issues of literacy and a sense of gender inequality 
presented barriers for farmers particularly women and youths. However, separate and gender 
balanced group discussions helped capture views and perspectives of one gender or class 
different from the other.  
3.8 Ethical Considerations   
Ethical review and approval was obtained both from the University of Leeds and at the 
University at a local University of Zambia (Appendix 1). These guided in the wider conduct of 
the research, treatment of participants, informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality and 
disclosure (Denscombe 2010). A key feature in the conduct of the study was an emphasis on 
the options of withdrawing. Through informed consent (mainly verbal), potential respondents 
were free to decide on their participation (Guillemin and Gillam 2004) (Appendix 2). The study 
also emphasised confidentiality. For brevity, I show only the interview code and date (e.g. 
P1.05.01.16) (See appendix for detailed list of participants).  
3.9 Limitations 
The methodological approach deployed in this study enabled collection and analyses of rich 
data, but several limitations can be noted.  
3.9.1 Perceptions, Views and Perspectives as Evidence 
This research operated largely in the qualitative domain which means respondents’ narratives, 
experiences, perceptions, views and perspectives were crucial in drawing conclusions. 
However, this approach also meant that respondents might be biased due their own agenda or 
might not always be driven by the need to give appropriate/right responses (See Bennett 2016 
in relation to conservation and environmental management). Drawing on narratives, 
perceptions, views and experiences was important to my study to better understand how local 
people experience LaSAIs and globally-linked value-chains, their governance and institutional 
environment.       
3.9.2 Snapshot versus Longitudinal Study 
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As outlined in Section 3.3.3, rural livelihoods are dynamic, yet findings in this study provide 
only a snapshot of the evolving livelihoods. Although it would be interesting to evaluate how 
rural livelihoods evolve alongside LaSAIs overtime, this was beyond the scope of this PhD. A 
focus on older and pioneering projects such as Kaleya, and by asking respondents about 
perceived livelihood changes over time helped generate general views and perspectives of 
livelihood changes over a considerable period. These local experiences – subjective as they 
might be – were important in drawing insights and useful conclusions about livelihood changes 
in local areas.     
3.9.3 Political Climate 
Zambia had a general election in 2016. As with previous elections, political developments in 
the country and in Mazabuka in particular – as an opposition dominated area – led to a lack of 
trust from potential respondents. Whilst the research team was never at any time turned away 
by any potential respondent or experience any participant drop-out, I still noticed that some 
respondents needed assurances that my research was associated with the University of Leeds 
and University of Zambia. Ability to explain in local languages, emphasis on my student status, 
potential use of the data/results and promises of anonymity helped deal with any anxieties and 
turned out to be the best possible approach to dealing with such a problem.   
3.10 Conclusion   
Understanding how LaSAIs play out within the national context and their outcomes requires a 
comprehensive approach that captures diverse dynamics. Yet, exploring a global phenomenon 
such as LaSAIs and governance processes at national level as they relate to meso-micro-level 
practices is not easy. There are obviously limits to the extent to which a single framework can 
help capture dynamics at different levels. The approach taken in this research explores national 
policy and institutional dynamics, industry dynamics as they relate to local participation and 
governance processes, local livelihoods, and agribusiness practices and how they shape 
national, industry and local processes engaging with power, politics and institutions across 
different levels. A discussion on power, politics and institutions justifies a focus on state actors 
to capture national narratives being advanced and why. However, an analysis of industry 
dynamics and agribusiness practices as they relate to inclusion and exclusion of smallholders 
suggest a need for an industry-specific framework. The need to maintain local narratives, views 
and perspectives of LaSAIs within the same national context creates value for a theoretical 
integration.  
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The role of state politics, policy and institutional dynamics, assumptions and narratives around 
LaSAIs are central to the following chapter, which demonstrates that whilst possibilities for 
LaSAIs have been created by state institutions, the state agencies seeking to administer land-
based resources also limit their potential through competing authority and agendas.   
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Chapter 4 Large-scale Agricultural Investments and Institutions: 
Patterns, Influence and Barriers in Zambia 
4.1 Introduction  
In this first of four empirical chapters, the governance dynamics of LaSAIs and competing 
authority and power relations between national actors mediating land access for the case of 
Zambia are described. The chapter particularly concentrates on drivers and actors shaping 
LaSAIs, potential tenstions between policy and development actors involved in LaSAIs, and 
the implications for institutional cooperation and collaboration. It provides an overview of 
patterns and trends in LaSAIs and how these play out within the national state and governing 
frameworks, creating a fittingly relevant context for subsequent chapters. The first objective of 
the research is addressed here by revealing the policy and governance dynamics with state 
politics, power and institutional processes.  It is argued that corporate interest, donor and 
regional support converge in driving LaSAIs, but national factors predominate. Whilst 
possibilities for LaSAIs are created by state institutions, the state agencies seeking to 
administer land-based resources also limit their potential through competing authority and 
agendas. The demand on land and water, accompanied by government and donor resources, 
heighten tensions among state entities over decision-making and creation of new frontiers of 
resource control. By focusing on state and non-state actors and their articulation in LaSAIs, 
this chapter shows that the top-down nature of governance of land, labour and water resources 
is problematic for long-term sustainable agriculture and rural development. The chapter 
highlights the importance of state entities, authority and influence in delivering LaSAIs and 
facilitating the emergence of a more locally-rooted agro-vision for agriculture and more 
sustainable and socially-just rural development.   
 LaSAIs have been a common feature of neoliberal transformation in which state entities 
facilitate foreign investments; yet the related governance dynamics remain less understood 
(Chapter 2). Much has been written about LaSAIs in the past decade (Fairhead et al. 2012; 
White et al. et al. 2012), but perspectives on how investments draw upon, restructure and/or 
challenge national state governance processes and relationships are limited (Wolford et al. 
2013). The politics within state institutions, extensions of political power and relationships 
remain peripheral to the ‘land-grabbing’ debate. These debates have particularly focused on 
states in relation to governance of the land sector and tenure security (Arezki et al. 2011). Of 
concern is that LaSAIs coincide with poor governance (German et al. 2013), unclear property 
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rights (Deininger and Byerlee 2012) and heightened competition in determining land access 
(Burnod et al. 2013). Negative aspects of LaSAIs such as dispossessions, corruption and lack 
of transparency require improved governance systems, with much support in multilateral 
organisations focused on strengthening of legal and bureaucratic frameworks within which 
LaSAIs take place (Stephens 2011). For analysis of LaSAIs to be accurate, there is need to 
explore and understand the nature and motivations of state and non-state actors themselves, 
their interactions as well as power and influence they exert (Burnod et a. 2013; Fairbain 2013) 
(Chapter 2). In countries such as Zambia where promotion of LaSAIs advances in the absence 
of a clear national land policy, state entities draw on different sorts of authority and practices 
in converging capital and land, creating new frontiers of land control (Chapter 1). In the 
following section, the nature of LaSAIs in Zambia is briefly provided with the aim of revisiting 
some theoretical elements at the centre of LaSAIs.  
4.2 Large-scale Land Acquisitions in the National Context  
LaSAIs and resource scarcity concerns have both made visible the role of the states and its 
relationships to investors and the local population. Detailed analysis of LaSAIs requires that 
we explore motivations and interactions of state and non-state actors, and how they shape 
governance dynamics. This requires understanding of: legal extensions of state power on the 
ground – territory; rulers (e.g. formal bodies) and their control of the conditions of their own 
reproduction – sovereignty; actors, multi-scale governance and legal practices – authority; and 
participants in the state changing property relationships and making claims on the state – 
subjects and subjectivities (Wolford et al. 2013, p.194). National and sub-national actors 
interact in multiple relationships, shaping state discourses concerning LaSAIs, the materiality 
of production, and the role of local producers (Fairbain 2013). The state never operates with a 
collective voice, as agencies articulate different kinds of power to shape access to land, driving 
‘ideological legitimation’ (Wolford et al. 2013, p.196). LaSAIs depend on the competencies of 
state bureaucracies, their embeddedness in society and their territorial reach and capacity 
(German et al. 2011).   
Integrating macro-level practices and interactions with micro-level experiences make visible 
the constitution of territories for LaSAIs, and the associated elements of sovereignty, authority 
and subjects. In Zambia, the government legitimises its own facilitating role – as development-
oriented land broker – through investment promotion institutions, as outlined in Section 1.2. 
Through ideological and political narratives, the drive for LaSAIs is perpetuated, reproducing 
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itself through state authority. However, new power and property relations created in host 
communities, raise questions about sovereignty and autonomy in resource access and decision-
making (Rutten et al. 2017). Section 1.2 shows that the idea that only 7% of the country’s total 
arable land is currently cultivated alongside an estimated 423,000ha (88%) deficit in irrigation 
potential has increased state expectations of LaSAIs, and its authority and claims on certain 
territories (GRZ 2016, p.16). It has also heightened the role of the state, and competing agendas 
within state agencies seeking to administer land resources for various motivations (Nolte 
2014). There is low threshold under which state institutions can alienate land, which means 
that the scope for expropriation has somewhat widened in the presence LaSAIs. The state 
variously channels neoliberal market forces to deliver land deals to different clients, often 
foreign (Nolte 2014). Given that a majority of the population (60%) is rural, characterised by 
acute poverty levels (77% of the rural population), and heavily dependent on agriculture in 
Zambia (GRZ 2013a), LaSAIs legitimizes the state’s territorial reach. New institutions all 
identified as linking foreign investments to priority areas (e.g. agriculture) have emerged, 
including the Zambia Development Agency which provides One-Stop services to investors. 
State entities can draw on different kinds of actors and authorities to facilitate deals (Chapter 
1).   
Much research in Zambia has until now narrowly focused on impacts of LaSAIs: local 
participation in LaSAIs (Hichaambwa and Jayne 2012), economic impacts (Ahlerup and 
Tengstam 2015), and smallholder productivity (Sipangule and Lay 2015). However, 
overreliance on micro-level analyses has led to limited insights into the wider governance 
dynamics, and how state agencies actively shape new frontiers of land control and make 
LaSAIs visible. This necessitates a departure from conventional descriptions of the national 
state as weak, fragile, corrupt and non-transparent (Arezki et al. 2011) to considerations of the 
state as a stage on which key decisions about LaSAIs are made and contested. Institutional 
cooperation and coordination reflects the extent to which institutions work or act together for 
the common purpose of enhancing the likelihood of LaSAIs taking place, and decision-making 
surrounding resource use and local participation (Osabuohien 2014). LaSAIs relate to state 
capacities specifically to the nature and quality of its institutional frameworks, since land deals 
and land governance depend on the prevailing institutional context (ibid.). Institutions that 
make land available and determine access/utilisation thus influence social and economic 
development.  
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As noted in Chapter 1 and 2 there is no necessary character to LaSAIs, which are investments 
framed ‘more broadly as embedded in complex multi-scale webs of relationships shaped by 
power, property, and production” (Wolford et al. 2013, 199). Recent studies have shown the 
dangers of advancing an inevitable agro-industrial future for sub-Saharan Africa or indeed an 
idea that governance and accountability are the silver bullets for LaSAIs (Peters 2013; Ruth et 
al. 2015). The broader significance in the framing emphasises the importance of place, time 
and context and how they shape practices, and discourses of territory, sovereignty, authority, 
and subjects. The chapter acknowledges that the profitability of investments depends on the 
nature of the ‘choice set’ presented by institutional and policy provisions (North 1990). Within 
bureaucratic tendencies, institutional provisions integrate in the formulation of policies in an 
economy, relevant for shaping property rights and relationships among actors. This chapter 
explores governance dynamics of LaSAIs and competing authority and power relations 
between national actors mediating land access in Zambia. 
4.3 Methodology 
This chapter combined policy analyses and multi-level interviews with diverse actors at 
national, district and community levels. Policies and strategic documents were analysed 
qualitatively for content (Table 4.1) (Section 3.5.2) (Elo and Kyngas 2008). Thirteen categories 
related to agricultural expansion and research purpose were developed (Table 4.3) (Appendix 
2). Knowledge fragmentation about LaSAIs in Zambia mean that manifest content categories 
were derived inductively, enabling us to link policy provisions to practice as highlighted by 
interviews (Cole 1998). Content analysis provided insights into policy levers and domestic 
enablers of investments and agro-expansion. 
Table 4. 1 Key policy documentation  
Document  Description 
Vision 2030 (V2030)  Long-term development plan 
National Agricultural Policy (NAP)   Agricultural policy   
National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) – 2014-2018  Investment plan 
Strategy for Industrialisation and Job Creation (IS)  Industrialisation strategy  
National Irrigation Policy and Strategy (NIPS)  Irrigation policy/strategy 
Fifth National Development Plan (5thNDP)  Development plan 
National Energy Policy (NEP)  Energy policy 
National Water Policy (NWP)  Water policy 
Sixth National Development Plan (6thNDP)  Development plan 
Revised Sixth National Development Plan (R6thNDP)  Development plan 
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National Resettlement Policy (NRP)  Resettlement policy 
Seventh National Development Plan (7thNDP)  Development plan 
 
Policy analysis was followed by wide-ranging interviews with multi-level actors. These were 
selected first by conducting a literature search and filtered and enhanced during scoping 
exercise. A sector-based review of secondary sources (Bowen 2009) as described in section 
3.4.3 led to a total of thirty-four interviews with multi-level actors. These actors were then 
categorized as national, regional, district and sub-district level actors to capture a range of 
perspectives as well as ensure broad representation (Figure 4.1). National-level interviews with 
state institutions, donor and NGO actors, private consultants, academic and research 
institutions focused on drivers/trends, experiences of and governance/coordination of 
investments. This was complemented with district and sub-district interviews which 
concentrated on regional development and natural resource issues as they relate to LaSAIs in 
sugarcane in Mazabuka (Section 3.5.3). This permitted analysis of macro-institutional and 
policy processes to local outcomes and measure drivers and challenges to investments. Core 
themes which emerged from interviews related to international, regional and domestic 
investments drivers, as well as trends and patterns and cooperation and coordination efforts. 
Qualitative data were organised as interview and field notes. Data were coded manually and 
using NVivo to produce varying themes and categories in relation to research objectives 
(Bazeley 2007). Specific relationships between and among key national and local actors were 
mapped out drawing on stakeholder narratives and experiences (Welsh 2002). These were 
analysed to make visible coordination of LaSAIs and the role of different state agencies, their 
authority and influence at play.  
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Trends and Patterns 
Interviews with investment promotion officers and the national farmers union confirmed an 
increase trends in LaSAIs since 2000, reporting acquisition of existing companies as well as 
resource, market and efficiency-seeking practices among foreign companies. Significant agro-
investments in primary production and output markets (e.g. transport and storage), inducing 
growth in export commodities such as wheat and soybeans, were also reported. Analysis of 
interviews identified five key trends in LaSAIs:  
(i) diversification by existing, and entry of new companies into agriculture;  
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(ii) increased demand for land, water and electricity;  
(iii)  increased tax receipts;  
(iv) growth in soy and other food crops shaped by wider private-enterprise growth; and  
(v) growth in agro-processing.  
However, state departments made contradictory claims about sources of investment, agreeing 
on Zimbabwe and South Africa as key drivers rather than China and Brazil. Lack of readily 
available data alongside poor monitoring systems make it difficult to synthesise actual 
investments (Land Matrix 2016). Despite entry of new foreign investors, relatively few large 
companies were engaging in agriculture at significant scale, highlighting the centrality of 
domestic actors. However, NGOs and donor actors argued foreign LaSAIs were creating a new 
dynamic of land control and access that reconfigures smallholder engagement in agriculture. 
Limited rural infrastructure development means investments align to main roads and rail 
networks, where favourable agro-ecological conditions are traditionally associated with 
commercial farming. 
State and political power frequently emerged in interviews as driving investment commodity 
focus by advancing diversification as a departure from maize cultivation. This includes 
promotion of non-traditional agricultural products (e.g. sugar, wheat, citrus and barley) and 
biofuels, which were also viewed as “presenting empowerment opportunity for growers and 
for rural economies” (P1:05.01.16). However, empowerment framed as rural employment and 
linked to larger agribusinesses has had variable outcomes. In the sugarcane outgrower schemes, 
this includes heavy reliance on low paying casual/temporal work and exclusion of youths and 
women. Meanwhile, despite massive promotion of biofuels, hesitation from state agencies has 
led to disappointing results (see Giles 2017). A senior official in the MoA alluded this to public 
fears of having to convert huge tracks of land to non-food commodities such as Jatropha 
curcas, which can lead to a ‘land-grabbing’ (Z1:29.06.15). However, national institutions and 
actors continue to place higher expectations on LaSAIs. 
4.4.2 Institutions and actors  
Analysis of institutions and actors shaping LaSAIs starts with the multi-level list of institutions 
summarised in Figure 4.1, drawn to contextualise actor interests, roles and influence in LaSAIs. 
The broader significance of this analysis lies in its attempt to ‘unbundle’ national actors, their 
motivations and capacity in shaping LaSAIs.  
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State agencies are generally agreeable to LaSAIs, motivated by prospects of rural development. 
Agencies articulate models through which investments unfold, and policies in agriculture and 
related sectors (energy, water, and land) permit the government to exploit abundant resources. 
Policy and legal frameworks allows power to alienate customary land and draw territorial zones 
for LaSAIs, with changes in customary law widening scope for appropriation. These define 
investment guidelines (e.g. minimum requirements) and influence decision-making in land 
availability, access and utilisation.  
Multilateral/bilateral donor agencies provide funding and technical assistance in value-chain 
development, whilst improving mechanisms through which LaSAIs take place. Donors fund 
irrigation agricultural schemes, infrastructure development involving private-public 
partnerships and models such as outgrower schemes (Matenga and Hichaambwa 2017). 
Concerned about what they describe as “chaotic land allocation and conversion”, multilateral 
organisations emphasise improving legal and bureaucratic structures shaping LaSAIs 
(K1:18.06.15).  
NGOs are diverse, with varying areas of focus, politics and orientation. Some focus on poverty 
reduction specifically through land rights, tax justice and livelihoods, but their scale is limited 
(ActionAid 2011). Their local and sectoral concentration means their influence in LaSAIs 
remains low. One officer at the Zambia Land Alliance (ZLA) blamed limited NGO efforts on 
the regional focus of strategies for implementation of protocols around LaSAIs, accompanied 
by “missing country-specific strategies” (Q3:10.05.16).  
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Figure 4.1: Actors in LaSAIs as they relate to study participants.
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Local and traditional authorities administer land, bolstered by economic opportunities 
represented by increasing demand for land. However, expanding state influence alongside 
LaSAIs as new actors means local communities have little representation in national 
committees and suffer limited capacity to evaluate consequences of LaSAIs. Some of this 
relates to multiple pathways for land acquisition, e.g. through: 1) state institutions, 2) 
local/traditional authorities or 3) private individual citizens. Land acquisition pathways taken 
by investors highlight varying motivations, but the absence of strong legal and bureaucratic 
enforcement creates inadequacies in regulation, whilst enhancing investor and state influence 
in negotiations (see Nolte 2014). In practice, land acquisition often bypasses local actors, as 
wider community consultations are lacking. Low levels of education, and a lack of resources 
and power place communities in a weak negotiating position, leading to exclusion and poor 
commitments to rights and local livelihoods. Private-sector actors including national farmer 
bodies encourage LaSAIs and negotiate policy for business emphasizing the access to markets. 
They encourage state agencies to limit their involvement in agriculture, exerting a new 
industrial agro-vision.  
State institutions exert enormous influence on LaSAI governance, driving erosion of 
community property systems. Multilateral institutions facilitate state efforts through 
ideological emphasis on trade and investment and their links to issues such as employment, 
sustainable livelihoods and rural development. Multi-level interactions between state and non-
state actors show variations in capacity to influence key decisions in LaSAIs. However, these 
processes show how a state-level policy frame influences spaces for manoeuvre around 
different models through which land deals unfold.    
4.4.3 Factors driving large-scale land acquisitions 
Analysis of interview data identified LaSAI drivers at three levels (Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2: Drivers to LaSAIs in Zambia. Arrows show interacting levels (Derived 
from interview data).  
First, interviews with donor and state actors show that multilateral and bilateral agencies boost 
LaSAIs through support towards agricultural irrigation schemes. Projects range from 57ha to 
5000ha in area under banners such as rural development, empowerment and climate-smart 
agriculture (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2: Selected donor-driven projects in Zambia (Policy documents and 
interviews) 
Scheme  Est. size (ha) Location  
Buleya-Malima  85 Southern 
Sioma  57.8 Western 
Zenga 100 Southern  
Sinazongwe 400 Southern  
Magobbo  2000 Southern  
Manyonyo  3000 Southern  
Nega Nega 2000 Southern  
Kanakantapa 595 Lusaka 
Momboshi 5000 Central  
Musakashi  1432 Copperbelt 
Lusitu  276 Lusaka  
 
As part of upscaling smallholder irrigation, donors aim to open 1,300ha, including additional 
5000ha and 2900ha for Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (AWF 2016). Under 



























Bank reportedly lined-up 25 feasible irrigation sites by 2018 which would bring an additional 
9560ha under irrigation with a broader climate-adaptation strategy targeting 200,000ha by 
2030 (Z1:29.06.15) (AWF 2016). Availability and access to cheaper credit from donor 
agencies means public officers are buoyed by possibilities of actualising agro-programmes and 
rent-seeking (Z1:29.06.15). 
Second, regional dynamics in markets, politics and funding opportunities frequently emerged 
in interviews as drivers. National interviews showed regional investments have been expanding 
and in regional markets such as COMESA and SADC, and a respondent from the World Bank 
stated that demand growth in “regional markets is sufficient to drive investments” 
(K3:16.12.15). Regional funding/support relate to irrigation and water resource development 
such as by the AWF which allocated “funds for feasibility studies in over 20 irrigation sites” 
(Z1:29.06.15) (AWF 2016). Meanwhile political and economic tensions in neighbouring 
Zimbabwe also added to the drivers as one Senior Agriculturalist at the World Bank remarked: 
“Zambia has benefited from problems in Zimbabwe” (K3:16.12.15).  
However, interview data analysis revealed major drivers of LaSAIs were largely at the national 
level. In what follows, five key domestic factors frequently cited in interviews as conditioning 
LaSAIs in Zambia are discussed.   
4.4.3.1 Maize exceptionalism: cause and driver of diversification     
LaSAIs have been encouraged to move away from maize as a diversification strategy. Since 
independence in 1964, public policy defined agriculture in terms of maize. This led to a culture 
among smallholders that sees maize as agriculture and vice-versa. A government concern is 
that dependency on maize and on rain-fed agriculture could induce serious livelihood struggles, 
particularly with climate variability.  
Political narratives often suggest LaSAIs are necessary for agriculture and economic 
diversification. However, NGO actors expressed opinions that agriculture/economic 
diversification currently excludes smallholders; focusing instead on agro-processing which 
prioritises commercialisation and value-added processes at a large scale. To one respondent at 
Oxfam, current efforts in ‘diversification have not been prioritised at small-scale level’ 
(Q2:07.01.16). Such advocacy has relegated smallholder initiatives and their role in agriculture 
despite forming the backbone of Zambia’s agriculture (see Colebrander and Koppen 2013). 
The Ministry of Agriculture is aware of these challenges and argues that whereas it seeks more 
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participation in LaSAIs and value-chains, smallholders should take the lead: “we are not 
inviting corporations to run these schemes” (Z1:29.06.15). In practice, however, corporations 
such as those in the sugarcane sector exert enormous influence in determining local 
participation, which is compounded by missing national strategies for smallholder value-chain 
inclusion and weak farmer associations at district level.    
4.4.3.2 National Politics and the Rural Development Imperative 
One consistent theme in national interviews was that LaSAIs reflected government policy on 
rural development and empowerment defined as ‘employment creation and income 
distribution’ (Z1:29.06.15). Organising smallholders in state-driven, typically “large-scale 
biased” outgrower schemes provides social-economic imperatives and enhances the state’s 
territorial reach. However, the size and quality of employment opportunities induced by 
LaSAIs have largely been disappointing with fewer than expected number of smallholders 
participating (Namutowe 2014).   
Prospects for rural development relate to taxation. The so-called ‘progressive politics’ enable 
preferential treatment of certain companies and sub-sectors (see Richardson 2010 with respect 
to sugarcane). These practices have arguably wasted opportunities for Treasury contributions 
as one Inspector at the Revenue Authority remarked: ‘much as there might be inflow of huge 
FDI, tax yields are not proportional’ (Z6:22.12.15). There is a wider perception that 
corporations always claimed unprofitability and that any rural development and economic 
benefits require reconsideration (ActionAid 2011).   
4.4.3.3 Legislation and Land Tenure System  
Legislation and land tenure systems facilitate conversion of customary land to state land, and 
this is happening at an increased rate. District interviews in Mazabuka reported rapid sugarcane 
expansion since 2001 but also revealed land scarcities and dispossession in sugarcane 
communities. One Chief highlighted that ‘expansion of smallholder fields is difficult because 
of being surrounded by plantations’ (D4:27.11.16). Donors expressed opinions that ‘resource 
scarcity is not fully acknowledged in policy and institutional practices’ (K4:10.12.15). With a 
long-standing stakeholder deadlock on the national land policy, NGOs fear this can affect 
interpretation, translation and enactment of LaSAI policies and commitment to local rights 
(Q3:10.05.16). 
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Interviews also show that rural land conversion reflects state expansion of infrastructure such 
as roads, electrification and telecommunications (as well as irrigation structures). Since 2000, 
successful governments have sustained rural infrastructure expenditure, accelerating with the 
current Patriotic Front government since 2011. Consequently, ‘unreachable pieces of land 4-5 
years ago are now accessible and up for grabs’, remarked one Officer at the MoL 
(Z4:15.12.15). The role of traditional authorities in facilitating LaSAIs has equally attracted 
attention. Seeing that chiefs are presenting customary land as a new investment frontier, public 
officers described traditional leaders as ‘very cooperative.’ However, exploiting customary 
land, chiefs are seen as facilitating land-grabbing among diverse investors without clarity and 
transparency on rural livelihoods. With significant smallholder farmlands already trapped in 
land deals, an Agricultural Specialist at the World Bank believes ‘chiefs have been careless in 
allocating land to investors and the impact of that might be evident in a few years’ 
(K3:16.12.15). Some senior officials in the MoLNR agree but suggested ‘these deals may be 
illegal’ (Z4:15.12.15). However, this focus on chiefs should not exonerate other parties 
including, as one NGO explains, ‘the government through state-house and local private land-
grabbers for own and on behalf of foreigners’ (Q:10.05.16). 
4.4.3.4 Transformative investment and policy environment 
Place and time are important aspects in capturing policy practices and discourses shaping 
LaSAIs. To understand factors fostering LaSAIs fully, a policy assessment was conducted, 
focusing on the extent to which key themes have emphasis placed on them in policy documents 
and implications (Table 4.3). 
Content analysis reveals that diverse cross-sector policies facilitate water and land access for 
LaSAIs. Emphasis has been placed on: 1) irrigation expansion and infrastructure development, 
2) agricultural production, and 3) mechanisation of agriculture. This is followed by expansion 
of area under cultivation and facilitation of water access for irrigation agriculture. Nationally, 
irrigation expansion is viewed as a suitable strategy for agricultural expansion, 
commercialization, rural development and poverty reduction (GRZ 2017, p.62). For instance, 
V2030 seeks to triple crop-land to 900,000ha by 2030 whilst ensuring increased smallholder 
productivity through expansion of irrigated outgrower schemes that are linked to LaSAIs (GRZ 
2006, p.62). The NRP provides for resettlement whilst facilitating agricultural land-use 
expansion, allowing for evictions, expropriations and dispossessions (NRP 2015, p.21). Whilst 
most policy documents seek to expand agriculture and attract foreign investment, there is a 
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striking silence on capacity-building of public institutions in policy documents that can ensure 
safe-guards including social-economic and environmental sustainability. 
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Table 4.3: Drivers to LaSAIs as identified in policy documents (Coding: Black=emphasized; Grey=not emphasized; White=Not mentioned). 
Drivers to LaSAIs 
NWP NIPS V2030 5thNDP NEP NAP  6thNDP NAIP IS R6thNDP NRP 7thNDP 
1994 2004 2006 2006 2007 2011  2011 2013 2013 2013 2015 2017 






































































































Central to this policy shift are narratives of resource endowment as a driver of LaSAIs, but 
inner workings of state agencies show divergences. For instance, whilst economic institutions 
such as the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) under the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and 
Investment (MoCTI), the MoA and farmer membership bodies (e.g. ZNFU) exploit resource 
abundance, ministries such as those responsible for lands (MoLNR), and water (MoMEWD) 
point to land scarcities and water depletion in local regions. Divisions of opinion within the 
MoA were identified, as one representative in the Ministry, corroborated by some NGO 
representatives, called for an integrated approach to LaSAIs, arguing that ‘diverse sectoral 
issues, overlapping elements and how sectors shape each other remain less understood’ 
(Z3:04.01.16).  
4.4.3.5 Investment promotion 
In the past decade, state institutions have vigorously promoted foreign investments in Zambia. 
While the ZDA is the main promotion hub, interviews with different state departments show 
multiple entry points including the Ministry of Tourism, farmer bodies (ZNFU) and recently 
the Investment Corporation of Zambia (an investment holding company for State-owned 
enterprises since 2014). Insights from interviews and policy documents reveal that investment 
promotion produces many unintended consequences, including defining investors in terms of 
foreign actors. For example, at the heart of the ZDA Bill (2006) and the Investment Act 
(Chapter 385) lies investment promotion and guarantees which have seen government enter 
into Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements with agri-businesses. In practice, these 
have avoided wide consultation, but have a clear foreign bias. Investment promotion through 
diverse fiscal incentives and tax exemptions have led to low revenue collection. Most NGOs 
argue that whilst FDI in agriculture is necessary, concessions have wasted opportunities to 
generate economic benefits, or at least ‘have not helped the country achieve sector-specific 
objectives’ (Q2:05.01.16). Findings suggest limited follow-through in agro-investment with 
the agricultural sector (2007-2014), which ranks third at a 25% rate of actualised investments 
compared to mining (53%) and manufacturing (27%) (Namutowe 2014). An officer at ZDA 
agrees: ‘investment in agriculture have been slow despite massive promotion’ (Z7:16.06.15).   
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4.5 Institutional cooperation and coordination 
This final empirical section focuses on institutional cooperation and coordination practices 
between and among state agencies, and what this means for prospects of LaSAIs. Findings are 
mapped in relationships highlighted as R1-R9 in Figure 4.3. 
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Analysis of state agency relationships reveals a deficit in inter-sectoral cooperation and 
coordination around LaSAIs. Horizontal cooperation among economically related institutions 
was observed to be stronger, but cooperation and interaction with natural resource and 
environmentally related institutions was poor. Vertical cooperation among national institutions 
remains less developed, affecting knowledge sharing and decision making such as those on 
environmental sustainability and resettlement.  
Overall, key decision making around LaSAIs lies in economically related institutions that shape 
narratives on ‘agriculture for development.’ Whereas actors exploit unevenness in influence on 
land and water, and donor and government resources, evidence suggests that efforts to improve 
coordination and broad-based collaboration and capacity remain limited due to three main 
reasons. 
4.5.1 Relationship between donor institutions and the Ministry of Agriculture   
There appears a general convergence between donors and the MoA to promote LaSAIs for 
commercialisation of agriculture, rural development and employment creation (Table 2). 
However, donors raised concerns about weak bilateral links, low interest and ownership levels 
on the part of public officials, ‘when government institutions are not holding project funds’ 
(K1:18.06.15) (R1). For instance, despite government rhetoric about agricultural expansion, 
irrigation expansion has been advanced by a single unit in the MoA, causing project delays 
(e.g. Manyonyo project took over 5 years) (K1:18.06.15). This is compounded by a lack of 
policy guidance on investment implementation. 
However, public officers in the MoA complained that while donors claimed they did not 
influence decisions around land allocation and LaSAIs, they supported projects in 
environmentally delicate areas which led to divergences. They alleged that donors advance the 
inevitability of LaSAIs, a vision that implies that state agencies should legitimise rather than 
hamper investments, alongside facilitating land and water access. They also alleged that donors 
stress the volume of investment and overstated potential employment opportunities which they 
then use to legitimise LaSAIs to the exclusion of local consultation. In contrast, respondents in 
the MoA believe ‘challenges are better known and understood by local experts’ (Z3:04.01.16). 
A case in Mkushi where a syndicate of six large-scale commercial farmers (supported by 
donors) has come against smallholders is emblematic of wider tensions. MoA sources argue 
that there are serious water management issues, with ‘over-subscribed water rights’ in this area 
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(Z3:04.01.16), corroborated by the Water Authority (WARMA) (Z5:12.01.16). A respondent 
at Oxfam believes that Mkushi has ‘now become a bad example on LaSAIs and water 
management’ (Q2:05.01.16) (Box 4.1). Some state agencies such as ZEMA feel disempowered 
to act.   
Box 4. 1: Mkushi Farm-block, State interventions and the New Corporates 
For a long time, Mkushi district in central province of Zambia formed part of several 
government efforts to expand commercial farming as a farming block. The history of the 
Mkushi farm block highlights the role of the state in facilitating commercial farming and 
foreign LaSAIs (Chu 2013). Alienated as a farm-block in the 1950s, and as the last major 
commercial block by the colonial government (Woode et al. 1978), 176,000ha of land were 
converted to state land for the promotion of settler agriculture. About 94% of the area was 
divided into 163 farms for cattle and tobacco production.  
However, by independence in 1964, only 74 farms had been taken up. Throughout this 
period, the role and participation of local Zambians remained peripheral with the block 
always witnessing “waves of new farmers arriving and leaving, inextricably linked to the 
political events in the surrounding countries” (Chu 2013, p12). Between 1964 and 1990, 
the block witnessed few investments and was generally considered less lucrative. The 1990s 
however saw new corporates from South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 2007/2008 crisis and 
the ensuing wave of LaSAIs built on this background augmented by donor financial support 
in Zambia (e.g. the World Bank).  
Alongside economic liberalisation in the 1990s and prioritisation of agriculture in the post-
2000, the government has sought to facilitate production by enabling land access and 
construction of infrastructure such as electricity connections. This necessitated expansion in 
irrigated agriculture in crops such as tobacco, maize, wheat, soya as large-scale. By 2009, 
Mkushi was the hotspot of commercial agriculture and was at the forefront of Zambian 
agricultural production.  
However, the expansion in irrigation brought forth a new twist of commercial activities in 
Mkushi – water governance. NGOs and some government officials have raised concerns 
about the environmental impacts of large-scale water extraction, land acqusitions and most 
importantly chemical use in the area. To many respondents, new and expanding corporate 




Donors and public officials were agreed on policy challenges associated with LaSAIs. Some 
of these relate to unclear guidelines on commercialisation of farm-blocks (e.g. Mkushi and 
Mazabuka sugarcane outgrowers). One senior officer in the MoA remarked: ‘when dealing 
with donors, I have no policy reference and am often accused of making things up’ 
(Z3:04.01.16). Poor policy consultation and practice is even more problematic as an officer at 
Oxfam said that ‘an agricultural policy does not demonstrate that (architects) consulted 
experts elsewhere’ (Q2:05.01.16). One consequence has been an inability to perceive 
agriculture in an integrated manner and a lack of coherence and interlinkages between sectors. 
4.5.2 Tensions within public institutions  
Analysis shows that the materialisation and potential social and environmental outcomes of 
LaSAIs are affected and shaped by and within state institutions. For a long period, water 
resource development prioritised hydro-power generation under the Ministry of Energy 
(MoEWD). A perception in the MoA was that besides energy, WARMA prioritised 
commercial as opposed to smallholder farmers. However, deepening interest in agriculture 
raises tensions between the two ministries about control and authority over the resource (R2). 
To one irrigation expert, WARMA was stifling MoA projects: “water applications from MoA 
to WARMA should be more than enough (for WARMA) not to interfere” (Z3:04.01.16). 
Ministries have overlapping of responsibilities, as WARMA has focused on boreholes and 
dams whilst MoA design dams and sometimes receives water rights applications. It is unclear 
which institution does what, making donor resources even more challenging to obtain. In 
response, WARMA disagrees, insisting smallholders benefit more as abstracting below 500 
m³/day is free of charge. On criticisms of poor water resource management, WARMA insists 
“(their) role is to regulate usage” but admit that it has come late with most “activities already 
established in delicate locations such as Mkushi.” WARMA added that the problem of illegal 
water use is because actors were less keen to “follow our channel, preferring to go through 
investment promotion agencies” (Z5:12.01.16), arguing “rampant deforestation reshapes the 
hydrological cycles” (R7) compounded by “unplanned infrastructure development by local 
authorities” (Z5:12.01.16).  
Whilst some of these challenges relate to mutual mistrust between Ministries, the 
environmental authority (ZEMA) was specifically identified as problematic. Interviewees gave 
examples of where appropriate investors were refused permission to operate whereas some 
rejected by the Environmental Impact Assessment were issued with certificates (R4) 
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(Z7:16.16.15; N5:10.12.15). ZEMA’s response to environmental matters has been slow, with 
only recent donor-driven capacity to monitor agro-chemical utilisation and disposal (Njombo 
2015).  
Facilitation and implementation of LaSAIs present public officers with opportunities to 
negotiate, oversee and determine project standards. However, funding and increasing access to 
resources heightens contestation between various implementing entities. This can threaten the 
job security of some officers and causes disagreements about implementation processes (R3). 
For instance, one senior officer in the MoA argued that “others state departments wanted 
smallholder irrigation project to be implemented by the ZDA” (Z1:29.06.15). Multiple 
investment entry points present tensions for coordination and monitoring. On investment 
promotion, ZDA believes they “know the investment climate better” and should take sole 
responsibility, accusing other ministries/departments of ‘lacking the legal mandate’ (R5) 
(Z7:16.16.15). However, the MoLNR reports tokenism by ZDA in monitoring investor 
activities and land-use dynamics (R8). Whilst agreeing that the MoLNR has no monitoring 
capacity, the informant maintained: “[we] cannot allocate (land) and at the same time monitor 
land-use dynamics” placing any failure of monitoring LaSAIs and their outcomes on ZDA 
(Z4:15.12.15). Meanwhile an anti-investor public narrative has emerged particularly against 
inward migration with a perception that these were displacing local businesses, exposing the 
role of ZDA. However, despite formulating investor guidelines, ZDA believes that the 
Immigration Department has not been “serious in screening who comes into the country” 
(Z8:16.06.15) (R6).  
4.5.3 Investors as part of wider taxation and economic development 
Disappointing experiences with foreign investors in agriculture and elsewhere means there is 
a lingering suspicion towards investors, who are often accused of declining to declare profits 
accurately (ActionAid 2011). Some of these reflect lack of capacity and robust systems to 
collect taxes, leading to information asymmetry about the nature and character of investments 
on the one hand and their impacts on the other. A senior official in the MoA believes that the 
presence of an investment contributes to the “proliferation of uncontrolled and reckless 
construction of dams” (Z3:04.01.16). And that this was in part because investors exploit 
multiple investment entry points (R9), and receive backing from donors, the latter seen as 
‘always defending issuance of water rights to investors’ (Z3:04.01.16). 
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Overall, LaSAIs in Zambia expose weaknesses in governance of LaSAIs and a serious lack of 
cross-sectoral collaboration in public institutions. Scale, implications and impacts of LaSAIs 
seem not to have been fully grasped, and the policy has not helped either. Collaboration and 
coordination weaknesses suggest systems are insufficient to manage LaSAIs and any further 
resource-use and agro-expansion will require a serious rethink. 
4.6 Discussion: cooperation and coordination deficits  
LaSAIs enable various institutions to express different sorts of power, authority and influence 
investment and resource decisions. However, the public dominance in agro-expansion comes 
alongside poor capacity in institutions, which results in poor coordination (Arezki et al. 2011). 
Donors advance an agro-industry perspective which strengthens links between LaSAIs and 
smallholders but neglect multi-stakeholder and multi-sector interaction that enhances 
institutional support and coordination. Through control of funds and direct support to investors, 
donors also shape policy pathways through which LaSAIs unfold, such as those on agro-
models. Visible power relations among national actors illuminate whose interests are advanced, 
and the implications of this. However, efforts continue to be foisted on weak institutions 
without a clear strategy for smallholder participation, raising questions about state capacity, 
politics and institutions shaping LaSAIs (German et al. 2013; Borras and Franco 2012).   
The occurrence of LaSAIs create possibilities for diverse actors to influence land access, but 
active creation of territorial zones for investment jeopardizes rural land access. Legal and 
bureaucratic frameworks enable foreign ownership of land, but also allow various actors to 
exert their authority and influence in land allocation, access and utilisation (Burnod et al. 2013). 
Weak cooperation witnesses between state agencies in LaSAI implementation leads to 
dispossession, displacements and poor protection of local rights (Giles 2017). Supporting 
LaSAIs remains an important development agenda in Zambia, but state politics, institutions 
and power dynamics mean that rural participation in these projects remains limited. For 
instance, outcomes for LaSAIs in rural areas, as well as local participation, depend on how 
traditional authorities shape negotiations with investors as well as manage divergences with 
government. However, in many instances, local people have been the losers, raising questions 
about sovereignty and autonomy (Nolte 2014). While new governance mechanisms have been 
advocated for governing LaSAIs, and to guide the development of national policies aimed at 
improving land governance, these have insufficiently been articulated in national policies such 
in land, water and forestry (Kalaba et al. 2013). This raises the need to (re)anchore national 
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policies to the question of how state power, institutions and politics shape natural resource use, 
and what this means for sustainable rural development. 
Analysis emphasises national and to some extent intra-regional dynamics as driving LaSAIs as 
opposed to international influence (Cotula 2012). Commercialisation, diversification and 
biofuels are some of the factors that are shaping the nature of LaSAIs in Zambia. Investment 
concentration on commercially dominated commodities such as sugarcane however suggests 
transitional challenges for smallholders in the emerging agro-vision (Peters 2013). Value-chain 
commodities such as sugar that require specialised production knowledge and respond to global 
dynamics means the level of smallholder interaction with these crops remains peripheral (Dubb 
2015). The extent to which farmers see new crops in this vision as the basis on which to build 
sustainable livelihoods, as well as their willingness to work under new contractual 
arrangements becomes crucial (Di Matteo et al. 2016). In Zambia, such interaction and 
integration have occurred due to policy developments, but political rhetoric around outgrowers 
for instance remain oblivious to micro-level experiences such as threats of appropriation of 
land, water and other assets. More broadly, findings highlight limited extent to which regional 
and global guidelines are being articulated in Zambia’s policy on land tenure and water, and 
elsewhere. It also speaks to the limited extent to which wider governance mechanism help 
address overlaps, gaps and conflicts between and within various state actors in policy and 
decision-making around LaSAIs (Kalaba et al. 2013). The argument is that existing 
frameworks do not adequately or comprehensively consider the potential diversity in 
narratives, politics and power dynamics shaping LaSAIs, which raise the need to analytically 
move beyond binaries associated with land-grabbing (Borras et al. 2012).    
Interaction between and among state and non-state actors matter in the governance of LaSAIs. 
Increased attention to land and water by national actors, accompanied by public and donor 
resources, promotes tensions between and among various state institutions (Burnod et al. 2013). 
Strong horizontal cooperation among economically related institutions highlights a dominant 
discourse of agricultural growth. However, a neglection of interaction with natural resource 
and environmental-related institutions highlight the limited extent to which sustainability 
strategies are been articulated (Kalaba et al. 2013). A deficit in inter-sectoral cooperation and 
coordination is evident, raising the need for enhanced inter-linkages and coordination of efforts 
among sectors. Within sub-Saharan Africa, poor stakeholder engagement and the consequences 
of sectoral approaches to governing inter-linked resources have been reported (see Atela et al. 
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2016 with respect to Kenya). In Zambia, these elements have heightened sectoral politics and 
resource control, degenerating into path dependencies. Claims that the MoA is better suited to 
control water resources than MoEWD reflect resource-based tensions and could be interpreted 
as desire to monopolise government/donor resources, raising fears that resulting power 
struggles and stakes in control of resources might prevent progressive reforms (Faye 2016). 
Sectors monopolise decision-making in resource access as they attempt to consolidate their 
respective mandates, but to the exclusion of key stakeholders in LaSAIs, signaling negative 
implications for local development.   
In sum, analysis suggests that outcomes of LaSAIs will depend on how national institutional 
and policy actors organise and coordinate investments to maximise outcomes. Given multiple 
stakeholder voices within the national context, harmonising policy and institutional processes 
is difficult. The lack of cooperation and collaboration witnessed between and among state 
institutions makes it even more difficult to clarify mandates, remove overlaps and enhance 
decision making around resources and investments. It also shows that greater multi-stakeholder 
partnership working would allow the integration of knowledge across various institutions and 
actors. This requires changing the top-down nature of LaSAIs to encourage cooperation and 
inclusiveness, ensuring integrated actions across multiple sectors. It also requires a clear focus 
on national politics, power and institutional dynamics, and how these interact to shape local 
development outcomes.  
4.7 Conclusion  
The possibilities of LaSAIs have been shown to be limited by national institutions and policy 
developments in coordinating LaSAIs and state capacity in Zambia. Various factors drive 
investments but ensuing demand for land and water accompanied by government and donor 
resources heighten tensions among economic, natural resource and environment-related 
institutions over resources and decision-making. Economic related institutions exert 
considerable influence on the emergence and consolidation of the national policy on LaSAIs, 
but there is poor cooperation and collaboration with natural resource and environmentally 
related institutions, which challenges sustainable resource use. The associated top-down nature 
of governance of land, labour and water resources is problematic for long-term sustainable 
agriculture and rural development, which reflects politics, power and institutional processes 
prevailing in Zambia.  
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This chapter offers important lessons for informing and improving sectoral and cross-sectoral 
cooperation and coordination of LaSAIs. It connects the debate about LaSAIs and rural 
development to state politics, power, capacity and institutions as stage on which outcomes and 
destiny of investments are determined. The empirical material presented reinstates the national 
actors who are often absent in analyses of LaSAIs and problematises investments as top-down 
and driven by narrow sectoral interests. It highlights how LaSAIs influence the emergence and 
consolidation of a national policy on foreign investments that re-organises agri-dynamics in 
favour of agribusinesses. Analyses of this nature demonstrate that researching the dynamics of 
institutions and policy practices makes more visible the interactions that shape state capacity 
and the potential effects of LaSAIs. It also makes visible state politics, power and institutional 
processes, central in determining investment governance and outcomes. By going beyond 
simplistic narratives of LaSAIs as they link to land-grabbing, the chapter asserts that the 
dominant argument of LaSAIs will be won or lost within improved national institutional 
cooperation and coordination efforts. The following chapter considers LaSAIs in the sugar 
industry, and how industry politics, governance and institutional processes shape smallholder 
inclusion and exclusion in the changing land property relationships and value-chains.
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Chapter 5 Smallholder Inclusion and Exclusion on the Zambian 
‘Sugar-belt’ 
5.1 Introduction   
In this second empirical chapter, industry-specific practices and patterns of smallholder 
inclusion and exclusion on the Zambian ‘sugarbelt’ are considered, with the view of building 
an understanding of how inclusive sugar value-chains are. LaSAIs and agribusiness actors hold 
power in institutional and contractual relationships with smallholders, influencing who they 
work with. Smallholder organisation and particpation in sugar value-chains including their 
interactions as market access avenues – contractual arrangements, terms and conditions under 
which smallholders produce sugarcane – and how these are determined is central to this 
chapter. It goes beyond simplistic binaries of inclusion and exclusion that often accompany 
analyses on contract farming and outgrower schemes to appreciate how complex production 
spaces can be and the need to recognise competing interests. As opposed to a national focus 
shown in the previous chapter, this chapter concentrates on industry level dynamics, but 
similarities between the chapters are drawn around industry politics, power relations and 
institutions that shape inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics. By combining industry and 
local community elements, the role and power relations around intermediaries and related 
institutions (e.g. buyers, agents, enforcers of practices) are considered in detail.  
It is argued that inclusion and exclusion are complex and multi-dimensional. Possibilities of 
smallholder inclusion reflect corporate, donor and public relations that shape the agro-industry 
structure. However, the real value of these relationship lie less in government’s ability to 
coordinate, monitor and discipline agri-businesses than in providing conditions for 
agribusiness expansion. That agribusinesses exert enormous industry influence, defining 
market dynamics, illustrate a failure if not inability of national actors to confront important 
elements shaping social realities at local level. Within projects, complex factors interact to 
variously create pathways for inclusion/exclusions but are intensified by industry politics, 
structure and organisation. A focus on social-economic sustainability in donor and government 
collaborations at macro-level would be crucial in enabling participation and if agri-businesses 
are to drive the agenda for poverty reduction and rural development.  
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The recent surge in LaSAIs and ensuing land-grabbing has presented contractual arrangements 
in smallholder coordination schemes as inclusive and more beneficial compared to for 
instances outright corporate land purchases or long-term leases (World Bank 2010) (Chapter 
2). Funnelling investments through outgrower schemes requires that we understand how 
agribusinesses relate to smallholders and how stakeholder interests are balanced. The way 
smallholders participate in value-chains and how terms and conditions for their inclusion are 
carved has implications on local possibilities for accumulation as well as access to production 
resources. Local implications for agrarian structures as they relate to LaSAIs and value-chain 
expansion points to not only exclusion but also processes of adverse inclusion (Du Toit 2004). 
Understanding how these elements play out require unpacking social-economic and political 
processes that underpins inclusion in local spaces which can highlight power in relationships 
and bargaining processes.  To reflect on how inclusive sugar value-chains are, analysis in this 
chapter is placed within the wider dynamics of LaSAIs and ensuing “win-win” narratives that 
underpin its promotion in international development policy (World Bank 2011; Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick 2009). The second research objective is addressed through an industry analysis, 
and a discussion of smallholder experiences both those included in sugarcane contractual 
arrangements and those excluded.  
5.2 Inclusion, Exclusion and Agrarian Change 
Outgrower schemes (used interchangeably with contract farming) are not a new phenomenon 
(Glover and Kusterer 1990; Little and Watts 1994; Oya 2012; Prowse 2012) but have gained 
renewed attention and promotion in international development policy as alternative to outright 
land purchases associated with LaSAIs (World Bank 2007). Little and Watts (1994) define 
outgrower schemes as a: 
 “form of vertical coordination between growers and buyers-processors that directly 
shape production decisions through contractually specifying market obligations (by 
volume, value, quality, and, at times, advanced price determination; provide specific 
inputs; and exercise some control at the point of production (i.e., a division of 
management functions between contractor and contractee)” (p.9).  
Contractual arrangements in outgrower schemes occupy a central position in the ‘land-
grabbing’ debate as most inclusive institutional and organisational arrangement, and a model 
for increased incomes, with few implications on local institutions. In international development 
policy and practice, outgrower arrangements have been folded under ‘win-win’ narratives 
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(World Bank 2007; FAO 2009). Smallholder coordination arrangements have been advanced 
in the LaSAI debate as conduits for local participation in markets and as pathways for income 
distribution, technology diffusion, knowledge transmission, and most importantly as 
alternative to ‘land-grabbing’ (Vicol 2017; Peluso and Lund 2011). According to Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick, 2009, p.3): 
“contract farming and outgrower schemes that involve existing farmers and land users 
can enable smallholders to benefit from foreign investment while giving the private 
sector room to invest….. contract farming or outgrower schemes are even better (than 
lease or purchase) because they leave smallholders in control of their land but still 
deliver output to the outside investor.” 
Outgrower schemes arguably avoid land displacements (World Bank 2011), and produce win-
win outcomes for participating communities (Kay 2012; Hall et al. 2017; Smalley 2015). 
However, structure and organisation of outgrower schemes vary greatly. Critical agrarian 
political economy perspectives argue that LaSAIs seek opportunities to control productive 
resources such as land and water (Peluso and Lund 2011), presenting outgrower schemes 
equally as important forms of land control (Vicol 2017). Agribusiness dominance in markets 
arguably creates unfair playfield, raising questions about the appropriateness of outgrower 
schemes (Kirsten and Sartorius 2002). Diverse institutional arrangements in agriculture exist 
such as those characterised as extractive, enclave and colonist (Hall 2011). As Oya (2012, p.6) 
argues, there has been “[…] no due consideration of political drivers, nor any serious account 
of power and class as organising principles to understand contract farming’s origin, 
development and outcomes for the different classes of participants.” Whereas power relations 
between corporations and smallholders have been seen to produce unrealistic and unequal 
bargaining power between parties (Prowse 2007), case studies such as those from Malawi show 
how contract farming lead to conflict, impoverishment, land concentration, and economic and 
social differentiation (Phillips 2009). To Adams et al. (2018, p.3), “power and dependences are 
established by the institutions as the ‘rules of the game,’ which correspond to externally driven 
increase in prices of land,” shaping bargaining power. Thus, rather than being forceful, 
agribusinesses variously exert power to control resources (Chapter 7). Land control may also 
determine whether local communities are incorporated into commercial value-chains via 
processing estates or commercialisation without core estates. This determines whether 
inclusion would be on advantageous terms or otherwise. However, prospects for smallholders 
vary, depending on the nature of the coordination schemes, the role of private-sector actors and 
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on what participants can/cannot do. Thus, the politics of such deals revolve around terms of 
inclusion or struggle for incorporation (Borras and Franco 2013, p.1735). 
In Zambia, outgrower schemes have been encouraged as pathway to rural development, 
employment and as empowerment (Chapter 4). However, without grounded insights into 
industry practices and experiences of rural households, it is difficult to appreciate broader 
claims around contractual arrangements as well as LaSAIs as inclusive models and pathways 
for ensuring rural development. This requires examination of smallholder-firm interactions and 
how such relationships shape gains, inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics, and is a focus of 
this chapter. 
5.3 Methodology 
This chapter draws from multi-level semi-structured interviews (n=27) with various 
stakeholders. These included national level key informants, industry experts, donor and NGO 
actors, district and sub-district actors (Table 5.1) (Appendix 3).  
Table 5.1: Data collection  
Multilevel interviews (national, district and industry):  n=25 
Sugarcane/Contract participants 
 
Kaleya (N=160)  Magobbo (N=80) 
Household survey 80 70 
Key informant interviews  8 8 
In-depth household interviews  6 6 
Focus group discussions 5 5 
Non-sugarcane/Contract participants (Magobbo) 
Household survey  30 
Focus group discussion  1 
 
Interviews focused on the wider developments in the sugar industry and how these shaped 
production dynamics and smallholder integration. The chapter also draws on household 
surveys with cane and non-cane growers in Kaleya and Magobbo including focus group 
discussions and wider community interviews. These considered livelihood and land-use 
dynamics in relation to production and determinants for sugarcane inclusion/exclusion. 
Documentary analysis considered industry background, growth and evolution (Section 3.5.2). 
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5.4 Results  
5.4.1 Growth and Expansion of Sugar Value-chains in Zambia 
The timeline in Figure 5.1 illustrates key ‘regimes’ in the Zambian sugar industry from 1960. 
It highlights early state involvement in the industry, which persist to date (Section 5.5.6). 
Sugarcane production was originally private-driven (first regime, 1960-1972) and exclusively 
large-scale. Since nationalisation, the Zambian government closely supported the sugarcane 
industry (second regime, 1972-1995), stimulating initial smallholder integration into sugarcane 
cultivation in the early 1980s at Kaleya. Industry expansion remained modest whilst 
smallholder participation remained limited or static.  
Privatisation of the industry (third regime, 1995 to date) marked a distinctive phase in the 
history of the sugar sub-sector and integration of smallholders in Zambia. The new wave of 
capital inflows from Illovo Sugar Plc in the post-2000 consolidated ZaSPlc’s industry position. 
In this period, ZaSPlc developed an additional 10,500 hectares of sugarcane whilst expanding 




Figure 5.1: Growth and expansion of the sugar industry in Zambia. Colour codes: Green=1st regime; Blue=2nd regime; Red=3rd regime (Derived 
from group discussions, interviews and national archive records).
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This industry expansion and ensuing forms of smallholder integration reflects the centrality of 
regional and foreign capital in the Zambia’s LaSAI-driven sugar value-chains. Whilst 
production systems vary, and contract participation not evenly spread among farmers, the focus 
here is largely on two smallholder outgrower schemes: Kaleya and Magobbo. References are 
however made to the third schemes (Manyonyo, See Chapter 7). 
5.4.2 Sugarcane Expansion: Revisiting Smallholder Outgrower Schemes 
a. Kaleya Smallholder Project  
Historical data and group discussions show how the formation of Kaleya in the 1980s marked 
the initial idea of smallholder inclusion into sugarcane. The rationale was to enhance cane 
throughput to the processing factory of ZaSPlc whilst incorporating smallholders as 
outgrowers. For a long time, smallholder incorporation in sugar value-chains reflected 
dynamics of structural change more broadly and the ensuing structural dependence on ZaSPlc. 
Oral histories reveal that initial inclusion of smallholders in Mazabuka/Kaleya started in 1984 
when the government advertised sugarcane growing as an opportunity for smallholders. Driven 
by prospects of increased incomes and reduced poverty, the Kaleya scheme grew from 64ha 
and 8 farmers (1984) to 2,400ha and 160 smallholders (2016).  
Originally, each farmer was allocated a 4ha sugarcane field, and 0.5ha as dwelling land on 
which a farmer built a house and grew subsistence crops. In 2000, smallholder cane fields were 
increased to an average 7.5ha. However, all land belongs to KaSCOL, and farmers are tenants 
running a 14-year lease – a crucial aspect in determining inclusion and terms and conditions 
for growing sugarcane (Box 5.1; Box 5.2). In 2000, smallholders acquired 19.5% equity share 
in KaSCOL aided by ZaSPlc itself which at that time commanded 25% shareholding in the 
intermediary but later transferred its equity share to its brainchild Mazabuka Cane Growers 
Trust (MCGT) (Figure 3.8). During what is known as commercialisation of KaSCOL and 
floating of company shares, farmers reportedly “lacked financial capacity and information, but 
private-sector actors jostled for shares” explained one farmer representative (SDK2:13.11.15). 
Crucially, a commercial imperative still remains dominant at Kaleya with most farmers 
expressing the opinion that shareholding prioritised commercial as opposed to smallholder 
farmers. 
In Kaleya, smallholder production and market participation relate to sugarcane agreements. 
Sugarcane agreements define roles and responsibilities between the estate and smallholders. 
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Whilst KaSCOL provides inputs, managerial and extension services, smallholders concentrate 
on cane field management. Consequently, labour requirements on sugarcane plots closely relate 
to family structures (Table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2: Sugarcane labour calendar in Kaleya (Derived from group discussions) 
✓ LP: land preparation, trash 
clearing                                                                            
✓ I: irrigation 
✓ RM: removing smut-cane 
✓ W: weeding                                                                                           
✓ FA: fertiliser application 
✓ H: harvesting 
✓ SL: slashing, clearing canals/field edges 
Key: Variations in intensity: ↑peak and ↓minimal  
Activity  Responsibility  
(men/women) 
October November December  January  February  March April  May June July August September  
W  Both             
I Both              
FA Men             
SL Men              
LP Both              
H       Harvesting  
Dry-off           
RM Both             
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KaSCOL harvests sugarcane but has given the cane cutting contract to smallholders through 
the farmer’s association KASFA. Considering this as a good gesture by KaSCOL and an 
evenue for income generation for smallholders, KASFA encourages the use household labour 
to fulfil the cane-cutting contract as a “way to empower our members.” To smallholders, cane 
cutting presented an opportunity to empower dependants and extended family members who 
often laid a claim on sugarcane incomes (Box 5.4; Box 5.5). However, analysis shows that the 
real value of the cane cutting agreement lies less in empowering farmers than in maintaining 
smallholder-intermediary relations and tapping into cheap labour in the demographically-
expanding scheme. 
Labour organisation within households tends to influence cane management and productivity 
among smallholders which in turn determines incomes. But the intensity of sugarcane 
cultivation means smallholders must internalise costs of extra labour, which implicitly 
enhances market imperatives and dependence relationships with KaSCOL.  
b. Magobbo Smallholder Project  
Magobbo is formerly a resettlement area. Previously ranched by Susman Brothers (Hugh 
2005), the government bought the land and resettled farmers including former workers in the 
Susman Brother’s agribusiness. This shows that local participants in the sugarcane scheme not 
a homogenous social category. Prior to sugarcane, farmers grew various crops including maize, 
cotton, groundnuts, and cowpeas, sunflower as well as rearing livestock (Section 3.4). 
According to the resettlement committee (the main community representation for settlers), 
ideas about growing sugarcane started in the 1980s but were always derailed by poor 
community support and “fears of loss of land among farmers” (SDM1:21.06.16). When the 
project started (2008) with the help of the EU, government and ZaSPlc, fears of loss of land 
resurfaced, challenging legitimacy and representation of scheme/community interests in the 
sugarcane project. For instance, farmers disagreed on land allocation to sugarcane in preference 
to wider livestock including subsistence production.  
Group discussions reveal how challenges of poor soils, floods and droughts drove farmers 
towards sugarcane as opposed rainfed crops such as maize. With reference to poor soils, a 
manager at Nanga Farm Plc (NaFPlc) reiterated that: “some farmers abused the land with 
traditional agro-practices such as limited intercropping” (SDMa:20.01.16). Perceptions about 
sugarcane among farmers also varied according to land fertility or productivity challenges, 
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reflecting the wider background and tensions about the project. Farmers in the land fertile zones 
and with larger landholdings generally resisted sugarcane uptake (SDMa:20.01.16).  
The sugarcane committee, formed to articulate grower interests, was identified as an important 
driver of the sugarcane project. Government endorsement of sugarcane and willingness to deal 
with land issues in the community (e.g. relocations) equally contributed. The European 
Commission provided 60% of project funding whilst ZaSPlc/MCGT provided 32% and 8% as 
farmer loans respectively (ZaSPlc2:06.15). Crucially, ZaSPlc runs a sugarcane supply 
agreement with farmers, as the sole buyer. This background means specific patterns of contract 
participation intimately connects to ZaSPlc and its related institutions. That production, 
management and marketing is controlled exclusively by ZaSPlc’s intermediary NaFPlc 
highlights this perspective. This centralised management system is seen by ZaSPlc as favouring 
smallholders in conducting joint activities (e.g. procuring inputs), whilst guaranteeing capital 
investments, but raises serious implications of what smallholders can do and the economic 
benefits. 
In Magobbo, individual/household plots were amalgamated into one block-farm. Formally, 
ZaSPlc required households to own up to 4ha of land in the project catchment area. This 
requirement excluded marginal landowning households from participating, as well as the 
landless including the land scarce often women and youths. In this set-up, smallholders are 
lessors to ZaSPlc/NaFPlc. In return, households receive a share of profits made on their plots 
per hectare within terms and conditions determined by the miller. Although the sugarcane 
committee signed a 5-year renewable management service contract (starting 2011), our 
respondent at ZaSPlc believes “hand holding by the corporation is still necessary” 
(ZaSPlc2:06.15), highlighting tight production control and coordination.  
c. Manyonyo Smallholder Project  
Manyonyo sugarcane project started as an idea in 2000, with direct involvement of the Ministry 
of Agriculture’s Smallholder Irrigation Project Unit. Supported by the Finnish government and 
the African Development Bank, scheme designs, layouts, and construction started in 2009. The 
project has 160 smallholders, 555 hectares of land and operates directly under ZaSPlc itself 
(Figure 3.3). Manyonyo was originally a diversified agricultural scheme and “open on choice 
of crops” (Z1:29.06.15) but excluding sugarcane as confirmed by donor and state actors 
(K1:18.06.15; K2:18.06.15; Z1:29.06.15). Contrary to Magobbo, Manyonyo considered 
multiple crops such as maize, bananas and horticultural crops including aquaculture under one 
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broad scheme – clustering. However, what national interviewees called “corporate take-over” 
by ZaSPlc completely shifted the project focus from horticultural crops to sugarcane – placing 
555ha of smallholder land in directly under the possibility of conversion to sugarcane (Figure 
3.3) (Z1:29.06.15). Some these processes highlight national and regional level dialogues 
(including silences) between and among the local authority, the company and state institutions. 
It also reflects the company’s territorial presence, power and influence, elements I advance in 
more detail in Chapter 7.  
Production control – water and land – presents possibilities of becoming sugarcane 
smallholders whilst limiting scope of their influence. With reference to controlled expansion, 
the potential to expand smallholder production is dependent on not only the milling capacity at 
ZaSPlc but also the firm’s throughput as the dominant grower of sugarcane alongside 
commercial supply chains which limits smallholder supply (Figure 5.3). This reflects power 
dynamics in the industry (Chapter 7). 
Tight coordination between cultivation and processing reflects specificities of sugarcane, the 
former is almost invariably subordinated to the latter. Perishability of sucrose content after 
harvest requires immediate transportation to the mill leading to structural dependence and 
domination of land-use within local mill supply area (Richardson and Richardson 2014). In 
Mazabuka and in relation to outgrower schemes, material control including sugarcane varieties, 
information flow and logistics between growers and the miller are highly integrated with 
interaction between the two ends conditioned by intermediaries. Overall, this hierarchical 
relationship and structural dependence influences, as shaped by the dominant firm, conditions 
and terms under which smallholders produce sugarcane.    
5.5 Sugarcane Production, Terms and Conditions 
Terms and conditions for smallholder participation in sugar value-chains vary according to 
production arrangements. They also differe accroding to origin, integration and operation of 
the schemes (Box 5.1). Three key institutions play a crucial role in determining the terms and 
conditions under which smallholders participate in sugar value-chains: ZaSPlc (buyer, 
processor), the Estimated Recoverable Crystal Committee (consisting members nominated by 
ZaSPlc and members of the Cane Growers Association of Mazabuka, CGAM), and the CGAM 
(representing all growers in the district). However, analysis shows the CGAM is dominated by, 
and aligns to commercial farmers and ZaSPlc as opposed to smallholders.  
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Box 5.1: Quota agreements and typical terms (Drawn from Sugarcane Agreements of 2010). 
Box 5.1.1: Kaleya Smallholder Sugarcane Agreement 
In Kaleya, cane farmers agreement evolved from the 1980s and 1990s alongside changes in 
management structures at KaSCOL and ZaSPlc. The agreement is detailed covering cane 
(production) and dwelling (residential) areas. While the agreements are signed between individual 
smallholders and KaSCOL, the cane price agreement is between KaSCOL and smallholder trust 
(KaST) on behalf of all farmers. The agreement emphasises what smallholders can/cannot do in the 
cane/dwelling areas. KaSCOL thus sublets cane/dwelling land areas at a rent under a 14-year 
renewable lease. The quota agreement is linked to the cane area covered by all smallholders. 
According to the agreement:  
1. Smallholders pay KaSCOL all expenses incurred such as supplying fertilisers and chemicals, 
hiring tractors; implements and operators; irrigation water and any other goods and services 
supplied.  
2. KaSCOL harvests and transports all cane to the mill  
3. Smallholders cannot carry out any developments or assign/sublet any cane/dwelling area 
without KaSCOL consent.  
4. Access to and use of drains, water pipes or anything used in relation to irrigation system shall 
exclusively be in connection with the cane field and dwelling land and will be constructed 
or installed by KaSCOL. KaSCOL supplies/delivers irrigation water to the cane area and 
repair and maintain irrigation equipment. KaSCOL also ploughs cane fields, plant the cane 
and provide all the necessary inputs and services necessary for proper growing of cane  
Smallholders maintain cane on the field to KaSCOL standards including adherence to fertiliser 
programme, maintenance of cane fields (weed-free condition); use of chemicals and maintenance of 
the surrounding of cane areas. KaSCOL may burn and harvest cane in the absence of smallholders. 
Smallholders shall ensure that their cane meet ZaSPlc quality standards. KaSCOL provides 
replanting services to smallholders but only KaSCOL approved varieties of sugar are allowed. 
Animals such as cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys and any other animals likely to be a ‘nuisance’ in the 
cane areas are prohibited. Smallholders can cultivate crops, keep poultry and other acceptable 
animals with consent from KaSCOL. 
Payments are calculated as a percentage of proceeds of the sale of smallholder cane as per cane price 
agreement. The cane price would include the price of molasses; therefore, no separate payment is 
due for molasses. KaSCOL deducts all charges due and payment by the smallholders before any 
payment is made to farmers. Smallholders may nominate qualified members of their immediate 
family preferably spouse, own child and any other successor to take over. However, KaSCOL 
reserves the right to repossess the farm from any smallholder should three successful nominees fail 
to manage the farm accordingly. The agreement can be terminated: if the smallholder is declared 
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bankrupt; death of a smallholder and where no satisfactory person has been nominated to succeed or 
has not been approved by KaSCOL; on disciplinary grounds; resignation; health grounds; not 
building a good house to KaSCOL standards; poor performance – below 75% of the highest producer 
in that block; or absence from the project area for more than 30 years. However, in reality some of 
these elements are less emphasised.  
Box 5.1.2: Magobbo Smallholder Sugarcane Agreement  
In Magobbo, the sugarcane agreement says much about the roles and responsibilities of ZaSPlc, 
CGAM and the ERC committee than on what smallholders can do. This is in part because of the role 
of Nanga Farms as a service provider which cultivates sugarcane on behalf of farmers on five term 
renewable contract. The chairperson for the sugarcane committee and Magobbo Cane Growers Trust 
signs the sugarcane agreement on behalf of smallholders. Individual farmers cannot withdraw their 
land from the block-farm and use it for other purposes. However, where a farmer wishes to withdraw 
from the scheme, he/she must pass all obligations to his/her successor and ceases any claims to the 
land. Having leased their land, farmers are considered as being in business of growing and supplying 
sugarcane while ZaSPlc purchases all the cane within terms and conditions of the agreement. The 
agreement covers five key areas: supply and purchases, quantities, delivery, acceptance of cane and 
quality. Smallholders are not directly involved in the processes. Smallholder annual quota for 
sugarcane is defined as the multiple product of the registered area to be planted to cane – not less 
than 54,487 tonnes of cane (2010/2011) plus or minus 5%. The ZaSPlc’s agronomy department 
makes available agronomic information from trials to the ‘growers’ and can test farmers’ cane for 
pests or diseases. ZaSPlc is also the sole agency permitted to import/introduce new varieties of cane. 
All cane delivered is weighed at the mill’s weighbridge which is “calibrated and assized in 
accordance to the requirements of the ERC committee and the cane testing services” often with no 
smallholder representation. ZaSPlc has the right to unilaterally reject any load of cane found with 
extraneous material (e.g. rocks, sand, metal or any other matter) that could be deemed damaging to 
the machinery or plant of the mill or if the juice quality of the cane is below minimum quality as set 
out by the ERC committee. 
Grower payments are based on a long formular that consider various factors including the estimated 
recoverable crystals (sucrose) of the cane delivered, grower share of the ERC price, agreed costs in 
the crop year per tonne of ERC delivered to the mill including sales of sugar and speciality products 
as well as the millers share of the ERC percentage as agreed. The ERC price is determined, 
communicated and reviewed by the ERC committee taking into consideration any capital investments 
“to expand or improve the efficiency of the mill or factory.” Scheme leaders and smallholders said 
that they did not understand the formula for sugarcane pricing and related determinants.  
Growers can collect filter cake or preference to purchase a quantity of molasses in proportion to the 
cane delivered as determined by the ERC committee. However, missing avenues for 
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commercialisation or use at household level means farmers often do not claim or buy any by-products 
in which case ZaSPlc assumes ownership and opportunity to commercialise.  
 
The role of the ZaSPlc’s ERC committee is very important in understanding industry terms and 
conditions for smallholders. The ERC committee can:  
1. Reduce annual quota by an average of the three years deficit/default if there is a shortfall 
on the delivery of cane in excess of 5% of the annual quota;   
2. Reallocate any deficit in the annual quota of cane delivered by the grower to other 
growers;   
3. Determines circumstances for exceptional increases above the annual quota (more than 
5% of the annual quota) and whether this can be accepted for crushing;  
4. Ensure that the purchase of cane satisfies quality requirements;   
5. Regulates timings of sugarcane deliveries and the related means of transport for 
delivering to the mill;   
6. Increase the annual quota for growers if additional milling capacity is made available; 
and   
7. Approve and regulate cane varieties for all growers.   
In Kaleya, farmers and KaSCOL sell sugarcane to ZaSPlc under a single purchasing agreement 
(Figure 3.4). Smallholder production is guided by a cane farmers’ agreement which specifies 
obligations. Cane and purchasing agreements are developed by ZaSPlc and KaSCOL 
respectively, and are tied to the farmer association, making independent negotiations 
impossible (Box 5.2). 
Cane-prices are determined by the district ERC committee (comprising ZaSPlc and their 
nominees) and payments to all growers are calculated on cane per hectare (TCH) – basically 
tonnes of cane per hectare which relates to yields. ZaSPlc buys sugarcane simply as a 
commercial transaction, but ultimately pays for sucrose – (ERC) (Figure 5.2). Sugarcane is 
assessed on potential amount of extracted sugar – the recoverable value rate (%RV) derived 
from a long ERC formula. In essence, the price for sugarcane and ERC would thus be different. 
A constant theme across group discussions and household interviews was that sugarcane prices 
did not include by-products, as such no separate payment was due to farmers (Box 5.2). Thus, 
KaSCOL applies a price-split arrangement. What this means in practice is that KaSCOL 
receives payments from ZaSPlc in form of ERC price but this is then translated and 
consolidated into TCH per household/farm less charges. Consequently, sugarcane quality and 
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cane-field management determine farmer returns and so are intermediation services. This two-
tier price-split has always been a source of conflict between KaSCOL and farmers. One farmer 
complained: “whilst the company gets 50%, farmers incur costs of production on the balance 
50%” (SDK4.12.1215).  
 
Figure 5.2: Cane split arrangement at Kaleya. Upward arrow shows product 
movement. Downward arrow show price transmission (Derived from interviews). 
Meanwhile farmers in Magobbo are paid a share of proceeds per hectare. However, a deficit of 
market and crop knowledge among farmers means that market dynamics remain complicated 
for smallholders as one farmer representative remarked:“we are sugar growers, but selling a 
commodity we have no idea about” (SDM1:21.01.16). More widely, a majority of respondents 
ascribed low and deteriorating conditions surrounding sugarcane production to institutional 
set-ups in which the intermediaries were implicated. Claims that intermediaries/millers 
deliberately kept information on pricing confidential were frequently heard. Given the random 
measurement of ERC on intake at the mill (i.e. based on random samples picked from haulage 
trucks at entry to the milll), a widely shared view among national experts was that: “cane 
pricing is crude to give the real value to producers” (D15.28.06.15).  
In both communities, farmers reported that smallholder prices were being influenced by several 
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1. the way sugarcane is stacked in haulage trucks, which determines which stalks are 
sampled for assessment; 
2. length of dry-off period;  
3. the burning of the fields;  
4. cutting and harvesting; and  
5. millers’ share of the ERC price, including cost of inputs.  
That decisions around these key elements which preclude smallholders reflected not only 
dynamics of contract participation but also asymmetrical power relations between farmers and 
intermediaries and the processor including its related institutions. Smallholders faced 
unpredictable decisions “on production, marketing, and pricing of sugarcane” (G4:15.06.15). 
In Magobbo, this affected the way risks and cost of failures were carried. This included 
accountability of parties on efficiency (e.g. wastage, poor crop management), which can mean 
a loss of real value of land. In Kaleya, it affected the way farmers perceive land and land 
development within the estate and overall profitability of sugarcane. For instance, group 
discussions revealed a general disinterest among cane growers to invest in the scheme 
preferring to relocate, buying land and investing elsewhere (Chapter 6).  
There are arguments that ZaSPlc creates economic activities for local people, e.g. employment, 
which ensures wealth distribution. However, this conceals the costs associated and the related 
realities (Section 7.5.2). Most of the workforce in sugar plantations is seasonal (mostly male), 
and mostly concentrated around harvesting period (March – August) – including in Kaleya 
where part of the cane cutting contract has been given to smallholders (Box 5.1). The centrality 
of seasonal migrant labour to ZaSPlc was highlighted in four main ways:  
1. Transportation of workers to and from other provinces (e.g. Western and North-
Western provinces);  
2. Establishment of temporal residential camps across the district;  
3. Provision of social support such as HIV/AIDS sensitization (ZaSPlc and district 
agencies), and;  
4. Distribution of food including energy drinks to migrant workers on plantations. 
The local authority complained that this concentration of seasonal workers strained health, 
housing, land and water services, whilst reducing gross payments of wages locally which could 
help to reduce poverty (Chapter 7). One district officer expressed an opinion that the focus on 
migrant labour means that “there are still high poverty rates prevailing in the district.”   
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5.6 Negotiating Inclusion and Contending Exclusion in Sugar Value-Chains  
This section addresses structural determinants of inclusion defined to include factors related 
to production, value-chain dynamics and national dynamics. It also discusses non-structural 
factors defined to include land ownership, inheritance and rules guiding membership in 
smallholder schemes. Combined, these factors show inclusionary processes are multi-
dimesnional, but closely relate to processes of exclusion.   
5.6.1 Structural Factors  
a. Public-Private Partnerships and Irrigation Management Transfers 
Discussions with farmers and interviews with officials identified public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) and Irrigation Management Transfers (IMTs) as important determinants of smallholder 
inclusion into sugarcane. Donors and state actors have in the post-2000 provided smallholder 
irrigation infrastructure, formalising institutions responsible for the management of outgrowers 
and then handing those over to groups of farmers to work in them (Box 5.2).  
Box 5.2: Public-Private Partnerships and Irrigation Management Transfers 
Public-Private Partnerships have gained prominence in agriculture and rural development strategies 
in Africa (Harrison and Chiroro 2016). In Zambia, legal and institutional frameworks enable state 
and donor actors to foster irrigation infrastructure, enabling smallholders to work alongside 
commercial entities. The smallholders are embedded in the supply chains as a strategy for poverty 
reduction, whilst the commercial entity provides market thrust. There are grounds for this optimism: 
“[w]e are displacing you from your land but giving you a percentage share in the scheme/company” 
explained one official (Z3:04.01.16). The rationale is that: “commercial entities should not lead to 
the exclusion of smallholders/local communities” he added (Z1:29.06.15). 
 
While promoting farmer inclusion, state funded schemes present sugarcane as an important 
crop for poverty reduction and rural development. Households who cannot access irrigation 
infrastructure and services are typically excluded. Within value-chain development, donors 
play an important role as funders: “the management models are key in drawing us into 
agriculture” (K1:18.06.15). Donors advance irrigation, technical expertise and infrastructural 
development, although efforts remain slow, limited and regional and around ZaSPlc. Thus, 
within Zambia, smallholder inclusion in sugarcane has always been regional. Interviews with 
national actors ascribed this to uneven donor and government support alongside financial 
power and influence by ZaSPlc (Chapter 7). 
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Records from the Zambia Revenue Authority show that 93% (n=38) of commercial 
farmers/entities producing sugarcane are based in southern province and around ZaSPlc. This 
spatiality and structure ensures that ZaSPlc is supplied by a variety of growers that are 
dependent upon one mill and processor (i.e. companies, commercial farmers, outgrower 
schemes) (Figure 5.3). This limit wider expansion of sugarcane among smallholders, making 
processes of inclusion highly contested. Donor and government actors acknowledged: “ZaSPlc 
and Mazabuka should have more smallholders engaged in sugarcane” (Z1:29.06.15; 
K1:18.06.15) in relation to state-donor support to the sector (Chapter 7), and the company and 
the milling capacity. 
Figure 5.3: Zambia sugar industry structure based on stakeholder interviews 
However, limited number of smallholders integrated in sugar value-chains also related to 
government and donor failure to incentivise smallholder inclusion elsewhere (e.g. Kasama and 
Kafue) (Figure 5.1). Limited value-chain participation by smallholders in sugar value-chains 
can be reflective of wider politics of sugarcane in Zambia (Chapter 7). By having more 
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production via smallholders, the government thinks that the power of Illovo/ZaSPlc may be 
curtailed. Whilst the government policy encourages more smallholders to participate in 
sugarcane production and engage ZaSPlc, respondents were fearful of the power and influence 
of the company. Fearing company take-overs, one official in the MoA feared that ZaSPlc might 
monopolise sugarcane, adding: “can we hold down this monster called Illovo” (Z1:29.06.15). 
Chapter 7 discusses corporate influence and power dynamics in the industry in detail.  
However, scaling up sugarcane among smallholders faces diverse challenges of technical 
expertise, collateral, insecurity of tenure, and high cost of irrigation infrastructure. Other 
challenges relate to observed variations in donor models and preferences which affects 
collaborations (e.g. collective block-farming vs individual clustering with mixed crops) 
(Section 3.4). These challenges mean that most smallholders are unlikely to participate in 
sugarcane growing in Zambia.   
b. Value-chain Inclusion as Corporate Strategy 
Privatisation and entry of Illovo galvanised the sugar industry and incentivised new ranks of 
smallholder sugarcane cultivators. The hallmark was the establishment of the Smallholder 
Development Office and the formation of Mazabuka Cane Growers Trust by ZaSPlc for 
promoting sugar in the district. One outcome has been a 141% (n=225) increase in smallholder 
growers in the period between 2009 and 2015. Our respondent at ZaSPlc explains that 
“smallholder inclusion is a deliberate effort to promote outgrowers outside any other 
corporate social responsibility” adding “you can see the sacrifices the company is making” 
(ZaSPlc2:06.15). ZaSPlc evidently desires to be viewed as that institution with the power of 
transforming smallholder sugarcane dreams into realities, with a variety of investments and 
policies as set out in Box 5.3. 
Box 5.3: Illovo and smallholder sugar sourcing in southern Africa 
Oxfam’s ‘Behind the Brands Campaign’ has witnessed commitments from global corporations such 
as Coca-Cola to ‘zero tolerance’ for land grabs in their sugar sourcing (Oxfam 2013). Suppliers such 
as Illovo Sugar have made similar commitments with respects to smallholders and land rights. Illovo 
published its own guidelines and road-map on land and land rights with reference to sustainable 
farming practices and land acquisition within its supply chain. “Illovo prioritises alternative model 
investments, such as the development of smallholder grower farming operations in areas in which 
we operate, rather than acquiring their land for our own development” it says (Illovo 2016). Within 
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this period, Illovo has been branded a ‘champion’ on ‘just sugar sourcing’ moving to ban ‘land-
grabbing’ in its supply chain (Oxfam 2016). 
 
A lack of resources, knowledge and capacity among smallholders builds a case for 
intermediaries as management companies that can guide on agronomic and technical aspects 
of sugarcane (e.g. disease control and quality managament). This included commercial 
elements such as procurement (e.g. fertiliser, pestcides and herbicides) and cane field 
management (Box 5.1). However, variability in governance structures for outgrower schemes 
means service providers play variable roles, with implications for the positioning and inclusion 
of growers. Smallholders require intermediary coordination of production partly because, from 
the management and quality perspective, small-scale projects as advanced in sugarcane still are 
large-scale biased. Smallholder inclusion and exclusion thus relates to the role of intermediaries 
which also relates to the processor.  
However, a continued deficit in capabilities among smallholders (e.g. on crop requirements, 
pest and disease controls, procurement processes, marketing dynamaics), more so alongside 
the presence of intermediaries, means participating farmers are not able to perform particular 
roles in sugarcane production. In Kaleya, discussions reveal heightened land contestations 
between smallholders and KaSCOL, the former demanding control over land and production. 
In Magobbo, farmers face a lack of crop knowledge and control over production: “[w]e grow 
sugarcane but there is nothing we know” (SDM2:06.15). A sense of frustration was observed 
among a majority of farmers who blamed intermediaries for their low financial gains, with 
some expressing the desire to work independently of Nanga Farms. However, on reflecting on 
meetings with farmers including discussions on various elements around sugarcane production, 
input procurement and prices, a manager at NaFPlc reported a general farmer disinterest in 
sugarcane crop knowledge. This means suggestions of independent management of schemes 
by smallholders was going to be difficult.  
In Kaleya, management practices were determined mainly at inception in the 1980s. These 
have passed down the years with new farmers relying largely on family experience and 
participation in sugarcane production as opposed to formalised trainings. Whilst these were 
written in cane farmers agreements with an understanding of smallholder agricultural 
operations, it is difficult to tell actual farmer input in the guidelines. Initially, these practices 
were communicated on recruitment through the initial farmer trainings of six months. 
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Overtime, trainings have become fewer and wider apart such that new farmers as successors 
have tended to rely on family experience and knowledge transmission. KaSCOL officers 
conduct field inspections and advise farmers on areas of concern. Thus, a senior official at 
KaSCOL was equally unconvinced about farmer-led schemes seeing “continued farmer receipt 
of warning letters from KaSCOL over non-adherence to cane management practices” 
(SDKa:14.11.15). Whilst sustaining smallholder inclusion, the current institutonal set-up 
means intermediaries remain an extension and trajectory of corprate dominance within which 
smallholders are implicated.  
The outcome of ZaSPlc’s expansion and ensuing smallholder integration – controlled and 
dependent upon corporate expansion and strategies – has been deepening grower dependency. 
Thus, the publicly articulated focus on smallholder integration conceals ZaSPlc’s expansion 
and concentration within the agro-industry chain which has ensured dominance in production 
(Figure 5.3). Highlighting a highly dynamic agribusiness context, such expansions present 
possibilities for as well as subordination of smallholders. These are also indicative of the 
transforming agrarian structures, processes and control by corporations in which smallholders 
negotiate inclusion. 
c. Role of Contracts, Quotas, Water and Markets  
Interviews and group discussion data reveals how delivery of contracts to growers for the 
supply of sugarcane expresses another conduit for determining smallholder inclusion. Using 
sugarcane agreements, ZaSPlc tightly controls quotas, water for irrigation and markets. 
Sugarcane agreements are “powerful and valuable documents without which one cannot 
produce sugarcane” explained one district official (D15:28.06.15). These highly-sought after 
agreements are not only conduits for specifying quantities, varieties and standards expected 
and impressed through intermediaries but also mechanisms for determining who participates 
in sugarcane production, where, how and when.  
The perishability of sugarcane that demands immediate processing means that to accommodate 
diverse growers, ZaSPlc must run a tight sugarcane supply quota arrangement. However, a 
consistent theme across group discussions was that allocation of scheme quotas spelt exclusion 
for some smallholders (e.g. Magobbo), which again produces another trajectory of rural 
livelihood transformation (Chapter 6). 
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For sugarcane, water is critical and emerging hydro-social relationships around the resource 
enables or limit possibilities for grower inclusion. In Mazabuka, ZaSPlc holds water rights, 
controlling the resource for outgrowers. In Kaleya, some farmers believe that the control and 
usage of water always aligned/strengthened KaSCOL’s sugarcane expansion whilst neglecting 
smallholders. In response and as a cost-saving measure, some farmers limit irrigation cycles to 
only two, with the balance covered by rainfall. This increases the crop’s susceptibility to 
diseases (e.g. smut), affecting yields. Farmers report that it cost them between £123-184 per 
irrigation cycle and that they were irrigating an average 5-6 cycles as opposed to average 10 
cycles required per season. To many respondents, “relationships around water and water 
rights require urgent consideration” (D15:28.06.15; G4:15.06.15) (Chapter 7). This confirms 
how inclusion can proceed on disadvantageous terms and conditions. In this case, the question 
is not about contract participation but rather what contract participants are able to do once they 
enter coordination schemes.  
Farmers gave mixed views on the way sugarcane schemes were organised and on the merits of 
collective production. In Magobbo, scheme leaders gave several advantages of being organised 
in schemes and under collective production arrangements. One scheme leader argued that 
“producing sugarcane is costly, individual farmers cannot afford on their own” while another 
one remarked that “it is easier to acquire and pay back bank loans.” Others added: “sugarcane 
needs technical advice on planting, management, irrigation and harvesting and local farmers 
lack this knowledge” and that “mutual interests and group ownership reduces risks of sabotage 
by unhappy groups of people.” However, scheme leaders and farmers agreed that collective 
production arrangements through amalgamated land brought about fears that the land will 
never be given back to farmers in the future as sugarcane promoters promised. Some farmers 
bemoaned a project’s lack of consideration of pre-existing water sources including cultural and 
traditional attachments such as graveyards which were erased in forming the block-farm.  
Group discussions with farmers revealed that prior sugarcane household members engaged in 
diverse land-uses and income generating activities such as crop or livestock production 
particularly for women. However, adoption of sugarcane meant that household members “are 
drawn on one source of income – sugarcane – which leads to intra-household conflicts.” Group 
discussions with scheme leaders and farmers also expressed opinions that direct involvement 
by Nanga Farms proved costly as the service provider had to cover all costs including water, 
inputs, labour, fuel including administration costs before any payment was due to farmers. A 
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general feeling among respondents was that “as a trustee we would want to get some works 
from Nanga Farms to reduce the payments we make to the service provider” (FGD, Magobbo 
2015). In Kaleya on the contrary, farmer complaints surrounded what they characterised as 
unclear commercial transations, control over land and water, affecting investments in the 
scheme and restrictions on what smallholders can do within the scheme or dwelling lands.  
5.6.2 Non-structural Factors  
 a. Politics of Land and the Growing Importance of Inheritance  
Interviews and group discussions in Magobbo revealed that land ownership in the farm-block 
was crucial in determining smallholder participation in sugarcane production. Formally, 
ZaSPlc required households to have a maximum of 4ha of land available in the catchment area 
and for sugarcane. This requirement excluded the landless, land scarce and marginal land-
owning households from participating, including the poor who could not afford to purchase 
land. These were mainly women, the aged, widows and youths. As highlighted in section 3.4.1, 
sugarcane production and agreements in Magobbo required that farmers lease out individual 
plots of land as a block-farm to ZaSPlc and Nanga Farms. ZaSPlc believed that this guaranteed 
its capital investment. However, the land agreements did not provide any escape route for 
farmers that might want to pursue alternative livelihoods and economic pathways outside 
sugarcane. This was because the sugarcane agreements as well as the farmer constitution 
requires a minimum of 20 years before farmers could claim back their initial land and possibly 
opt-out of the scheme/block and sugarcane or re-allocate their land to other activities (Box 5.1). 
Focus group discussions however revealed that few were aware of this period.  
Given the ceiling on scheme land ownership per household (4ha) in the scheme, farmers with 
extra land in the catchment faced three possibilities.  
1. Sell their extra land, but weak monetised land markets and low prices meant that 
some farmers lost out due to fear of incurring losses and the need to achieve quicker 
returns.  
2. Swap an equivalent amount of land with anyone willing to join the scheme, but 
discounting – from economic calculations – preference, location, fertility and 
quality components of land since there was no way farmers could know the value 
of the land.  
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3. Lose out completely. Group discussion with the scheme leaders revealed that this 
was because the land in the catchment area could technically not be converted to 
other uses as this was against the agreement with ZaSPlc. In this case land was 
vested in the community trust, in practice the sugarcane committee.  
Extra unclaimed hectares of land were placed under the committee. Sugarcane payments from 
this land act as a source of income for committee activities. However, this so-called ‘buffer 
money’ was a sharp source of conflicts, and leadership contestations, raising governance 
challenges and accusations of misappropriation of funds.  
Claims of land accumulation by some farmers were reported in group discussions and 
household case studies. The better-off farmers within and outside Magobbo accumulated pieces 
of land in the scheme creating absentee landlords, as one caretaker remarked: “[t]he farm 
owner stays in town. He asked me to come here to join the sugarcane family” (SDM8.02.16). 
The land and resource poor category farmers that could neither swap nor buy land in the 
scheme were excluded. To one manager at NaFPlc, participation by outsiders (who could flex 
their financial power and buy land from farmers in the catchment area) eventually led to a 
mixed farmer group, raising “challenges for scheme coordination, governance and benefit 
sharing” (SDMa:20.01.16). During fieldwork, divisions in the scheme were visible, with two 
parallel committees all running and claiming legitimacy. A remark from one district official 
was illustrative: “Magobbo is where everyone wants to be in the sugarcane committee” 
(D6:06.15). Financial incentives available to committee members from the buffer money 
heightened stakes for leadership positions but also created possibilities of ‘elite-capture’ 
(Phillips 2014). This was compounded by the fact that district officials prioritised commercial 
interests aligning to ZaSPlc interests, in effort to maintain ‘opportunities’ for smallholders. 
Consequently, the scheme suffers from lack of control/guidance either from district officials or 
ZaSPlc/NaFPlc, enhancing power imbalances in the schemes (Chapter 7).  
Consequently, and within grower households, divergences and disputes were reported in group 
discussions and interviews. For instance, multiple claims to land were reportedly heightened 
by sugarcane adoption, leading to exclusion from within. Where powerful household members 
dominated, this resulted in alienation and exclusion of weaker members such as youths and 
women from sugarcane incomes and decision making. Although a few devised plans for 
instance for income sharing, this again affected what a household could do (e.g. asset 
acquisition, investments). Within this account, women constitute yet again another cohort of 
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losers, typically facing marginalisation. Declining importance of livestock and reduced 
subsistence production had impacts particularly on women (Section 3.4), who traditionally had 
participated in these activities, compelling them to enter the sugarcane labour market.   
A scheme policy to recruit one worker from each household, against the culture that 
discourages them to work and the perception that sugarcane is a man’s crop, has seen women 
participate in various tasks on the plantation including weeding (Table 5.3). Group discussions 
with women cited poverty, poor expenditure decisions by husbands as heads of the household, 
unfavourable sugarcane returns, indebtedness, social prestige and respect as some of the 
motivating factors for seeking wage employment.   
Table 5.3: Proportion of workers from smallholder households working in Magobbo scheme 
(n=80; availed by Nanga Farms).  
Year  Female Male 
2014 33% (n=26) 67% (n=54) 
2015 30% (n=24) 70% (n=56) 
2016 26% (n=29) 64% (n=51) 
 
However, group discussions with women revealed unsavoury experiences from working on 
sugarcane plantations. Women complained about poor working conditions; low wages, 
unfavourable work shifts that discouraged more women from participating – with fears of 
health implications emerging from exposure to dangerous sugarcane chemicals (e.g. on skin 
condition, reproduction). Once again, a key highlight here is how inclusion brings forth adverse 
experiences for women value-chain participants.  
In contrast, Kaleya faced generational challenges with the passing of some ‘original farmers’ 
(102/160 farmers; 66%). Whilst being successful in attracting young famers, inclusion has 
become highly contested, more so in polygamous families since only one person often a 
nephew can legally inherit the sugarcane field. Inclusion in the scheme is defined either by a 
Will or inheritance (Box 5.1). However, serious inheritance disputes abound, as one farmer 
remarked: “it is all about waiting for somebody to die in order to inherit the sugarcane farm” 
(GDK2:13.01.16). Cane fields were perceived as family-owned as opposed to individual, 
increasing claims as well as obligations on the part of inheritors. Increasingly, family members 
often organised to impose their preferred candidates or demand a share of proceeds. In response 
to family conflicts and most importantly land ownership structure in the scheme, farmers are 
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seeking investment opportunities elsewhere: “this is just inherited property. We need to secure 
a future for our children” remarked one farmer (GDK2:13.01.16). That some farmers are 
relocating and seeking livelihoods/investment opportunities away from the scheme whilst 
remaining in sugar value-chains, highlight how production systems increasingly disconnect 
farmers from their position as growers and as custodians of the land (Dubb 2016) (Chapter 6). 
Whilst KaSCOL demands that each farmer deposits a Will indicating their successor, culture 
that sees sugarcane plots as family owned was blamed for increasing cases of household 
inheritance related conflicts. Within the Tonga matrilineal tradition, strong beliefs were 
reported: “that farmers – predominantly male – do not entrust property in their children” 
(SDKc:19.01.16), heightening tensions with extended families. Culture is more challenging for 
women: “a female spouse – who has powers to remarry on the farm – cannot inherit” 
explained one KaSCOL officer (SDKc:19.01.16). Women shared the feeling that “their future 
in sugarcane was neither determined nor secured, more so if one was married to a successor” 
(GDK3:11.12). This tradition means opportunities for women were attached to their marital 
status and were differentiated (Box 5.4) compared to their male counterparts (Box 5.5).  
Box 5.4: A Woman Successor in Kaleya 
     The story of Jemuna2 started in 1993 when her polygamous husband joined the scheme. 
Upon his death (2011) their son inherited the farm but due to poor sugarcane management, 
KaSCOL transferred the farm to Jemuna (the mother). Jemuna reports lack of respect in the 
house, intimidations, and increased family obligations. She remarks: “it is always war after 
sugarcane payments,” reporting emotional/physical abuse from her children (who perceive 
themselves as rightful heirs) and false accusations from relatives about poor farm 
management. “I fear that my children or family members family would harm or kill me” 
(CSM3:02.16). Her opinion is that this is because “am not the original owner of the farm” 
and that I “am a woman.” Organising/coordinating household labour became problematic.  
 
                                                          
2 Real names have been concealed to guarantee anonymity 
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Box 5.5: When a man inherits a farm in Kaleya 
When Dimuna’s father died, extended family members chose two preferred candidates to 
take-over whilst preparing sixteen other potential candidates. Upon announcing Dimuna as 
successor, he describes “unhappiness, disappointment and anger” among family members 
and that “he feared for his life.”  Similarly, he noticed changes in the work culture among 
household/family members and poor cooperation. Financial disputes soon ensued but 
believes this was common to all successors. He adds: “I have to be stubborn on expenditure 
decisions in order to follow my dreams” (CSM1:02.16) 
Some of these challenges related to failure by family members to actively pursue alternative 
livelihood/economic opportunities outside the scheme – a clear culture of sugarcane 
dependency. To one KASFA representative, “it is not the question of financial resources,” but 
“culture that sees sugarcane fields as promising a good future” (SDKc:19.01.16). These 
dynamics determine what farmers could do within the scheme, and the possibilities of poverty 
reduction. For instance, the poor category households were more likely to face sharp 
inheritance conflicts. These households reflected poor labour organisation and were those that 
were unable to invest away from the scheme, highlighting crucial hierarchies within 
transforming social relations (Chapter 6).   
b. Scheme Membership and Role of Traditional Leaders   
Local interviews and group discussions reveal that participation in sugarcane further related to 
scheme membership as well as the role of traditional leaders. In Kaleya, a farmer association 
KASFA dealt with inheritance issues whilst acting as link between smallholders and KaSCOL. 
In Magobbo, the committee was key in selecting participants, bringing to the fore elements of 
corruption and nepotism. But some industry experts described these associations as “weak and 
fluid” and “production and survival oriented as opposed to being critical in engaging 
downstream actors” (D15.28.06.15) (Box 5.6). A lack of business and industry understanding 
means that “associations think they have an ok deal” argued one expert (G4:15.06.15). In both 
communities, farmer associations lacked expert knowledge on sugarcane. Most farmers believe 
that this led to a lack of effectiveness on production and price matters, leading to what was 
described as failed promises. Thus, the way farmer associations shape community narratives 
and the playing out of politics greatly shaped inclusion and exclusion as well as possibilities 
for farmers.   
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Box 5.6: Farmer Associations and Leadership Struggles in Magobbo. 
In Magobbo, sugarcane business is handled by the sugarcane committee – a committee of 10 
members led by a chairperson. The committee members are elected from the general membership by 
the smallholders on 5-year terms. The committee is not specialised and receive no traiing sugarcane 
production, pricing, marketing or procurement. Its role includes dealing with grower’s concerns such 
as information sharing on prices, procurement and other decisions by ZaSPlc and Nanga Farms 
including dealing with scheme conflicts. The committee draws on the Magobbo Cane Growers Trust 
– a trust that holds and receive funds from sugarcane grown in former grazing lands and other 
unclaimed land – heightening leadership stakes in the scheme.  
The research team was told that elections to elect a new committee were held on 30th September 2015 
under the guidance and observation of district representatives such as the council and the DACO 
who facilitated the ushering in of the new committee members. However, by 2016, power was still 
not handed over and the new committee was not allowed by the old committee to conduct any 
sugarcane business especially signing for the committee monies (e.g. payments to farmers or drawing 
from the scheme account). Discussions with the settlement committee – the oldest committee formed 
in the 1980s to deal with settlers and act as an overseer in the entire settlement area – confirmed that 
it was being consulted on community matters by both the old and new committees. The settlement 
committee argued that the sugarcane scheme was receiving mixed messages from the district: 
political representatives, DACO, ZaSPlc and the courts who were involved in solving the case.  
Efforts to resolve leadership challenges through the courts, policy and settlement committee all 
proved futile. A laid-back approach from ZaSPlc seem to place district as well as scheme actors in a 
difficult situation and led to conclusions that ZaSPlc preffered working with the old committee whom 
they continued to consult on sugarcane matter (e.g. signing on farmer payments). Farmers were 
fearful that the partnership between the old committee and ZaSPlc aimed to transform the scheme 
into the KaSCOL model which could mean complete loss of land by farmers. To the settlement 
committee, what was going on “is a battle over the future of Magobbo” whilst farmers expressed 
opinions that the old committee hanged onto power because they were misappropriating scheme 
funds.         
 
Chiefs on the other hand dealt with land matters whilst endorsing sugarcane. In Magobbo, 
evidence revealed how instrumental chiefs were at project inception particularly with respect 
to relocations of households from the sugarcane farm-block to new dwelling lands just outside 
the sugarcane catchment area. Strong links between the Ministry of Chiefs at district level and 
ZaSPlc were observed, more than any other government department interviewed. However, 
Chiefs entrench business interests as opposed to representing smallholders in wider district 
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circles. However, discussions with Chiefs revealed another trajectory of corporate influence 
that side-lined the smallholders. Chiefs complained about broken promises and departure from 
investment pledges, e.g. “the number of smallholders growing sugarcane is smaller than we 
imagined, which makes ZaSPlc richer” (D3:01.16). They also complained about being 
sidelined: “ZaSPlc does not align with us, they work independently and directly with farmers” 
(D4:01.16). Chiefs were also of the view that the the current institutional arrangement was 
sophisticated for community members to adopt sugarcane in that it placed so much power in 
ZaSPlc, its institutions and intermediaries to dictate who grew sugarcane in the area (Chapter 
7).  
In response, chiefs proposed somewhat of a community-based approach to sugarcane 
productin. A sense of frustration among chiefs who wanted more community members to grow 
sugarcane was clear: “we want a different sugarcane model where farmers can deliver to the 
mill on sledges/ox-carts” remarked one Chief (D4:11.15). They believed that this model would 
allow more villagers to grow sugarcane and contribute to reducing poverty and suffering in 
their communities. However, these dynamics, indicative of power relations, highlight dynamics 
of who can influence what in the sugar industry – and is a focus of Chapter 7. 
5.7 Unpacking Exclusion in Magobbo 
As outlined in section 3.4.1, the selection of Magobbo as a case study community allowed for 
identification of non-cane growers within the 3-5 kilometre radius applied in the study on 
which data on dynamics of exclusion were collected. This radius however did not yield 
sufficient coparable cases in Kaleya as non-cane growers were located far beyond the scheme. 
Interviews and household surveys with non-cane growers revealed original plans by promoters 
of the scheme to incorporate all settlers in the area as growers. This would involve swapping 
with farmers who had extra land in the catchment area. However, rather than swapping, some 
farmers sold their extra land for quick economic gains (including those that exited sugarcane). 
This led to unintended lost opportunty for others who wanted to grow sugarcane and thus non-
participation. The sugarcane committee corroborates: “there were disagreements, some just 
resisted whilst others sold their land completely” (SDM2:06.15). Conversely, opportunities for 
new participants outside the scheme were created through land purchases. The landless, land 
scarce or those who were willing to swap but did not get that chance faced exclusion. 
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In determining actual shifting patterns of land-use, transfers or sales, farmers were asked about 
land allocation before and after the sugarcane project and then probing current land availability 
(Figure 5.4). In addition, survey data showed that on average, households held 2.3ha, 2ha and 
1.6ha of land as available, accessed and utilised respectively, lower than before sugarcane 
adoption. This was clearly indicative of land transfers and conversions in relation to sugarcane 
expansion.   
 
Figure 5.4: Household land-use pattern before and after the sugarcane project (n=70, 
from household surveys). 
Interviews and group discussions identified two sets of factors for determining exclusion:  
1. Active farmer decisions; and 
2. Those related to project selection.  
In illustrating processes and multiple realities, I explored these further in household surveys 
asking non-cane growers how important they thought these factors were in influencing their 
exclusion as summarsed in Table 5.4. Some farmers that were land insecure expressed 
unwillingless to participate in sugarcane production, judging the risks of loss of land in that 
sugarcane growers in Magobbo effectively leased the land to ZaSPlc. They also highligted 
unclear sugarcane benefits. Other factors were indirect relating to household contenstations and 
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Table 5.4: Factors influencing sugarcane exclusion in Magobbo (n=30).  
Exclusionary factors   Very important  Important Less important  
Active farmer decisions 
Fear of loss of land 60%(18) 20%(6) 20%(6) 
Unclear sugarcane benefits 17%(5) 33%(10) 50% (15) 
Project selection criteria 
Not owning land in the catchment area 88% (27) 12%(3) – 
Family land disputes  50%(15) 50%(15) – 
No one to swap land with – 71%(21) 29%(9) 
Participation by outsiders reduced inclusion chances 9%(3) 36%(11) 55%(16) 
 
Although some farmers were unconvinced about sugarcane benefits, survey data shows 
sugarcane remains appealing to non-cane growers: about 94% (n=28) of the surveyed non-
sugarcane growers considered growing sugarcane in the future. The perception was that 
sugarcane was profitable a crop. This also included the fact that there were few opportunities 
being promoted to non-cane growers for agriculture and other businesses in the area. Already, 
this has knock-on effects on adjacent communities. Some farmers were acquiring land in 
Kabesha (east of Magobbo) in response to rumours that the area will soon be an extension of 
the Magobbo block-farm and that farmers will be invited to become growers. One non-
sugarcane grower who acquired land in Kabesha remarked: “when sugarcane extends to 
Kabesha, I will automatically be a sugarcane grower” (SDM13:18.01.16).  
Magobbo farm-block is an incorporation of both individual household and communal grazing 
land. One major concern among non-cane growers included the incorporation of communal 
grazing land into sugarcane (about 23ha) placed under the committee, as encouarged by chiefs, 
district departments such as agriculture and lands and other district officials. Under the idea 
that money realised from the grazing land (known as buffer money) would be used to develop 
the wider community (e.g. infrastructure as social responsibility), non-cane growers reluctantly 
agreed with the project promoters and government departments to release the land. However, 
this immediately proved problematic as one grower argued: “the money is not benefiting the 
community that originally accessed the grazing land” (SDM13:18.01.16). A majority of non-
cane growers including cane growers alleged misappropriation of funds by the sugarcane 
committee. In this context, opportunities for cane growing translated into a crisis for non-cane 
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growers, illustrative of how processes of inclusion sets into motion processes of exclusion 
(Tobin et al. 2016).   
5.8 Discussion: Coordination Schemes as Inclusive Models?    
This chapter explored dynamics of smallholder inclusion and exclusion on the Zambian 
‘sugarbelt.’ In so doing, it contributes to a growing body of literature interested in how value-
chain expansion plays out in local environments (Bolwig et al. 2010). Evidence highlightes 
lived realities and experiences, underlining how the socially contested intersection of the 
global-local value-chain produces diverse and uneven but interdependent hierarchies of 
inclusion and exclusion. Whilst LaSAIs and ensuing outgrower schemes as coordination 
schemes continue to be linked to inclusionary perspectives as mutually beneficial 
arrangements, this study challenges these somewhat simplistic narratives. Participation and 
governing power relations show how market institutions cannot always be pro-poor and 
inclusionary. There are diverse mechanisms through which outgrower schemes create 
hierarchies of dependences at local level. However, understanding smallholder inclusion and 
exclusion requires a consideration of structural and non-structural factors. Within the structural 
context, multi-level partnerships, corporate strategies and intermediaries create an inclusionary 
context, though with a visible agribusiness influence (Peters 2013). Government and donor 
collaborations sustain conversations around private-sector development and smallholder 
integration for poverty reduction (Barret 2008). However, fears of corporate take-overs by state 
agenices highlight divergences between broad smallholder inclusion in sugarcane production, 
employment and income distribution as rural empowerment and development and agribusiness 
objectives (German et al. 2016). Whilst development narratives enhanced the role of 
smallholders in sugarcane, endogenous corporate expansion also limits their participation 
(Hess et al. 2016; Dubb et al. 2016). In part, this relates to tight control over land and water, 
with smallholder schemes rendering a systematic conduit through which resources are absorbed 
into corporate production (Dubb 2016). Here, land property relationships are redefined, 
allowing corporations access to land whilst exerting control over communities, with impacts 
across social relations (Adams et al. 2018). Any narratives around ‘just sugarcane sourcing’ 
(as proposed under Oxfam 2016) thus require scrutiny. In the two case study communities, 
while coordination schemes present opportunities for economic and material accumulation, 
schemes fall short of being ‘win-win’ arrangements – there are winners (intermediaries and 
firms) and there are losers (typically certain smallholder participants). Rather than being 
homogenous, farmer groups are heterogenous with the better-off households obviously 
147 
accumulating. Within local communities, dynamics of sugarcane as a crop and of contractual 
arrangements produce mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion – the poorest households 
generally and particularly women and youths face exclusion.    
Non-structural elements played even a greater role in shaping participation and non-
participation among smallholders, contrary to some narratives (Barret et al. 2012). 
Smallholders relate to value-chains differently and participation is clearly non-random as 
opposed to random (ibidi.). Any inclusion first relates to there being a farmer 
group/association, which intensifies inclusionary processes whilst opening hierarchies of 
inequalities within communities (Tobin et al. 2016; Ashraf et al. 2009). The consequences of 
widening inequalities in commodity chains are widely acknowledged (Phillips 2014) and so 
are the patterns of differentiation (Oya 2012). But the potential for perpetuating inequalities in 
this study stemmed from the fact that inclusion simultaneously produced processes of 
exclusion. This relates to the ways in which the schemes are instituted and managed, as well 
as how they interface with local social and political processes and practices, i.e. both the nature 
of the economic structures and the embeddedness with local socio-political processes and 
practices. This confirms what Tobin et al. (2016) argue: “local exclusionary mechanisms are 
activated when value chains are implemented” (p.78). 
Inclusion reflects asset ownership and initial welfare status (Donovan and Poole 2013; Tobin 
et al. 2016), contrary to other generalisations (Barret et al. 2008). This means that economic 
benefits of sugarcane cultivation are limited to a small proportion of smallholders (Tobin et al. 
2016). For instance, employment opportunities prioritised cane-growing households. 
Exclusion or inclusion on disadvantageous terms meant that some growers/farmers would 
always be willing to accept work and strike deals with the better-off and be willing to share 
gains (Chapter 6). This situation was clearly gendered, illustrating another trajectory of 
inequality (Broek et al. 2017). These transforming social relations points to a design challenge 
of how to share benefits to a wide-range of farmers without marginalising them (Howard 2016). 
Thus, any optimism placed on linking smallholders to markets through value-chains require a 
general rethink particularly that value creation and its capture fundamentally points in one 
direction – firms and their intermediaries. However, firms and intermediaries seem to care less 
or are oblivious to the social processes and structures with which they are interacting. As a 
result, smallholder-firm interactions confine to cane field operations as opposed to genuine 
industry activities that enhance local value. In Mazabuka, this is exacerbated by weak and fluid 
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farmer associations that are production and survival oriented as opposed to critically 
engagemed with downstream actors around market and commercial activities that would 
generate greater value for their members. 
Governance, transparency and decision-making are important in smallholder schemes. 
Resulting limited participatory governance processes in my case entrenched pre-existing 
marginalisation (Mathur et al. 2014). Decision-making was left in the hands of the minority 
who controlled benefits, including ‘buffer money,’ highlighting possibilities and consequences 
of elite capture (Phillips 2014). Within uneven social and political structures, these became 
gatekeepers of reforms. Two committees claiming legitimacy in Magobbo – one voted out of 
power by the farmers, the other refusing to relinquish power – highlight this aspect (Box 5.5). 
Through silences and occasional actions, corporations or district officials play complicit roles 
in entrenching scheme personal interests. 
Competing and divergent interests within local spaces further create challenges for 
participation. For instance, differences in priorities between sugarcane and livestock 
production highlights incompatibilities in farmer preferences. Divergences between those with 
land in the scheme, those that divided land to negotiate family disputes, the economically 
powerful that bought land and the land-abundant that swapped, further highlight uneven 
hierarchies of experiences and participation (as noted by Phillips 2014 with respect to Malawi). 
These processes however presented avenues for land accumulation by some farmers within and 
outside the projects that reorganises tenure relations (Oya 2012). Clearly, presenting LaSAIs 
and ensuing contractual arrangements as alternatives to land grabbing is to create a false view 
about the realities of corporate expansion. Sugarcane agreements are not only agreements on 
paper. Rather, they permeate, transform and shape property-right relationships (see recent 
reports by Adams et al. 2018 from Malawi). Corporations and intermediaries exert significant 
influence within the value-chains, reflective of the industry structure/organisation and power 
relations. The choice of whether to become an independent grower or not is contentious. 
Analysis in this chapter shows that growers do not necessarily have to coordinate all aspects of 
production nor deal directly with millers as this produces other risks (Vermeulen and Cotula 
2010; Barret et al. 2012). However, integration alongside inadequate smallholder participation 
in processes that ensure equitable benefit sharing means intermediaries are not always 
harnessed progressively within the collaborative environments such as outgrower schemes 
(Howard 2016). The incorporation of communal grazing land determined what the excluded 
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could do (e.g. livestock, subsistence production, ecosystem services). Farmers opting out of 
sugarcane challenge assumptions that inclusion is necessarily desirable (Hospes and Clancy 
2011; Bolwig et al. 2010). However, unlike past studies, this study shows active decisions on 
exclusion are not always economic in nature, they also relate to social and cultural processes 
within host communities. 
In Mazabuka, sugarcane can be described as a ‘pull crop’ for drawing farmers towards 
commodity production and for being responsible for the majority land conversion in the 
district. This aspect was incompatible and problematic for other forms of livelihood expansion 
(e.g. livestock) (Borras and Franco 2012). Reports where farmers sought investment and 
livelihood opportunities away from the schemes could mean an emerging farmer disconnection 
from not only land but also from their status as farmers (Mckay and Colque 2016). From 
another angle, this builds the case that ‘land-grabbing’ does not necessarily need to be forceful 
(Borras et al. 2011). As Adams et al. (2018, p.4) argues, “the grabbing might be slower than 
direct grabbing because farmers are not able to control inputs and output profits are lowered.” 
On the contrary, land-grabbing projects itself through slow and systematic processes of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ enveloped within economic processes – what McKay and 
Colque refer to as ‘productive exclusion’ (2016, p.604). Within this perspective, for instance, 
water is a critical resource but used and controlled by agribusinesses to determine the 
positionality of farmers and what they can do. In Mazabuka, sugarcane decisions are land and 
water decisions. Thus, the materiality of sugarcane produces inherent boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion that growers must negotiate (Hess et al. 2016). The control of water rights by 
ZaSPlc sustained endogenous agribusiness concentration and expansion whilst ensuring 
grower dependency on the company.  
5.9 Conclusion  
Evidence from two case study communities provides insight into diverse factors that determine 
inclusion and exclusion, and it is clear that outgrower schemes have implications on the 
transformation of smallholders and local agrarian systems. Evidence presented in this chapter 
went beyond beyond narrow binaries of inclusion and exclusion that accompany many analyses 
on contract farming and outgrower schemes, conceiving the production space instead as a 
platform where interests compete, producing diverse hierarchies within inclusion and 
exclusion. This study shows that inclusion and exclusion are complex and multi-dimensional. 
Possibilities of smallholder inclusion reflect corporate, donor and public relations that shape 
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the agro-industry structure in Zambia. In projects however, the real value of these relationship 
lies less in government’s ability to coordinate, monitor and discipline agri-businesses than in 
providing conditions for agribusiness expansion. That agribusinesses exert enormous industry 
influence, defining market dynamics, illustrate a failure if not inability of national actors to 
confront important elements shaping social realities at local level. Clearly ZaSPlc is taking 
advantage of the institutional diversity around outgrower schemes and attempts to shape 
available institutions to their benefit. There is lack of negotiability and flexibility in the 
institutional arrangement which translates into unequal distribution of gains between 
smallholders, intermediaries and ZaSPlc – the latter being the main actor in pricing and 
calculation of sucrose levels. Within projects, complex factors interact to variously create 
pathways for inclusion/exclusions but are intensified by industry politics, structure and 
organisation. A focus on social-economic sustainability in donor and government 
collaborations at macro-level would be crucial in enabling participation and if agri-businesses 
are to drive the agenda for poverty reduction and rural-development. Inclusion thus must be 
advanced on strong scheme organisations that are farmer driven. However, this requires 
stronger grower-intermediary-miller collaborations to enable fair benefit sharing as opposed to 
binding relations – and is a focus of Chapter 7. The chapter has demonstrated how activation 
of value-chains produces and exacerbates inequalities within local spaces. Given the rationality 
of smallholders, my case shows that agri-industry participation is neither a privilege nor 
inevitable pathway as claimed in dominant narratives on the topic (World Bank 2010; 2008). 
Rather, agri-industry transformation should offer smallholders choices for participation or exit. 
These positions must acknowledge diversities on either side. But the current transformation of 
tenure and social relations means choices for smallholders at production level remain limited, 
and so are the prospects for livelihoods. The following chapter considers how inclusion in sugar 
value chains shapes land and labour relations and most importantly impacts household 
livelihoods, strategies and pathways – the basis for rural social differentiation.  
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Chapter 6 Outgrower Schemes, Livelihoods and Response 
Pathways on the Zambian ‘Sugarbelt’ 
6.1 Introduction  
This third empirical chapter shifts the focus to local level and household analysis with an aim 
of exploring how integration and production of sugarcane contributes to and affects rural 
patterns of livelihoods and social differentiatiation in unfolding smallholder outgrower 
schemes. Drawing from classical agrarian political economy literature, LaSAIs arguably 
integrates smallholders into market dynamics, deepening social differentiation and intensifying 
processes of class formation. Rural populations have increasingly become heterogenous within 
and across communities, but how to narrate livelihood impacts in a conceptually coherent 
manner still remains a major challenge for researchers. 
In this chapter, an analysis of household asset profile, strategies and livelihood response 
pathways focuses on two smallholder outgrower schemes. The first centrally controls land 
through an integrated company which rents out sugarcane plots to smallholders whilst acting 
as an intermediary (Kaleya). The second amalgamates individual smallholder plots of land to 
form a contiguous block-farm managed by a ZaSPlc intermediary, integrating smallholders as 
shareholders (Magobbo). How local livelihood outcomes differ between the two differently 
structured smallholder schemes are considered in relation to causes and consequences of the 
differences in the evolution, operation and integration of the two models. By doing so, this 
chapter addresses opportunities and barriers towards enhanced household and community 
livelihoods in sugarcane as well as response pathways for different households integrated in 
sugar value-chains. 
It is argued that Kaleya scheme produces greater livelihood impacts across financial capital 
and other dynamics but that these remain low quality and fail to produce significant path-
changing gains for households. Further, dynamics in livelihood groups and strategies, 
livelihood contributions of LaSAIs and sugarcane uptake, and livelihood response pathways, 
reflect causes and consequences of differences in the evolution, operation, and integration of 
outgrower schemes. One outcome is the production of narrow as opposed to broad-based 
livelihoods. Livelihood diversification away from sugarcane schemes but forged within land-
based and agrarian activities show smallholders do not always switch to profit-maximising 
strategies. To develop effective smallholder outgrower schemes, this chapter shows that greater 
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attention must be paid to the role of institutional arrangements and local conditions in unfolding 
outcomes for land and water relations, and how emerging relationships shape inclusivity of an 
agricultural investment. Outgrower arrangements that ensure commodity production alongside 
alternative farmer activities that boost livelihoods are thus strengthened for this purpose. 
Chapter 1 and 2 considered how the current discourse on value-chain development and 
smallholder integration into value-chains serve smallholder groups poorly, with exclusion 
constructed as problematic rather than a desirable rational and alternative livelihood strategy. 
Chapter 2 has shown that in critical agrarian studies, the connections between LaSAIs and 
outgrower schemes are strong, but evidence on which outgrower model produces improved 
livelihood outcomes remain relatively weak. Relatively little research is available on the 
livelihood implications and outcomes of different models of agricultural commercialisation 
(Hall et al. 2017; Cotula et al. 2005; Smalley 2013). The fact that LaSAIs and outgrower 
schemes have been resituated as important forms of land control (Chapter 5) means that 
institutional and contractual arrangements are central to delivering expected livelihood 
outcomes. However, a narrow focus on the micro-functioning of firms and companies, e.g. 
transaction costs including economic bargaining, in mainstream approaches often neglects 
context-specific dynamics of outgrower schemes, local livelihoods and the activities that 
smallholder farmers enter into as livelihood response pathways (Birthal et al. 2005). Rapid 
value-chain expansion in commodities such as sugarcane that create complex contexts within 
which smallholders pursue their livelihoods is a key area of research need (Singh et al. 2016). 
Previous research has reported negative impacts of LaSAIs, for example through land 
enclosures (Oberlack et al. 2016; Bottazzi et al. 2016; Borras et al. 2011; Peluso and Lund 
2011). However, how LaSAIs contribute to the re-organising social-economic and 
environmental land-scape and how livelihood outcomes differ between differently structured 
outgrower schemes remains less explored (Hall et al. 2017; Pritchard et al. 2017; Vicol 2017). 
6.2 LaSAIs and Outgrower Schemes: Re-engaging Livelihood Perspectives 
Chapter 2 noted how the onset of LaSAIs reinforced debates on the merits of outgrower 
schemes as means of integrating smallholders into commodity value-chains (Oya 2011). While 
there exist diverse defining features for outgrower schemes, coordination arrangements such 
as those where smallholder incorporation into commercial value-chains is shaped by core 
processing estates are lauded as pro-poor, and best alternative to outright purchases (World 
Bank 2011) but remain controversial on livelihoods outcomes (Borras and Franco 2013). 
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Rather than a focus on institutional, social and economic processes of resource control (Borras 
and Franco 2010; 2012; Hall 2011), recent studies have started to integrate sustainable 
livelihood approaches (SLA) in the land-grab debate (Vicol 2017). Scoones (2009) called for 
new priorities to re-energise livelihoods perspectives whilst Zoomers and Otsuki (2017) have 
called for the revision and incorporation of livelihood analyses in land investments, arguing 
SLA can help explain differential responses and outcomes. Included also are international 
development actors and civil society organisations concerned with socially responsible 
investments for local communities (FAO 2012). Diversity in processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, power dynamics and institutional processes that shape bargaining power in 
outgrower schemes means that smallholders can have their livelihoods squeezed, generating 
diverse impacts across different households. Within this perspective, efforts such as those by 
Zoomers (2008) examine how livelihoods cope under new scarcities and land-grabbing while 
others focus on the inclusiveness of LaSAIs and business models (Di-Matteo et al. 2016; Vicol 
2017). Equally featuring are reflections on the interaction of actors within value-chains and 
local livelihoods (Challies and Murray 2011) and how investment crops shape resource access 
for rural households (Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010). However, how LaSAIs play out in 
different outgrower schemes continue to receive peripheral attention in the land-grab literature. 
I have shown in Section 2.6.2 the need to connect the somewhat macro-analytical perspectives 
associated with the debate on the agrarian question (within land and labour dynamics) and the 
people-centred household-scale framework of sustainable livelihood analysis. In reformulating 
classic agrarian question (asking: who owns what? who does what? who gets what? and what 
do they do with it?) (Bernstein 2010), debates explore the nature and character of these 
processes and interpretations in the face of LaSAIs, asking how these processes operate. As 
Pritchard et al. (2017) notes, these broad macro-analytical brushstrokes conceal essestial 
elements: […] if the emergent dynamics of rural social differentiation and class formation are 
hitched to the politics of labour, how do we unpack the problem of why some households 
devide upward livelihood trajectories, while others remain mired in disadvantage, and/or 
descend into more intense poverty?” (p.44). This necessitates a departure from sustainable 
livelihood analyses concerned with what comprises rural livelihood assets and they matter to 
different households to a focus on micro-details about household’s decision-making and 
livelihood pathways – the middle ground (Pritchard et al. 2017; Dorward et al. 2009; Dorward 
2009).         
154 
 
Debate on issues related to the agrarian question is highly relevant to rural Zambia, where the 
livelihood circumstances of agricultural communities have been buffeted by dramatic changes 
driven partly by LaSAIs. In Zambia, the promotion of LaSAIs in national policies continues to 
reshape social and institutional relations and models for integrating smallholders but 
implications on what local people can do is poorly understood (Matenga 2017; Hall et al. 2017). 
Rural livelihoods such as in Mazabuka have come under pressure from LaSAIs particularly in 
the post-2000 with the entry of Illovo and expansion of ZaSPlc (Lay et al. 2018). Different 
outgrowing structures as outlined in Chapter 3 mean local livelihood responses and outcomes 
for outgrowers vary, and evaluating these differences is a central focus for this chapter. The 
ways that smallholders are incorporated in models of agriculture commercialisation determines 
gains and possibilities for local participants, financial or natural capital-based. In rural Zambia, 
the expansion in sugarcane reorganises land tenure relations in outgrower schemes which in 
turn shapes what smallholders engage in for their livelihoods, as alternative pathways (Chapter 
5). These possibilities differ according to land access and control in outgrower schemes and 
institutional arrangements, which links to Dorward’s middle ground approach outlined in 
Chapter 2. This is relevant in understanding local groups of livelihoods, their activities and 
exploring processes of rural differentiation (Pritchard et al. 2017).  
Examining temporal trajectories of livelihoods and outcomes allows a better understanding of 
assets as dynamic and as part of a wider livelihood transformation in the context of household 
decision-making (Pritchard et al. 2017). This view is relevant because incorporation of 
smallholders into commercial value-chains on advantageous terms means smallholders can 
expand their capabilities and engage into diverse activities that facilitate local accumulation 
and boost resilience of livelihoods (Ellis 2000). Integration into outgrower schemes can allow 
smallholders to hold onto activities that maintain current livelihood levels. The opposite could 
mean being excluded and squeezed out, which can possibly lead to less resilient livelihoods. 
This chapter focuses on how LaSAIs contribute to local patterns of livelihoods in sugarcane 
outgrower schemes. It explores how capabilities across alternative activities (as strategies and 
response pathways) are created beside sugarcane, and how new risks and vulnerabilities emerge 
for growers. Rural livelihoods also relate to the wider social and institutional context (e.g. 
trends, hazards and seasonal aspects) (Zoomers and Otsuki 2017). The chapter presents 
outcomes of LaSAIs and livelihoods as dependent upon structure and organisation of 
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outgrower schemes as well as ability to benefit from resources and enter into activities of 
welfare value.  
6.3 Methodology  
This chapter draws from key informant interviews, surveys, in-depth household interviews, 
focus group discussions as well as detailed observations and field notes (Table 6.1) (Appendix 
4).  
Table 6.1: Data collection  
Multilevel interviews (national, district and industry):  n=25 
Sugarcane/Contract participants 
 
Kaleya (N=160)  Magobbo (N=80) 
Household survey 80 70 
Key informant interviews  8 8 
In-depth household interviews  6 6 
Focus group discussions 5 5 
Non-sugarcane/Contract participants (Magobbo) 
Household survey  30 
Focus group discussion  1 
 
Various interviews considered wider implications of sugarcane expansion on resource access, 
control and utilisation in the wider communities. This was followed by household surveys 
across different participants, concentrating on asset dynamics and farming strategies. Focus 
group discussions were conducted across gender, age, and farmer associations, considering 
livelihood experiences and differentiated impacts of sugarcane expansion. Group discussions 
with community and association/committee leaders allowed for the identification of poor, 
medium and better-off households. The procedure for selecting 12 households through group 
discussions was guided by the desire to use the disussions as vehicle to purposively select a 
range of households exhibiting diverse livelihood circumstances. In-depth household 
interviews across the three categories gathered more knowledge on household decisions around 
livelihood strategies, land-use changes, labour and income sources. In-depth household 
interviews took an oral history style but within study themes, recounting livelihood decisions 
and opportunities (Pritchard et al. 2017). Livelihood impacts considered diversity and ability 
to induce a mix of agriculture and non-agriculture activities and how desirable these were in 
the context of household welfare. Thus, rather than a focus on statistical conclusions about 
LaSAIs in Zambia, the study explored dynamics in two case studies as “critical vantage 
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points” to consider the implications of sugarcane expansion on local development and 
livelihoods (Neves and Du Toit 2013, p.96).  
Quantitative data from household questionnaires were analysed using SPSS to generate 
statistical summaries that can validate and confirm qualitative data. Qualitative data from 
different sources were sorted and coded in NVivo based on broad themes and objectives and 
subjected to thematic analysis (Kumar 2005; Bazeley 2007). Central to this analysis was the 
need to engage with local narratives and experiences in order to account for causes and 
consequences of the differences between the two schemes. 
6.4 Results   
6.4.1 Livelihood Groups and Strategies  
In Mazabuka, smallholders make up much of the agrarian landscape, and inclusion in 
outgrower schemes is encouraged in national policies for economic and political reasons. 
Participants are not homogenous, and contract participation differently impacts local patterns 
of wealth and livelihood assets. Mean ages for smallholders were 40 years (Magobbo non-
outgrowers), 57 years (Magobbo outgrowers), and 54 years (Kaleya outgrowers). Most 
households were male-headed, married and had agriculture as their main source of income 
(Table 6.2). 




















9%  8% 
Married 81% 74%  63% 
Divorced/sepa
rated  3% 7%  8% 
Widowed 13% 10%  21% 
Mean age  40 57  54 
Sex head of 
household  
Male 77% 76%  
                                                  
65% 
Female  23% 24%  35% 







Agriculture 26% 100%  100% 
Business 29% 
                                                        
Nil         Nil 
Other  45% Nil  Nil 
Socio-economic categories and livelihood groups were drawn from an adapted success/wealth 
ranking. To construct locally relevant socio-economic categories, focus groups with 
community key informants and scheme leaders were asked to define wealth groups and then 
use what is called a proportional pilling of stones representing households to divide the 
population into three wealth categories, on which household interviews were conducted.  
Most households cluster around poor (50%, n=40) or medium (38%, n=30) category in 
Magobbo and around medium (45%, n=72) and better-off (40%, n=64) in Kaleya. Group 
discussions and household interviews showed that ‘living well’ relates to four key elements: 1) 
land-ownership 2) investment activities 3) length in sugarcane production, and 4) institutional 
arrangements and the extent to which smallholders participate in sugarcane production. Across 
the cases, lack of natural capital (land) and capital for investments was identified in interviews 
and focus groups as being crucial in determining wellbeing. In Kaleya, smallholders 
emphasised inadequate investment resources. Whilst smallholders made land purchases and 
exploit customary land in Chief Mwanachingwala, farmers in Magobbo in contrast faced acute 
land challenges as explained by Chief Naluama: “farming expansion is very difficult because 
we are surrounded by big commercial farms” (D4:27.11.16).  
In Magobbo, poor households were landless and lacked requisite resources to rent or purchase 
alternative productive land, while the medium household accessed average 0-3ha of land 
outside the scheme. Community data revealed sugarcane targeted prime land, displacing 
smallholder agriculture. In response to these enclosures, most farmers were searching for 
alternative production land away from the sugarcane schemes. Short-term and informal rental 
markets away from the scheme sometimes as far as 10 kilometres were common, permitting 
farmers to fluctuate between moving in and out of production. 
In Kaleya, the poor and medium category acquired pieces of land but made little or no new 
investments and largely invested and produced on their dwelling land (0.5ha). However, land 
acquisitions averaged 3ha in Kaleya acquired through relatives, traditional authorities or as 
outright purchases compared to lower hectares in Magobbo often accessed through rental 
markets. Across the cases, the better-off took risks by investing in land and non-farm activities 
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(e.g. property development and other businesses), which requires some level of investments 
but these were few. This category possessed productive assets, and could diversify to 
accumulate, investing in alternative land for livestock and crop production, attending to prior 
wealth/asset acquisition (physical capital). 
Across the cases, surveys revealed key drivers to sugarcane uptake among smallholders 
emphasised food insecurity, lower incomes, influence from friends, family pressures, including 
risk strategies against floods/droughts. In Magobbo, less emphasised as driver to sugarcane 
uptake was availability of land (26%, n=18), compared to 65% (n=52) in Kaleya who reported 
land availability.  
However attractive financially sugarcane appears to be, there are hidden costs as well as risks. 
In both cases, survey data revealed a striking low degree of income diversification among 
growers with most households heavily reliant on sugarcane. Income calendars revealed a clear 
seasonality pattern, peaking during harvest (as plantation jobs open) and after sugarcane 
payments. Low and unpredictable sugarcane incomes and prices push farmers into the 
traditional lending system – Kaloba – which charged 100% interest. In Magobbo, Kaloba was 
cited for indebtedness among growers, but non-cane growers seized the opportunity as lenders: 
“sugarcane farmers borrow money from me whenever my children send me cash” 
(SDM9:18.01.16). While plantations offer wage opportunities, a consistent theme in group 
discussions with women and youths revealed difficulties in finding jobs. Unequal access to 
jobs on the plantations/estates among women and youths entrenched inequalities, some of 
which relate to the industry’s reliance on migrant labour (Chapter 5). In Kaleya, contractual 
arrangements enable the farmer association (KASFA) to run a sugarcane cutting contract from 
KaSCOL for its members/dependants, enhancing employment of labour (human capital). More 
widely, one district official bemoaned low labour absorption in schemes: “outgrower schemes 
are creating jobs but there is still high levels of unemployment and poverty out there” 
(D8:26.06.15). 
Sugarcane income analysis from household questionnaires showed Kaleya growers were 
relatively better-off than their Magobbo counterparts (Table 6.3). However, Kaleya faces 
enormous service charges from KaSCOL, averaging Zambian Kwach 36,017 per season per 
household compared to Magobbo’s ZMK9,075 in the same period. However, poor expenditure 
patterns reported in group discussions force farmers (poor and medium) to explore Kaloba, 
which results in indebtedness. 
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Table 6.3: Estimated incomes (Extracted from household questionnaires). 
Kaleya (n=77) 
 2013 2014 2015 
Production (tons)  795.143 835.481 754 
Farmer prices (ZMK) 106.558 109.987 124.104 
Gross annual income 77,337 83,605 85,778 
Average deductions: ZMK 36,017 
Net annual income  41,320 47,588 49,761 
Estimated monthly incomes  3,443 3,966 4,147 
    
Magobbo (n=65) 
Production (tons)  Unknown but farmers own average 4.2ha in the scheme  
Farmer prices  Unknown 
Gross annual incomes  48,083 33,288 38,345 
Average deductions: ZMK9,075 
Net annual income  39,008 24,213 29,270 
Estimated monthly incomes 3,250 2,018 2,439 
Surveys across the case studies reveal crop production is a very important livelihood activity 
among 95% (n=76 in Kaleya) and 67% (n=47 in Magobbo) of farmers (e.g. Maize and 
vegetable production). Interestingly, 84% (n=67) and 90% (n=72) in Kaleya considered 
livestock rearing and petty trading as generally playing a less important role to their livelihoods 
respectively compared to 34% (n=24) and 41% (n=29) in Magobbo. District interviews reveal 
that land conversion to sugarcane (natural capital) induced a general shift away from livestock, 
highlighting incompatibilities with pre-existing livelihood strategies (physical capital). 
Officials explained that farmers in the region defined agriculture in terms of sugarcane 
production, “challenging efforts for diversification” (D13:16.01.16).  
In Kaleya, the more socio-economically advantaged households were more likely to cultivate 
larger land areas, diversify crops for consumption and income generation including maize, 
vegetables, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, cotton, sunflower, tobacco, pumpkins, beans, cassava, 
and cowpeas. On the contrary the poor and medium households focused on maize, vegetables, 
groundnuts, sweet potatoes for consumption. Group discussions and household interviews 
related this to labour competition, and lack of requisite physical resources (e.g. inputs such as 
fertiliser, chemicals and irrigation water) at household level. In Magobbo, shifting and 
fragmenting land-holding due to sugarcane expansion and the lack of resources to either rent 
or purchase land reinforced these challenges. Land access outside the schemes in both 
communities showed the importance of not only independent household production and natural 
capital, but also highlight land constraints associated with sugarcane growing. Where possible, 
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this resulted in a narrow focus on subsistence production mainly around maize, pumpkins, 
groundnuts and vegetables.  
Surveys showed household land allocation patterns before and after sugarcane uptake which 
revealed changing importance of crop production to current livelihoods (Figure 6.1). Across 
the case studies, cropping calendars revealed land allocation to crops and their importance to 
livelihoods generally reduced with the uptake of sugarcane (including cash crops such as cotton 
and sunflower), with very little diversification.  
 
Figure 6.1: Land allocation before and after sugarcane uptake drawn from surveys. 
Maize was crucial in food provisioning and was second to sugarcane in terms of land allocation. 
A significant drop in land allocated to cash crop cotton was recorded in Magobbo from 71% 
(n=50) to 6% (n=4) compared to Kaleya, from 30% (n=24) to 5% (n=4) before and after 
sugarcane uptake respectively. The general trend in southern province and within the period of 
LaSAIs is that the number of households growing cotton sharply declined from 18% in 2005 
to 6% in 2007, and from 15% to 11% as a share of national production in the same period 
(FAOSTAT 2017). For smallholders, cropping patterns for cotton competes with maize for 
land and labour while sugarcane was seen to constrain both.   
6.4.2 Sugarcane and Livelihood Contributions   
This section addresses livelihood contributions of LaSAIs and sugarcane expansion among 
outgrowers. Across both cases, focus group discussions, surveys and interviews made no 
claims of immediate household-use of sugarcane or direct enhancement in physical assets. 

































hedges, medicinal values, windbreaks etc, see Favretto et al. (2014), this research finds no 
claims of household use of material properties of sugarcane. A consistent theme among farmers 
however was that financial capital from sugarcane helped make improvements in other assets 
including access to social services and food.   
Upfront physical infrastructure investment is crucial for successful sugarcane production. In 
case study areas, infrastructure such as bulk-water supply systems and canals as provided and 
maintained by intermediaries shifts bargaining power in favour of companies, excluding 
growers from key production processes. In practice, sugarcane related production assets (e.g. 
mini-dams, canals, sprayers etc.) were not directly transferable to other activities of livelihood 
and welfare value. This also hindered household investment in on-farm range of infrastructure, 
which limited household level of physical asset accumulation and opportunities for deriving 
livelihoods. In Magobbo, smallholders lacked access to necessary water for crop production 
and other uses on dwelling land, with some resorting to shallow wells or boreholes away from 
their dwelling lands. In Kaleya, KaSCOL supplies households with tapped water, which they 
can then use for home gardening but farmers face challenges of rationing. Smallholders can 
also use water from canals for washing and other uses but face strict rules from KaSCOL.  
Kaleya generally exhibited high levels of physical asset acquisition. However, survey data 
highlighted divergences in assets, falling on productive, and peaking on non-productive assets. 
For instance, only 14% (n=11), and 28% (n=22) of the participants had cattle or alternative 
private water sources (combined) for production in Kaleya compared to 29% (n=20), and 14% 
(n=10) in Magobbo (Figure 6.2). A few better-off farmers acquired productive assets for 





































In Magobbo, shareholding together with lack of necessary equipment limits farmer 
involvement in various key processes of sugarcane production, raising challenges of 
knowledge translation. Lack of participation in production was cited by scheme leaders as 
being responsible for reducing sugarcane incomes: “we must free Nanga Farms of some works, 
e.g. cane cutting and haulage to enhance incomes for our members” (SDM3:06.15). In 
contrast, farmer involvement in production in Kaleya enhanced incomes and crop knowledge. 
However, the centrality of intermediaries in smallholder outgrower schemes means capabilities 
and skills development among farmers remain poor (human capital). Some of this relates to 
low education levels and asymmetrical information flow within the scheme set-up and the 
industry as highlighted by events missing from farmer programs such as farmer trainings on 
pricing, marketing and commercial aspects (X7:15.06.15).  
In Kaleya, household labour was crucial in determining productivity and so was their health 
and capabilities (human capital). Here, and where insufficient labour existed, the better-off 
households hired extra labour while the poor and medium households increased their working 
hours. However, intra-household disputes for instance around inheritance, control of the 
sugarcane fields and income negatively affected labour productivity. In Magobbo, 
shareholding permits family members to work on the plantations. However, restricting number 
of workers per household to only one means employment challenges persist on the plantation.  
Group discussions and surveys explored community social organisations and access, and what 
sort of resources and opportunities were shared (social capital). Analysis revealed low levels 
of social organisations and networks in both communities, with smallholders lacking wider 
socio-economic support. One frequently mentioned association among women was a 
community level micro-finance organisation for savings, Own Savings for Assets and Wealth 
Creation (OSAWE). Group discussions revealed that regular payments (about ZMK200 per 
month), competing financial demands and the seasonality of sugarcane incomes discouraged 
women participation. Others cited governance and lack of trust in groups as discouraging 
participation. More widely in Magobbo, group discussions revealed a degenerating pattern in 
social networks as land-holding became fragmented and livelihood strategies more isolated. 
Community-level support systems however remain high-trust, enhancing coping strategies 
such as informal borrowing, borrowing food, assistance from neighbours, and friends. In 
Kaleya, similar patterns were observed, but clear divides were reported between ‘successors’ 
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(new farmers that take over sugarcane plots through inheritance e.g. when original farmer dies) 
and ‘original farmers,’ affecting social cohesion, support and cooperation.  
6.4.3 Livelihood Dynamics and Response Pathways 
This section draws on group discussions and household interviews to explore livelihood 
dynamics and response pathways for different smallholders. Pathways were considered in 
terms of new investments in land, social expenditure such as those on education and health 
including crop and income diversification that took place without compromising household 
material well-being (Pritchard et al. 2017). Drawing on local definitions as summarised in 
Table 6.4, analysis considers the extent to which outgrower households were hanging-in, 
stepping-up, and stepping-out, using the terms introduced by Dorward et al. (2009) and 
discussed in section 3.2.2. Evidence shows the main driver for household decision-making 
mediating farmer responses to sugarcane expansion included the flexibility of ownership, 
access and utilisation of natural capital such as land and water. Although varied across seasons, 
timing, duration, division of labour, analysis showed that response pathways revolved around 
coping and adaptive strategies, predominantly food security, diversification and supplementary 
income as stressors.  
In Kaleya, households ‘hanging-in’ generally made no new livelihood investments within or 
outside the schemes and were described as always having ‘old model assets’ with little market 
value (15%, n=24). They were the landless who cultivated fewer crops and worked on their 
dwelling land (0.5ha) (Kaleya) or relied on land rental markets or sharecropping (in 
Magobbo:49%, n=39). In Kaleya, a few that acquired extra land (averaging 3ha) lacked 
requisite resources for investments. Across the cases, the lack of access to financial services 
meant that this group of farmers exploited Kaloba. Poor expenditure decisions led to low 
education levels, health access, poor planning and food insecurity. Selling household assets, 
engaging in piece-works (labouring) and borrowing were common risk strategies. This group 
of households worked less on their sugarcane farms, experienced poor cane yields and often 
received warning letters from KaSCOL (SDK3:19.01.16). In Magobbo on the contrary, these 
mostly worked on the plantation to supplement their incomes, e.g. weeding, spraying, irrigation 
etc, including the new labour regime for women that engaged in precarious and poor-paying 
estate jobs (Table5.3). 
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Table 6.4: Livelihood groups and activities drawn from wealth ranking and various sources.  
Kaleya 
 
Hanging-in Stepping-up  Stepping-out 
Land holding outside 
schemes3 
Yes  Yes Yes 
Investments  No, face investment challenges Attempt to make investments although often 
falling 
Make relatively larger land 
investments/development 
Cropping patterns  Staple maize, vegetables for 
consumption  
Maize, vegetables, sweet potatoes, groundnuts 
for consumption and sale (limited) 
Maize and other crops for consumption alongside 
cash crops (cotton, sunflower) 
Production dynamics  Poor farm and labour 
management/organisation  
Good farm and labour management/organisation  ‘Exceptional’ farm and labour 
management/organisation 
Income sources  Sugarcane, labouring, selling 
household assets 
Sugarcane, petty trading, remittances, 
crop/livestock sales, renting out property. 
Engage in low value non-farm activities   
Sugarcane fields within Kaleya and in other 
schemes in the district; renting out property, 
hiring extra fields, salaries from professional 
work, strong remittances, trading and crop sales 
including livestock. High value non-farm 
activities   
Employ farm labour  No, rely on family labour Yes, during peak periods  Yes, through-out production period  
% of community households 15% Majority 10% 
Magobbo 
Land holding outside schemes No, landless  Yes (0-3ha)  Yes (3-20ha) 
Investments  No, lack resources to rent 
alternative production land 
Attempt to make investments within agriculture 
but always failing  
Yes, beyond agriculture  
Cropping patterns  Sugarcane and staple maize Maize, groundnuts and sweet potatoes  Maize, cowpeas, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, 
cotton   
Production dynamics  Lack requisite inputs, no 
livestock  
Limited access to inputs. Can own 5-10 cattle, 
goats, pigs, chickens and other livestock    
Have requisite resources for production. Can own 
10-30 cattle, goats, pigs, ducks, donkeys, 
chickens and other livestock  
Income sources  Sugarcane Sugarcane, petty trading, crop and livestock sales 
at limited scale 
Sugarcane, trading, crop sales, livestock sales as 
well as incomes from professional work 
Employ farm labour  No No  Yes.  
% of community households  Majority  38%  13%  
                                                          
3 Precise estimates were difficult to get as land holding increasingly locates away from schemes 
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Households ‘stepping-up’ accessed land away from the scheme but made limited investments 
due to lack of requisite resources (Kaleya:75%, n=120). They attempt to expand, diversify 
production and invest in complementary assets such as hammer-mills, petty trading, property 
and livestock albeit but at a limited scale. Limited diversity in crop production meant that 
households focused largely on subsistence (Magobbo:38%, n=30). Keeping debts to the 
minimum, these were described as having a medium level of ‘modern assets’ including 
education and food and health access.  
Households ‘stepping-out’ engaged in diverse livelihood activities (e.g. property development, 
grocery stores, transportation) as well as acquire complementary assets (e.g. hammer-mills) 
(Kaleya:10%, n=16; Magobbo:13%, n=10). Land access enabled rearing of livestock (e.g. 
cattle, goats, poultry) including production of diverse crops for consumption and sale (e.g. 
tobacco and cotton). Diverse incomes sources allowed households to limit their debts. 
Requisite resources enabled land-based investments including drilling boreholes necessary for 
expanding crop production. This also included social expenditure (health and education) as 
well as possibilities of hiring extra labour for production. In terms of scheme/plantation 
opportunities, these households worked in somewhat specialised areas such as maintenance 
and light duties. In Kaleya, group discussions described these as ‘good planners’ with ‘latest 
household assets’ (SDK2:13.11.15). 
6.4.4 Sugarcane-based Livelihoods in the Wider Context 
Several factors were cited as preventing the achievement of livelihood goals (Table 6.5). A 
recurring theme in group discussions emphasised restrictions of what farmers could do within 
schemes which was largely production related and access to ecosystem services. This was 
widely emphasised in Magobbo where most farmers reported regrets over a lost opportunity of 
livestock rearing: “I would choose another business that can give me flexibility on the land to 
rear animals” (Magobbo 2016). In Kaleya, smallholders emphasised “lack of title deeds to the 
sugarcane plots” and dwelling land which they said affected the level of investments farmers 
made within the scheme, corroborated by the area Chief. 
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Table 6.5: Barriers to achieving livelihood goals (Various community data sources). 
Barrier Farmer perceptions Kaleya Magobbo Illustrative Quotes  
Water Sugarcane heightens 
water politics, affecting 







“Farmers are deprived of water and 
restricted on usage” (Kaleya) 







“Sugarcane took away our land. 
Now we have to rent sometimes 9-
10 kilometres away” (Magobbo) 




11% (n=8) “Lack of family manpower 










“Firewood is difficult to access 













“It is all about waiting for 
somebody to die to inherit 
sugarcane plots…families are 
disintegrated” (KASCOL Officer) 
Sugarcane 
prices 
Sugarcane brings market 
fluctuations which is 
risky for household 





“Unlike other crops, cane prices 
fluctuate very much” (Magobbo) 
Transparency 










“There are always unclear 
deductions especially fertiliser” 
(Kaleya farmer 2015) 
“No one stands for us during 
financial transactions” (Magobbo) 
 
Farmers described the seasons 2013-2015 as generally poor, pointing to costs of production as 
it relates to weather patterns (rainfall, floods), pests and diseases and price declines. However, 
analysis showed how integration into sugar value-chains brought new livelihood challenges for 
smallholders across trends, hazards and seasonality. 
a. Trends  
One consistent theme in local assessment was that LaSAIs exerted pressure on land resources 
around schemes, and on the larger proportion of smallholder production. In surveys, most 
sugarcane growers reported reduced access to land (78%, n=62 and 70%, n=49) and eco-system 
services (51%, n=41; 33%, n=23) in Kaleya and Magobbo respectively. Meanwhile, data 
showed how smallholder agriculture suffered from unpredicted, variable, low and occasionally 
intense rainfall patterns. Disruptions to farming patterns due to climate variability increased 
risks of maize dependence and rain-fed agriculture which again drove sugarcane uptake among 
65% (n=52) and 90% (n=63) of farmers in Kaleya and Magobbo respectively. While water 
shortages affected yields and increased costs of production, low and fluctuating prices eroded 
farmer incomes. Sugar companies and firms related trends in price fluctuations to regional 
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economic challenges such as access to secure regional and international markets such as the 
EU – which are reportedly affected being affected by competition from countries such as Brazil 
(SDKa:14.11.15). 
b. Hazards   
Sugarcane companies and smallholders revealed serious water deficits in schemes. Low and 
variable rainfall patterns recently experienced in Zambia led to a serious electricity shortage, 
inducing a growth decline of about 3% in 2015. Subsequent fuel subsidies and emergency 
annual electricity import bill of about $660 million (equivalent to 3.2% GDP) sent shivers 
among policy makers about the risks of hydro power (IMF 2016). A resulting reliance on 
irrigation in schemes increased the costs of production further while entrenching water politics. 
One farmer representative in Kaleya confirmed: “we have a problem of water allocation and 
distribution between smallholder and estate fields” (SK1:06.16) as corroborated by one 
KaSCOL officer (SDK3:19.01.16). Water shortages increased susceptibility of sugarcane to 
pests and diseases (e.g. yellow aphids, beetles, smut), further lowering yields and incomes. A 
lack of expert knowledge on sugarcane compounded these challenges and increased 
smallholder reliance on intermediaries. This was compounded by regional volatilities of 
currencies so that pesticides and other chemicals including complex fertilisers/blends common 
to sugarcane become costly for smallholders, pushing the cost of production and eroding 
profitability of sugarcane (Mbulo 2015). In Magobbo, knowledge gaps among smallholders 
produced mistrust in the buyer-grower relationships as one representative at ZaSPlc remarked: 
“[Farmers] doubted the narrative that the decline in yields 2014/2015 season was due to 
yellow aphids and challenges of water” (ZaSPlc2:06.2015). In some households, this resulted 
in the loss of livestock, which again affected risk strategies. 
c. Seasonality  
Seasonal calendars show that maize and other subsistence production paralleled sugarcane 
cropping, the latter mixing rainfall and irrigation water. However, rainfall period induced 
livestock diseases that result in losses and is also peak for livestock and/or asset sales, as 
farmers respond to increasing food prices, food and labour shortages. For some farmers, food 
shortages were immediately replaced by – as a coping strategy – consumption of new crops 
before maturity – green consumption – at peak in February and March, which again affects 
overall harvests. In both cases, poor harvests and rushed “green consumption” widened the gap 




Sugarcane requires considerable labour input throughout its cultivation cycle (Table 5.2). In 
Kaleya, farmers reported that only three months after harvest were relatively free from 
sugarcane related activities with others arguing that in practice it was only “one month before 
land preparation begins all over again” (Kaleya 2015). Kaleya calendars revealed labour 
intensity and shortages between August and February. For maize and other crops, this period 
is also the time for land preparation (e.g. land ploughing), sowing and weeding whilst the same 
period demands irrigation, weeding, smut-cane removal and slashing/clearing of irrigation 
canals for sugarcane. Labour shortages limited the capacity to cultivate larger farmlands and 
diversify livelihood activities. However, household interviews showed that the social-
economically advantaged households were more likely to hire extra labour, thereby cultivating 
large farmlands. Low incomes, labour shortages as well as tight management requirements for 
sugarcane compel poor and to some extent medium households to spend more time and labour 
on sugarcane in comparison to better-off households, producing narrow farming and livelihood 
strategies. 
The seasonality of sugarcane, which coincides with subsistence production, produced crucial 
trade-offs for the poor and medium households such as finding waged employment whilst 
maintaining subsistence production. Across the cases, seasonality exacerbated labour shortages 
while waged employment suffered low wages alongside high variability in food prices. Once 
again, this entrenched sugarcane dependence and poor coping mechanisms. To one farmer, “it 
is the same life and same problems being encountered” each year (Magobbo 2015).  
6.5 Discussion: Outgrowers and Livelihood Dynamics  
This chapter has sought to demonstrate how LaSAIs and outgrower arrangements impact local 
livelihoods in differently structured outgrower schemes in rural Zambia. Insights presented 
point to the centrality of causes and consequences of differences in the evolution, operation, 
and integration of outgrower schemes in unfolding social and agrarian relations and livelihood 
outcomes. This study shows outgrowers that link smallholder production to other livelihood 
options are effective in employing labour and promoting diversified and sustainable 
livelihoods, but quality of employment remains low. Dynamics in livelihood groups and 
strategies, livelihood contributions of LaSAIs and sugarcane uptake, and livelihood response 
pathways emerging across the case studies point to narrow farming and livelihood strategies 
around sugarcane as opposed to diverse and broad-based livelihoods that boost resilience. 
Livelihood diversification efforts away from sugarcane but within agriculture shows that 
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smallholders will not always switch to alternative high-paying strategies. For significant path-
changing gains for poor households, research must delve into the way local resources have 
been controlled and accessed in outgrower arrangements and how local conditions shape 
investment outcomes.  
Land remains an important determinant for rural social differentiation and launchpad for 
upward mobility, but with labour dynamics emerging as equally important. While the evidence 
of increased incomes brings optimism around outgrower arrangements (Barrett et al. 2012), 
evidence shows a focus on financial capital challenges wider assertions about delivery of 
livelihoods. Thus, there are clear ‘losers and winners’ among different farmer groups and 
between schemes, with diverse hierarchies of gains that exclude the poorest households. This 
is as much the result of processes associated with the structure and organisation of outgrower 
schemes as is the way in which contract farming insinuates itself into local livelihood 
landscapes (Vicol 2017, p.164). Different institutional arrangements spread gains unevenly, 
accompanied by restrictive spread of benefits to local participants (White 1997). This is evident 
in income calculations, deductions and sucrose-based payments. Differences in the outgrowing 
models means local collective actions and farmer collaborations between schemes and around 
production and bargaining processes remain limited (Rutten et al. 2017). Infrastructure, 
productivity, knowledge spill overs and transfer from agribusinesses to smallholders thus 
remain limited (Kleemann and Thiete 2015). This is more striking in shareholding variant of 
outgrowing than where an integrated company which allows shareholding, production and 
alternative pathways for local accumulation.  
Households linked to other livelihood assets such as land and water resources beyond the 
schemes generally registered improved livelihoods. However, diversification away from the 
schemes but within agriculture across the schemes can be interpreted as a strategy to deflect 
the overtures of corporate agriculture and processes related to outgrowing models. The 
materiality of sugarcane means smallholders face poor labour organisation and crucial trade-
offs which limit sugarcane production and challenges crop production. This in part is because 
household labour cannot easily be shifted (Hall et al. 2017). With reference to sugarcane, 
smallholders cannot restrict production to a proportion of their land and allocate the rest to 
other crops as is the case with for instance raspberries (Challies and Murray 2011), making 
access to alternative production resources crucial. Sugarcane monocropping which restricts 
crop and livestock production within its proximity adds to local adaptation challenges. These 
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fears confirm inconsistencies in the views that present LaSAIs pre-eminently as development 
force (Borras and Franco 2012). Meanwhile household adjustments between and among 
different livelihood capitals remain problematic. Contrasting experiences in Jatropha (Achten 
et al. 2010), sugarcane as capital intensive crop makes it even more difficult for smallholders 
to limit initial investments and control start-up risks. The resulting centralised processing set-
ups render production not only large-scale but also limit pathways for gains among 
smallholders particularly in shareholding variant (Dubb et al. 2015). The question of gender is 
crucial in these arrangements. Whilst gender norms shape patterns of work activities among 
household members, women are now breaking away particularly in Magobbo to seek financial 
independence on plantations. 
Across the cases, low sugarcane returns, restricted access to natural capital around plantations 
and inadequate institutional support increasingly pushes farmers away from sugarcane schemes 
and lose their position as farmers (Dubb 2015). Whether land is owned by intermediaries or 
held under rental arrangements, tight control by firms means systematic alienation of farmers 
from downstream value creation/capture (Vicol 2017). Whilst attempts exist to produce 
smallholder efficiencies (e.g. Magobbo), evidence shows there are clear new configurations of 
market power and control in production spaces (Cohen 2013). Through diverse patterns of land 
control, evidence confirms clear processes of capital accumulation by firms which is 
inconsistent with inclusive development outcomes (Anseeuw et al. 2012).  
Processes of agrarian differentiation as they relate to income sources and resilience become 
apparent as better-off households respond to opportunities away from sugarcane schemes. 
Livelihood strategies and pathways are thus both constitutive features and a consequence of 
pre-existing inequalities that interlinks with land-based relations and agrarian dynamics – a 
spring-board for upward social mobility (Neves and Du Toit 2013; Pritchard et al. 2017). 
Across the case studies, growers need access to land as a platform for hanging-in, stepping-up 
and stepping-out, particularly that households rarely exit agriculture. Previous studies talk 
about how smallholders affected by LaSAIs switch to wage employment on the investment 
farm or choose options that offer the higher pay-off (Dessy et al. 2012). This research shows 
otherwise. Farmers prioritise flexibility of own land ownership and cultivation, with land being 
the basis for building food production and security (hanging-in), engaging in other income 
generating activities such as livestock rearing (stepping-up) whose value feeds into other 
livelihood activities (stepping-out). Decisions about investments and pathways are more 
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complex, with the socio-economic and natural environment playing a crucial role in unfolding 
livelihoods (Hall et al. 2017). Thus, livelihood strategies do not always facilitate accumulation 
of capital or upward social mobility of households. Rather, strategies reflect to a larger extent 
household circumstances, some of which might be distress. 
Overall, local livelihoods and pathways speak to consequences of sugarcane expansion and 
resulting models of commercialisation that determine resource control on the one hand as well 
as shape livelihood strategies and responses on the other. Here, mechanisms for ownership, 
securing and strengthening land rights are crucial as insecurity of tenure is not always about 
land titles. Any successful livelihood outcomes would demand that promoters and policy actors 
consider not only the dynamics at the production space (e.g. natural capital) but also the 
institutional structures and local conditions that mediate farmer integration and their role on 
emerging livelihoods (Hall et al. 2017a). 
6.6 Conclusion  
There is no one way to interpret livelihood processes and impacts associated with LaSAIs. 
However, livelihood processes depend on how land has been integrated into sugar value-chains 
as well as institutional and power dynamics shaping its availability, access and use. A central 
question surrounding models of agricultural commercialisation is how different outgrower 
schemes deliver what is expected of them and what this means for rural social differentiation. 
In recent years, the growth of LaSAIs in Zambia ignited debates about outgrower schemes, and 
their role in shaping rural livelihoods. While introducing diverse production systems, LaSAI 
control of land and water resources and influence on commercial aspects increasingly 
disconnects smallholders from agriculture and local resources, entrenching unequal rural 
livelihood landscapes. For sugarcane, and where access to land and water within and outside 
schemes exist, positive outcomes for livelihoods can be realised, as shown in Kaleya. 
Participation in production enables higher incomes, and improved employment of labour which 
can be combined with other assets/options for building livelihoods. In contrast, in the Magobbo 
case, incorporation of smallholders as shareholders and creation of a block-farm allows 
smallholders to receive dividends, but farmers cannot influence efficiency and profitability of 
operations. Employment effects between the two cases were different, with Magobbo labour 
regimes exhibiting uneven integration across women and youths compared to their male 
counterparts. One outcome has been a lack of sufficient flexibility to combine labour, farming 
and other livelihood options. Relationships around local resources have not only been 
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exclusionary for smallholders but also entangling, challenging pro-poor narratives that often 
accompany value-chain expansion (Chapter 5) (Vicol 2017). However, it is difficult to tell 
whether a process of deagrarianisation is taking place within households or not.    
Dynamics in livelihood groups and strategies, livelihood contributions of LaSAIs and 
sugarcane uptake, and livelihood response pathways reflect causes and consequences of 
differences in the evolution, operation, and integration of outgrower schemes. Farmers carry 
both risks and benefits associated with sugar value-chains, but emerging contractual 
arrangements mean that wider “win-win” narratives associated with outgrowers remain 
inconsistent. This study confirms sugarcane has not produced significant path-changing gains 
for poor farmers (Vicol 2017). Instead, it underscores the view that there exist diverse ways 
and processes to land control which do not necessarily involve expulsion of smallholders 
(Peluso and Lund 2011). Adequate smallholder access to land and water resources at 
production space as well as within the value-chain is needed for LaSAIs to adequately 
transform grower livelihoods in unfolding outgrower schemes.  
Outgrower designs require striking a balance between resources that feed into commodity 
production and those that build subsistence and boost resilience. Beyond the specificities of 
the commodity sugar, and the models covered, findings engage in ongoing debates about the 
social relations of agrarian change in Africa. Understanding local specificities of evolution, 
operation and integration of outgrower schemes is a vital step towards creating nuanced and 
sustainable policy frameworks for rural development. The following chapter considers national 
policy and institional dynamics, industry patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and livelihood 
impacts within the wider context of industry politics and agribusiness power and influence in 
national, regional and local domains.  
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Chapter 7 Business ‘Power of Presence:’ Foreign Capital, Industry 
Practices and Politics of Sustainable Development in Zambian 
Agriculture 
7.1 Introduction  
The final empirical chapter takes up the thread of discussion of trends and patterns of LaSAIs 
discussed in Chapter 4; dynamics of inclusion and exclusion encountered in Chapter 5; and 
livelihood and response pathways presented in Chapter 6 with an aim of understanding agribusiness 
power and influence as well as institutions governing these processes.These are not disjointed 
proceses, rather they relate to the policy and industry practices – and in particular the power and 
influence of the dominant agribusiness.  Although the focus of this chapter is on a specific 
agribusiness, the chapter begins to show the way in which industries are strictured and organised 
and how power and influence are implicated. Using perceptions about the way power is deployed 
in different domains – what I refer to as ‘power of presence,’ – an agribusiness manoevres at 
national, regional and local levels are analysed. In particular, the chapter analyses national, regional 
and local level domains around the sugar industry and how they enable an agribusiness to exert 
control and influence industry governance. Local level analyses focuses on how an agribusiness 
shapes land and labour relations and what this means for wider development and sustainability of 
livelihoods. 
Throughout this chapter it is argued that investment and trade policies currently foster 
agribusinesses but neglect environmental assessments that expose social and ecological 
contradictions such as on competing water uses. State-donor relations enable smallholder 
integration in sugarcane as poverty reduction whilst agribusinesses are limiting their participation 
through controls on resources and production systems. Meanwhile through different power 
expressions, possibilities of sustainable agriculture and rural development are undermined by 
agribusiness practices. The chapter highlights the limits and importance of domestic institutions in 
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framing LaSAIs as well as mediating corporate practices that will be required to provide a greater 
focus on national planning processes for rural development. 
Whilst neoliberal policy developments over the past decades have been a source of power for 
different actors, agribusinesses linked to outgrower schemes have somewhat been distanced from 
problematic ramifications of LaSAIs (Elgert 2016; Bloomfield 2012). Global governance 
institutions such as the World Trade Organisation explicitly emphasise agribusiness expansion, 
market access and increased global exports in developing countries such as those in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Spann 2017; Weber 2014). However, despite widespread acceptance of the deepening role 
of corporations in agriculture, the sort of power and influence exerted by agribusinesses in national 
settings and their implications on sustainable development remain poorly understood. Attempts to 
address sustainability concerns in LaSAIs have failed to examine and question how agribusinesses 
with outgrower schemes exert their power to influence industry governance, social and ecological 
relations (Spann 2017; Amanor 2012). Understanding claims to agriculture for development as 
enshrined in Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) thus requires understanding how policy 
developments in poor countries enable agribusiness power to shape governance dynamics. In what 
follows I discuss ‘power of presence’ and what this means for an industry analysis.  
7.2 Agribusiness ‘Power of Presence’ 
This chapter is conceptually grounded in the notion of ‘power of presence’, which refers to how an 
agribusiness uses its existence at a jurisdictional scale to influence policy developments and 
industry practices at national, regional and local levels. Jurisdictional scale relates to bounded and 
organized political units, e.g., districts, provinces/regions, and nations, with linkages between them 
created by constitutional and statutory means (Cash et al. 2006). Power is the ability of one actor 
to prevail over others in achieving desired goals (Lukes 2005). Influence is the process of affecting 
the thoughts, behaviour and feelings of another, but the actual capacity to influence depends on 
power (Lefebvre 1991). Agribusinesses organise in national contexts, and deploy their existence, 
power, knowledge and influence to shape governance and regulation at different levels. In this 
chapter, I explore the extent to which an agribusiness can influence policies or align its efforts to a 
national agenda at one level, and shape regional and local governance dynamics at another level 
within the jurisdictional scale which reflects their presence.  
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The way in which ‘power of presence’ is applied is non-linear as there can be changes in political 
and economic processes and environments. For instance, local and regional expressions of power 
are interrelated, and link to the national context. National policy actors relate differently to 
agribusiness production, industry governance and agenda setting. Regional actors include district 
administrators implementing development plans. Local actors include smallholders as growers and 
their communities. It is important to recognise that actors at different levels have widely different 
interests, perspectives and resources that means that understanding the context is vital (see 
Cornwall 2002). Gaventa (2006) and colleagues, including Cornwall, have adapted Lukess seminal 
framework on power consider a development context. This isolates three forms of power. 
Instrumental power considers overt, measurable, and observable expressions of direct influence 
(for instance through force, financial, social resources). Structural power refers to the wider 
socioeconomic and political context within which political agendas are shaped and decision-
making and actions are embedded. Discursive power considers how actors shape socio norms, 
values, and identities, and how these favour dominant interests (Lukes 2005). Gaventa (2006) adds 
an insightful angle to these forms of power. That is, ‘Lukes’ three forms of power must also be 
understood in relation to how spaces for engagement are created, and the levels of power (from 
local to global), in which they occur’ (p.25). 
Using Lukes’ three-way split, Gaventa (2006) uses the simpler language of visible, invisible and 
hidden power and then relates them to (Gaventa 2006). These effectively describe the different 
ways in which one actor may exert power over another.  However, there are other forms of power 
that may be seen more positively, about ‘power to’. This is effectively captured in the work of 
Rowlands (1995, 1997) who talks about the power that might be in collaboration when groups of 
actors work together. This form of power, ‘power with’ tends to be less of a zero-sum game’ – “an 
increase in one person’s power does not necessarily diminish that of another” (Rowlands 1995, 
p.102) – which may lead to beneficial outcomes for the actors working collaboratively (even if 
others may be affected differently).   
In this chapter I apply both ‘power over’ and ‘power with’ (Rowlands 1997; 1995; Veneklasen and 
Miller 2007). I expand on power as domination and zero-sum (power over) and formulations of 
power considered collaborative and non-zero-sum (power with) (Rowlands 1997; 1995) to expand 
on Gaventa’s visible, hidden and invisible formulation of power (Gaventa 2006). The value of 
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Gaventa’s framework also lies in how considers how power is exercised at different levels and in 
different spaces/domains Power analysis thus invokes narratives of scale – as “spatial, temporal 
quantitative or analytical dimensions used to measure and study any phenomenon – and levels – as 
units of analysis that are located at different positions on a scale” (Cash et al. 2006, p.8).  
This chapter maps out three domains at local and regional levels and five domains at national level 
to demonstrate how agribusiness power and influence takes place at different levels, which relates 
to the guiding laws, regulations and operating rules around the sugar industry (Cash et al. 2006). 
Domains are opportunities/channels where an agribusiness can act to potentially affect policies, 
discourses, decisions and relationships that affect its interest. Domain boundaries are shaped by 
power relations, defining “what is possible within them, and who may enter, with what identity, 
discourse and interests” (Gaventa 2006, p.26). Domains are illustrative, selected to show different 
kinds of power, observed or perceived; the former inclined towards local-level dynamics while the 
latter leans towards national-level policy practices. Domains are closed when firms make decisions 
without broader consultation and involvement; invited when agribusinesses invite actors to 
participate; and claimed/created (organic) when the less powerful actors make sufficient pressure 
and claims on the powerful (Cornwall 2002; Gaventa 2006).  
In Zambia’s sugar sub-sector, competition for industry leadership and hegemony is visible, which, 
with supportive laws and regulations, creates barriers to entry (Kalinda and Chisanga 2014). 
Regional and local level domains show a powerful agribusiness can exercise power over for 
instance through shaping actions and thought processes of less powerful actors. This also relates to 
agribusiness practices in regional development linkages and practices (embeddedness and 
participation in regional/local development plans); land tenure relations; and labour regimes 
(dynamics on employment) in outgrower schemes (visible power). However, agribusinesses can 
also influence socio-political and economic agendas (hidden power), shaping meaning and what is 
acceptable about an industry, production or marketing (invisible power) (Gaventa 2006). 
7.3 Methodology  
Data collection was shaped by a framework which utilises perception as evidence, assessing views 
and perceptions of an agribusiness power and influence in various domains. Perceptions provide 
insights into agribusiness legitimacy and acceptability of their actions, how and why they act the 
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way they do and implications for their actions. Perceptions also highlight how stakeholders 
experience an agribusiness with outgrower schemes (Bennett 2016).  
This chapter draws from multi-level key informant interviews, in-depth household interviews, 
focus group discussions including detailed observations and field notes (Chapter 3) (Appendix 5). 
Multi-level interviews were conducted with state, donor and NGO actors, private sugar consultants, 
firms and companies, academics and research think-tanks to understand structure and organisation 
of the sub-sector, trends and dynamics as well as diverse perspectives around the sugar industry 
(n=13). Interviews also considered stakeholder views of agribusiness power and influence in the 
sugar industry and in agriculture in general. These were complemented by policy analysis to 
identify drivers of sugarcane expansion and key actors and narratives. Policy analysis helped in 
exploring how an agribusiness shapes industry direction. The chapter also draws from district 
interviews (n=12) illuminated how agribusiness practices impacts local and wider development 
prospects, paying attention to influence and power dynamics at play. These also considered district-
agribusiness relationship and what this means for prospects for sustainable rural development. 
Meanwhile a diverse group of participants at sub-district level were included to generate a cross 
section views and perspectives on agribusiness conduct and practices. Perspectives were generated 
from a mixture of contract and non-contract farmers to generate robust perspectives on the practices 
of an agribusiness (Table 7.1).  
Table 7.1: Summary data sources 
Multilevel interviews (national, district and industry):  n=25 
Sugarcane/Contract participants 
 
Kaleya Magobbo Manyonyo 
Key informant interviews  8 8 1 
In-depth household interviews  6 6 Nil 
Focus group discussions 5 5 1 
Non-sugarcane/Contract participants (Magobbo)  
Focus group discussion  Nil 1 Nil 
Wider community interviews  3 3 3 
 
Household interviews were conducted across better-off, medium, and poor category households. 
Interviews took an oral history style but within study objectives, focusing on smallholder 
experiences and drivers of change.  Focus group discussions were also conducted across gender, 
age, and farmer associations concentrating on smallholder experiences, agribusiness practices, 
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local processes and implications for industry participation and sustainable rural development. In 
terms of analysis, broad themes were developed from qualitative data manually and using software 
NVivo and subjected to thematic analysis linked to research objectives (Kumar 2005; Bazeley 
2007). Policy analysis with an inductive approach enabled us to link policy elements to practice 
(Cole 1998) which was important in exploring agribusiness influence.  
Analysis considered broad themes developed from qualitative data using software NVivo. These 
were then subjected to thematic analysis and linked to research objectives (Kumar 2005; Bazeley 
2007). An open coding scheme was adopted in analysis of policy documents. Coded fragments of 
the documents were then linked to the themes in the research objectives. Concepts from the policy 
documents were labelled and defined into specific categories and dimensions for comparisons with 
agribusiness power domains. Policy analysis with an inductive approach enabled us to link policy 
elements to practice, which was important in exploring agribusiness influence (Cole 1988).   
7.4 Results 
Intra-domain analyses show how an agribusiness combines different forms of power to shape 
policy, regional and local dynamics. Analysis of interview data shows hidden/structural power 
expression as power with is key in national domains, whilst visible/instrumental expressions are 
crucial in local/regional domains (as power over). This was reflective of state-donor collaborations 
as well as corporate financial and economic power.       
7.4.1 Regional and local-level analyses: agribusinesses, rural and economic development 
This section focuses on regional and local domains within which agribusiness power and influence 
is perceived. These were selected based on their ability to show visible/structural, hidden/structural, 
and invisible/discursive expressions of power in relation to power over and power with 
respectively. My analysis with respect to the forms of power being exercised in these domains is 
summarised in Table 7.2. To demonstrate agribusiness power over and power with as they relate 
to visible and invisible power expressions, regional and local analyses identified practices of an 
agribusiness in three domains: 1) wider development linkages, 2) land tenure relations, and 3) 
labour dynamics. I focus on these in the following sections.  
a. Agribusinesses in Wider Development Linkages 
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Agribusinesses have in the wider development linkages expressed power with and power over 
which also relates to visible power (Table 7.2). Agribusinesses have been promoted for regional 
and local development in Zambia. A senior political representative believes “Mazabuka is 
privileged to host the biggest agribusiness in the region” (D5:26.06.15), which has been 
accompanied by business opportunities in banking, construction, hospitality and fast-foods 
industries. Related investments in social and economic infrastructure such as energy, irrigation, 
health and education arguably “enhance the socio-economic status of the district” and contributed 
to poverty reduction (D6:26.06.2015). However, most public officers were critical, arguing ZaSPlc 
has changed the patterns of development in the district/region.  
Interviews revealed a lack of cooperation and engagement between ZaSPlc and the district such as 
in development planning, infrastructure and social-service delivery. One example was the Spatial 
Development Framework for the Mazabuka Urban Integrated Development Plan (IDP) which, 
driven by the theme Building Mazabuka Together, was designed to guide present and future 
developments in the district. One officer in the Planning Department reported ZaSPlc was “a key 
stakeholder in the development of the IDP but became disinterested during implementation” 
(D12:16.01.16). Instead, the company was perceived to exert power over by generating its own 
development plans mostly within the estate, which to one respondent in the Planning Department, 
“were incompatible with district sustainable development plans” (D12:16.01.16). Planning 
Officers accused ZaSPlc of “illegality in land development and planning within estates” 
(D8:16.01.16) but blamed this on the agribusiness’ power with in national political and economic 
connections seen as limiting and undermining local regulations (visible power).   
Table 7.2: Power of presence domains and expressions (Colour codes show emphasised elements: 
Black=invisible power; Blue=visible power; Gray=hidden power). 
Level Domain 
Power with Power over  
 




Wider development linkages  
  





Zambia National Sugar Adaptation Strategy 
  
Vitamin A Fortification of Sugar 
  




 Concessions e.g. Investor Promotion and Protection Agreement  
  
National labour regimes  
  
District interviews showed sugarcane expansion changed the demographic dynamics of Mazabuka. 
The largest migrant group in the formal agricultural sector in Zambia are cane cutters from other 
provinces (SDMa:12.06.16). This transitory workforce predominantly male was cited by the 
Planning Department as straining public infrastructure, housing and health services. The argument 
was that, “seasonal workers stopped returning to their villages,” and “are acquiring and 
developing illegal pieces of land” which contributed to unplanned settlements (D12.16.01.16). A 
consistent theme across district interviewees was that social service and infrastructure provisioning 
was less prominent in ZaSPlc’s social activities. Here, power over enables ZaSPlc to restrict 
education, housing, and health services to their estates and direct employees despite calls to extend 
services to wider areas (ActionAid 2011).  This also highlights an agribusiness structural power 
within a particular territory and domain.  
District officials expressed opinions the presence of an agribusiness undermined revenue 
generation in the local authority (power over). Municipal Council officers bemoaned lack of 
valuable service contracts such as those around warehousing, distribution and haulage as conduits 
for securing economic benefits but instead perceived a “strong foreign business involvement” 
(D7:12.15). For instance, most warehousing and distribution, and cane haulage are reportedly 
conducted by Barlow World Logistics and Rolling Thunder respectively (Richardson 2010). Thus, 
many district officers believed ZaSPlc gave a false reputation about the district: “that we receive 
a lot of money from the corporation” (D8:26.06.2015). 
Others believed it was almost impossible for the local authority to explore revenue generating 
streams linked to the agribusiness because of continuous state intervention in local decisions such 
as around taxation. Respondents reported how state officials enter investment sites to make policy 
pronouncements and express their support for ZaSPlc. Respondents constantly referred to 
government decision to abolish crop-levy (2009), which cost the local authority an estimated 
$400,000 annual cane levy from ZaSPlc (Richardson 2010, p.929). According to the area Member 
of Parliament, this has led to serious “erosion of financial capacity in the local authority” 
(D2:11.06.16). The decision to scrap crop-levy is generally perceived to illustrate ZaSPlc’s 
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influence in national politics (power over/visible power), but also highlights governance gaps at 
local level. That the directive to scrap crop levy came when the then President Rupiah Banda 
officiated at the company’s launch of Nakambala sugar estate in 2009 confirms perceived power 
with: 
“I wish to assure South African investors…that their investment in Zambia is secure, 
safeguarded by the progressive politics and robust legal framework put in place by my 
government” (Chishimba and Mulenga 2009, cited in Richardson 2010, p.928). 
Clearly, state manoevres to align public interest to an agribusiness allows ZaSPlc’s visible power 
to influence government actions. One political representative reflected that this meant that 
agribusiness had many ways of achieving its objectives even at the expense of local capacity. 
Consequently, most district officers felt disempowered by state-business relations seen as 
undermining local authority not only on taxation but also on ability to intervene in estates/schemes 
such as on environmental regulation. This highlights ZaSPlc’s perceived influence as well as 
government’s ‘neoliberal light touch’ approach to the sector, which allows policies to oscillate 
between imposing taxes and removing it, and between strict socio-economic and environmental 
rules to relaxing them.  
b. Land Tenure Relations    
Land tenure relations highlighted agribusiness power to and power over in local domains including 
engagement with smallholders, which also relates to invisible power (Table 7.2). Revenue 
Authority records reveal that 93% (n=38) of commercial entities producing sugarcane were based 
in Mazabuka, connecting to ZaSPlc. One outcome has been conversion of vast customary land 
from subsistence agriculture (maize, livestock) to commercial sugarcane under diverse land 
ownership and production arrangements (Chapter 6). Consequently, “90% of land in Mazabuka 
falls under commercial farming” according to one agricultural officer (D13:16.01.16) and is 
“possibly titled” (D2:11.06.16). Despite some political countermovement such as in the previous 
regime of Levy Mwanawasa that reportedly stopped ZaSPlc expansion through direct land 
acquisitions in the district,4 calling for enhanced local participation as outgrowers (D15:23.06.15), 
ZaSPlc recently incorporated 10,500ha sugarcane fields (2007) alongside a $200 million factory 
                                                          
4 The launch of the first ever Citizen Economic Empowerment Initiative in 2008 stems from a wide 
perceived failure of Zambians to benefit from foreign investments (see also Richardson 2010).  
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expansion in 2009. International finance in outgrower initiatives such as the EU’s Accompanying 
Measures for Sugar Protocol countries also played a crucial a role in sugarcane expansion in 
Mazabuka, enabling agribusiness invisible power/power with.  
However, that land belongs to farmers in Manyonyo, leased out in Magobbo and under a 
management company in Kaleya reflects diverse ways in which an agribusiness shapes production 
and controls land (Table 3.3). Corporate take-over of the Manyonyo scheme in 2012 for instance 
is symptomatic of the agribusiness power and influence in the district. I focus on this scheme to 
demonstrate how financial power enables power over as well as how political connections help an 
agribusiness to consolidates land and shape production dynamics (power with).  
The idea of Manyonyo project started in 2000: with direct involvement of the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Smallholder Irrigation Project Unit. With the support of the Finnish government and 
the African Development Bank, scheme designs, layouts, and construction started in 2009. 
Manyonyo was originally ‘open on choice of crops’ such as maize, bananas, horticultural crops, 
but excluding sugarcane as confirmed by donor and state actors. 
Officers in the MoA reveal that “ZaSPlc claimed the project fell in its expansion radius” (50km 
east of the Nakambala mill) and suggested “modification to the scheme design and layout” 
(Z1:29.06.15). According to officials in the MoA, the government agreed to convert the scheme to 
sugarcane under an off-take agreement (invisible/structural power) but leveraging smallholders in 
production decision-making. Donors as well as officers in the MoA reveal that on linking the 
scheme to a commercial bank for possible financing of Manyonyo operations5, ZaSPlc changed its 
position arguing that “the bank processes were delaying the project.” Discussions with ZaSPlc 
representatives corroborate: “the bank gave uncomfortable clauses such as on disbursement of 
funds” and upon reviewing them, “we thought these clauses could chain smallholders” 
(ZaSPlc2:06.15), illustrative of ZaSPlc’s visible power/power over. Group discussion with 
Manyonyo scheme representatives revealed how ZaSPlc undercut the bank’s funding of ZMK13.5 
million (595ha) and the revised ZMK3.5 million (250ha) at 20% interest rate to offer ZMK1.5 
million (126ha) at 14% loan through its brainchild Mazabuka Cane Growers Trust (MCGT) in 
                                                          




2014 (X3:27.06.15). These perspectives also play out among farmers in Manyonyo: “if not for 
ZaSPlc, no single cane would have been grown in this project” (X3:27.06.15). I return to this 
positive view of ZaSPlc later but suffice to say that this reflects the wider discursive/invisible power 
– of public image and reputation that ZaSPlc wants to entrench in political and economic circles as 
being smallholder driven which was then highlighted by the establishment of the Smallholder 
Development office within the company in 2014. ZaSPlc prided itself that whilst the idea of 
Manyonyo project started in 2002, it was within 2 years of its involvement that the project became 
operationalised/implemented. Crucially, ZaSPlc can bring ideas that state agencies are able to 
implement without exercising any overt force.  
Meanwhile ZaSPlc power over through financial and market power was perceived across all 
schemes (visible power). In Kaleya, the MCGT financed 6.2% smallholder equity stake in KaSCOL 
giving farmers a total of 19.5%. Analysis shows the real value of this financing lies less in being 
pro-smallholders than in shaping decision-making at KaSCOL in favour of MCGT and thus ZaSPlc 
which at that time already held 25% stake in the intermediary. Elsewhere in Magobbo, MCGT 
funded and facilitated farmer relocations as well as 20% initial development costs which, according 
to one representative at MCGT “are incomparable to bank lending rates” (ZaSPlc3:06.15). There 
was a perception among district actors that these sorts of support acted to extend ZaSPlc’s power 
and influence. For instance, this way ZaSPlc was perceived to deflect wider ‘land grabbing’ 
narratives despite exerting central management of production that are characteristic of plantations 
that ensures corporate land consolidation (invisible power) (Hall et al. 2017; Matenga 2017). 
This relates to Illovo and the public face of smallholder sugar sourcing in southern Africa. For 
instance, Oxfam’s ‘Behind the Brands Campaign’ witnessed commitments from global 
corporations such as PepsiCo and Coca-cola to ‘zero tolerance’ for land grabs in their sugar 
sourcing (Oxfam 2013). Suppliers such as Illovo Sugar have made similar commitments with 
respects to smallholders and land rights. Illovo published its own guidelines on land and land rights 
with reference to sustainable farming practices and land acquisition within its supply chain. ‘Illovo 
prioritises alternative model investments, such as the development of smallholder grower farming 
operations in areas in which we operate, rather than acquiring their land for our own development’ 
it says (Illovo 2016). Illovo is now considered a ‘champion’ on ‘just sugar sourcing’ (Oxfam 2016). 
In response to land-grabbing concerns such as from advocacy groups, a quote from the ZaSPlc 
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representative is illustrative of power within: “here we don’t have land-grabs. We actually look for 
land to benefit local people” (ZaSPlc2:16.06.15). Whilst there is no technical ‘land-grabs’ in 
Mazabuka, Illovo manages to control vast swathes of land, and through employing different 
management systems limit the uptake and participation, choice and opportunities for farmers 
(power over). 
c. Labour Dynamics  
Labour dynamics enabled analyses of agribusiness power over in local level labour regimes that 
relates to visible and invisible power. Analysis shows how an agribusiness exerts its economic 
power and through using its image and reputation as larger employer to shape as well as undermine 
labour regimes (visible power). A widely held public image about ZaSPlc in Zambia is that the 
number of people employed by ZaSPlc provided not only a good example of how an agribusiness 
should interface with local economies but also represented the biggest contribution to the national 
economy. Frequently quoted figures show that the sugar industry engages over 11,000 people 
directly and 75,000 indirectly, most of which are associated with ZaSPlc (Palerm et al. 2010, p1) 
(Figure 7.1). The importance of job creation cannot be undermined politically, as the government 
is clear: “we don’t want to shake these companies providing employment” (Z1:09.12.15). Some 
NGOs believe that this narrative raised challenges for agribusiness regulation whilst others 
expressed opinions that policy positions on rural employment and the need to garner political 
support from an opposition dominated southern region offers opportunities for ZaSPlc to exert 




Figure 7.1: Fixed-term and seasonal employment trends in Nanga Farms 
Tight control over production systems permits ZaSPlc to influence diverse labour regimes in 
sugarcane. Financial and economic dominance in production enables ZaSPlc to deploy skilled 
expatriate staff whilst exploiting unskilled labour and limiting smallholder uptake in schemes, as 
corroborated by Richardson (2010). This dualism means that despite the much publicised job 
creation, labour intensity in sugarcane is low. One donor representative at the ADB illustrated that 
“$16 million spent on 165 farmers in Manyonyo could informally engage around 200,000 farmers 
in the cotton sector” (K2:18.06.15). However, according to one independent consultant, ZaSPlc 
has always argued that “what they don’t meet through direct formal engagement of smallholders 
is off-set through massive recruitment of workers” (P2:15.06.15). At issue, however, is that many 
of these sugarcane related jobs are seasonal (Figure 3), depressing gross disbursement of wages 
more so in outgrower systems where wages were reduced by a factor of three, when compared to 
ZaSPlc’s own plantations. However, it is clear labour regimes play an important role in asserting 
an agribusiness regional and national influence. 
7.5 National level analysis: policy practices and business influence  
This section focuses on key national-level policies shaping the sugar industry, and how these 
processes have been framed in a way that deepens the power and influence of an agribusiness.  My 
analysis isolates five domains where policies and practices in sugarcane expansion play out to 
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enhance different sorts of agribusiness power. However, domains express power with and power 
over which with varying intensity are also linked to hidden, visible and invisible power. 
First is ZaSPlc perceived policy influence around vitamin A fortification of sugar (VitAF). All 
domestic or imported sugar for direct consumption in Zambia require mandatory fortification with 
vitamin A. Interestingly, Vit.AF has been coordinated by the Food and Nutrition Commission 
(NFNC) under the Ministry of Health. Frequently quoted figures cite Vitamin A deficiencies 
(xerophthalmia) of over 65% and 53% among children and women respectively as the key driver 
to Vit.AF (Z13:23.18.16). Despite low sugar access among majority Zambians, Vit.AF continues 
to shape sugar politics in Zambia within which an agribusiness is implicated.  
The NFNC confirmed that the capacity and dominance of ZaSPlc in the industry (hidden 
power/power over) gave the agribusiness an advantage over alternative vehicles such as maize 
meal. A senior officer at the NFNC explained how using a production capacity of over 250,000 
MT (1998), “ZaSPlc convinced stakeholders of its capabilities to satisfy the domestic market and 
in order to receive state/donor support” (Z13:18.12.15). In immediately establishing itself in the 
Vit.AF and public health policy developments, collaborations with international finance such as 
UNICEF and the Global Alliance enabled ZaSPlc power with in subsidizing/facilitating 
fortification, equipment and other concessions.  
A widely held view among respondents was that Vit.AF is effectively a non-tariff barrier on sugar 
imports which, in collaboration with state agencies that allows space for manoevre, limits entry of 
new investors (power with). To some actors in the Food and Beverage Industry (FaBI), power with 
effectively “locks the market for Illovo” (P4:15.12.15). According to one Consultant, that ZaSPlc 
contributes “only 10% of total production of Illovo against 30-40% net profit of the group” 
(P1:05.01.16) (Illovo 2016) is illustrative of how donor-state collaborations enable ZaSPlc exploit 
the domestic market. Sugarcane companies and private consultants revealed how prospective 
investments in different parts of the country failed to take-off for various reasons. However, 
interviewees implied that a deliberate failure by government to enhance competition, and intra-
sector diversity through a financial focus on outgrowers linked to ZaSPlc reflected agribusiness 
power with. Limited investments in the sector have thus been blamed on ZaSPlc’s discursive power 
(insivisble power) seen as discouraging new investments. 
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The links between Vit.AF and sugar import rules/guidelines imposed by various state departments 
and supported by ZaSPlc which calls for strict application of Vit.AF rules (power with) are strong. 
For instance, flexing its industry presence within the politics of VitAF, an NGO representative 
explained how ZaSPlc called for “rigorous scrutiny of competing sugar processors,” accusing 
them of failing to comply with packaging, labelling, quality and testing guidelines (power over) 
(Q4:09.12.15). Through such influence, ZaSPlc hidden power was perceived to coerce the 
government to renege on possible industry reforms. For a long period of time FaBI and NGO actors 
have called for abolishing Vit.AF alongside calls to allow sugar imports. They have also called for 
deliberate policy to encourage more agribusinesses in the industry as well as limit state involvement 
in the industry for competition and market growth (Ellis et al. 2010). However, state agencies insist 
on import permits from the MoA and elsewhere, entrenching ZaSPlc’s industry position and 
limiting industry competition (GRZ 2017; Ellis et al. 2012). Whereas inability to allow imports 
was seen by many as protecting the local market, state failure to promote competitiveness in the 
sector is pointed to ZaSPlc’s power with (Richardson 2010). Some policy actors in the MoA 
corroborate: “agribusinesses lack transparency and wield too much power” (Z1:29.06.15). 
Meanwhile, the FaBI actors as well as processors argue that whilst the public health objectives of 
Vit.AF are noble, related processes have hindered market growth and industry competition. Think-
tanks, FaBI and NGO actors expressed concerns that the recently revised Food and Drugs Act 
(1994) which maintains fortification shows that “reforms in favour of VitAF will continue to shape 
the dynamics of sugar” (G2:18.12.15) and so will the presence of ZaSPlc.  
Second is the donor-driven formulation of the Zambia National Sugar Adaptation Strategy (ZNSS). 
The ZNSS responds to trade policy shifts in the EU that departs from fixed regulations and price 
management in sugar markets to building partnerships and private sector development, considered 
the primary means for governing traditional export sectors in developing countries (Orbie 2007). 
In this transition, the European Commission offered financial assistance to developing countries 
for trade capacity (CEC 2012). Known as the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocols 
Countries (AMSP), objectives of this ‘aid for trade initiative’ point to enhancing sugar industry 
competitiveness, diversifying the economies of cane growing areas and addressing wider impacts 
of the reforms in adjusting countries (Richardson and Richardson-Ngwenya 2014).  
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The ZNSS is one major specific measure for promoting sugarcane. Formulated in 2006, the ZNSS 
prioritised sugar expansion through: 1) outgrower schemes; 2) sugar diversification; 3) 
infrastructure; and 4) the development of a national sugar trade policy (Palerm et al. 2010). As with 
Vit.AF, the implementation of the ZNSS revolved around ZaSPlc, with state-donor actors lauding 
the resulting integration of smallholders, bioethanol production and infrastructure development. 
That smallholder integration points to Magobbo and/or Manayonyo schemes means the ZNSS 
inserted ZaSPlc directly into state-donor programs (power with). Again, using scale, capacity and 
financial power, ZaSPlc positioned itself to play a visible role in actualising state-donor policy 
developments including guaranteeing their funds in the development of outgrower schemes which 
further plays to its image and reputation (Power over). Consequently, ZaSPlc effectively brought 
additional 1000ha under direct production and control in Magobbo and Manyonyo within two 
years. Analysis shows that a macro focus in the ZNSS neglected environmental issues. That donors 
and the government belatedly conducted a Strategic Environmental Assessment for sugarcane 
expansion – 4 years after the ZNSS – confirms these concerns (Palerm et al. 2010). Crucially, 
whilst the ZNSS expands scope for production in Mazabuka and around ZaSPlc, the SEA warns 
about serious water availability challenges stemming from competing uses: power generation, 
agriculture, mining and urban consumption in the main ‘sugarbelt’ Kafue River. A neglect in 
environmental regulation by the local authority highlight ZaSPlc power over in regional/local 
authority.  
Third is a widely held perception that ZaSPlc deploys power over and power with through financial 
and economic opportunities to exploit the domestic market through access to concessions, 
including influence on trade policy rules that govern sugar imports. Prior to its historic factory 
expansion investment, ZaSPlc signed an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA), 
which interviewees believed effectively granted the agribusiness three advantages. First, was 
guaranteeing its investments in Zambia. Second was depressing its import bill such as on 
machinery whilst helping access cheap finance. Third and most importantly was compelling the 
government to treat sugar as a “sensitive and priority product within policy guidelines” (Mataka 
2008 cited in Richardson 2010, p.929). With effective state bias towards foreign businesses and 
that only multi-million-dollar projects qualify for IPPAs, ZaSPlc’s economic power is perceived 




Fourth is ZaSPlc’s perceived power over in sugar price transmission and dynamics. Zambia is a 
low-cost sugar producing country, averaging US$169/tonne compared to US$263/tonne world 
average (Ellis et al. 2010). In highlighting pricing politics, the Competition Commission (CPCC) 
fined ZaSPlc 5% (ZMK76,728,650) of 2013 annual turnover for ‘price discrimination and unfair 
pricing’ (GRZ 2017). The CPCC reports that one category of industrial consumers was charged 
22% more than others and that household consumers paid 28% more than the former also paying 
41% higher compared to regional/export consumers. To one NGO representative, “this fine is long 
overdue…and hoped ‘this will unlock the market to encourage competition” (Q6:25.10.17). 
However, other NGO representatives were sceptical that concrete demands for ZaSPlc to 
immediately effect market-reflective price structure are missing, adding: “there are lessons to be 
learnt on how agribusinesses commit injustices with impunity” (Q7:26.10.2017). FaBI actors who 
command 24% of the overall 41% domestic sales gave examples of how ZaSPlc increased sugar 
prices five times (oscillating between 7% and 14%) in 2014, whilst 2015 saw increases of 12.5% 
and 17%, sparking negative reaction among industrial consumers. In response, industrial 
consumers complained to the CPCC calling for reduction in prices to world market levels alongside 
a 10% surcharge to cover local conditions or allow sugar imports (Chisanga et al. 2014). However, 
interviewees argued that rather than addressing concerns through a wider stakeholder consultation 
and representation from FaBI, “the MoA and ZaSPlc met and later sent adjusted prices” 
(P5:15.12.15) (Power with). A general perception was that this highlighted not only the way 
decisions were being made in the industry and how ZaSPlc shaped competition (visible power) but 
also how the absence of government action on market issues entrenched agribusiness influence in 
industry/national politics (power with). 
The final domain reflects the way labour issues play-out at national policy level to highlight power 
over (structural power). National policies have allowed reduced minimum wages for the 
agricultural and sugar industry in Zambia. National interviews revealed how inadequate regulation 
and rules that permit ZaSPlc and strong lobby groups to negotiate and influence discounted sector 
minimum wages contribute to poor labour conditions at local level. A senior economist at the 
largest national farmers union (ZNFU) explained that the combination of seasonal, long and short-
term labour engagements make “agriculture unique” and that the sensitivity of the sector means 
“we cannot put anyone on a minimum wage” (N1:04.12.15). As the Ministry of Labour “has 
allowed this arrangement to continue” means that “for now we are not affected by the labour 
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legislation” he added. Sector-based approach to wages and conditions of services for farm workers 
have been adopted such as such as with the National Union for Plantation, Agricultural and Allied 
Workers (NUPAAW) as corroborated by an officer at Nanga Farms (SDM2:20.01.16). Given the 
dominance of ZaSPlc, many respondents perceive the influence of ZaSPlc in sugarcane-specific 
wages and conditions of service (power with). Not only that, invisible power projected through the 
powerful image and reputation as the largest employer that puts ZaSPlc in good terms with national 
politics was perceived to further enables it to exert influence on sector labour dynamics. While 
discounted sector-specific wages suggest a neglect of labour legislation, it also reflects the 
economic power wielded by the agribusiness as well as limits of state power in state-business 
relationships. 
Within the labour perspective, there have been concerns that state institutions face challenges of 
how to enforce tax and labour laws. District officials reported ‘casualisation’ of labour and poor 
health and safety standards in sugarcane, which they blamed on weak frameworks for monitoring 
agricultural conditions on plantations/estates. Some of these relate to inability of local actors to 
enter production sites to assess adherence to agriculture and sustainability guidelines. According 
to one agricultural officer, “[t]here is politics involved in sugarcane. As civil servants, we have 
stepped-back lest we get accused of supporting an [opposition] political party” (D13:16.01.16) 
(power over). There have been complaints about alienation of local authorities in the business of 
sugarcane and general lack of embeddedness in the regional economy that potentially produces 
regulatory blind spots (power over).  
7.6 Actors, structure and organisation of the sugar industry    
This final section explores key actors, and their influence in the sugar sub-sector. Evaluation of the 
sugar industry started by identifying key actors/institutions shaping national and industry policies 
and practices. These were then linked to the perceived number of individuals (Figure 7.2). Whilst 
various institutions interplay to influence the sugar industry, analysis shows it is state-donor-
agribusiness relations that dominate, enabling national, regional and local expression of 
agribusiness power (Figure 7.2).   
State institutions exert power to formulate national and industry policies, whilst promoting 
outgrower schemes. Nutrition bodies such as the NFNC shape agribusiness/industry practices 
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through controversial public health policies such as those on fortification (Vit.AF). The CPCC 
regulate and shape market guidelines, accepting agribusinesses as private-sector development. 
Other institutions facilitate land acquisitions (Ministry of Lands, MoL), promote agro-investments 
(Zambia Development Agency, ZDA), and regulate water-rights whilst fostering renewable energy 




Figure 7.2: Actor influence in the sugar industry. Diameter of bubbles signify estimated number of actors/individuals involved in relation 









































The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) promotes commercial farming, whilst others facilitate trade 
and sugar related policies (Ministry of Commerce and Trade, MoCTI). Social and 
environmental sustainability aligns to the environmental management agency (ZEMA) which 
approves sugarcane projects but suffer political influence (Giles 2017). 
Multilateral and bilateral development institutions provide technical and financial support. 
However, through resources and infrastructure, donors hold visible power over to shape policy 
as well as power with state institutions and agribusinesses to expand sugarcane production 
(Palerm et al. 2010). State-donor induced irrigation infrastructure enables smallholder 
integration through outgrower schemes whilst entrenching agribusiness concentration.   
Associations such as the National Farmers Union (ZNFU) influence sector labour politics and 
policies such as on electricity tariffs and trade, production and market dynamics but their 
influence remains mixed. Local authorities intervene in land issues, with chiefs acting as key 
facilitators but are limited by state or agribusiness actors. Local and international NGOs that 
focus on welfare (CSPR), livelihoods (Oxfam), land rights (ZLA) as well as tax justice 
(ActionAid) also exert little industry influence, with efforts being more sectoral and less 
vigorously pursued (Phiri et al. 2015; ActionAid 2011). Similarly, household consumers are 
unable to engage the government/corporations such as on product quality and potential 
“discriminatory and unfair pricing” (GRZ 2017). Industrial consumers in the FaBI exhibit 
power within to organise and influence sector dynamics such as prices but identify lack of 
competition as inhibiting their business potential (GRZ 2017, p.1).  
Data suggests that expanding state, donor and agribusiness influence limit spaces for broad-
based stakeholder participation in the industry such as those in FaBI and advocacy groups. One 
FaBI actor expressed an opinion that “the biggest problem is that ZaSPlc has no competitor at 
a large-scale,” enabling it to “establish a dictatorship line of doing business” (P6:15.12.15). 
This was largely blamed on industry lack of competition, particularly “government’s 
disinterest in inviting other players to enter the market” and through “granting significant 
incentives to ZaSPlc” (Q4:09.12.15). According to a respondent at the Research-Tank IAPRI, 
the government has allowed “different authorities in the sugar industry” which at times “seems 
to contradict its own policy on investment promotion and private-sector participation” 
(G3:14.06.15). However, donor and state collaborations enable and sustain ZaSPlc’s 




accused of entrenching agribusiness interests. For instance, to one respondent at the 
Competition Commission, lack of wider industry participation at large-scale level was probably 
because “the market is not conducive enough for other players to enter” (Z10:18.12.15Z) 
enabling an agribusiness power and influence across multiple levels and domains. 
7.7 Discussion: Neoliberal Agriculture, Deepening Agribusiness and Claims to 
Sustainable Rural Development  
This chapter highlights perceptions of how an agribusiness uses its power to shape policy 
development and industry practices. Through a combination of different sorts of power 
interplay, an agribusiness exerts control over the governance dynamics of an agro-industry 
chain, whilst limiting its commitment to social and economic sustainability. While various 
actors shape national and industry dynamics of sugarcane, state-donor-agribusiness relations 
dominate, ensuring agribusiness role in national development and agriculture. One outcome is 
that possibilities of sustainable agriculture, rural and economic development have been 
undermined by actual agribusiness practices as exemplified in local-level domains. By 
identifying different domains, analysis highlights the limits and importance of domestic 
institutions in framing LaSAIs as well as mediating corporate practices that will be required to 
enable a greater focus on sustainable agriculture and rural development.    
The push for LaSAIs in Africa remains central in international policy on development and 
agriculture, ensuring agribusiness expansion. Donor and state actors shape mechanisms that 
underpin transformations in agriculture, but also raise governance issues (German et al. 2016). 
Gaventa’s power framework enables analyses of agribusiness power between and within 
various levels and domains. In drawing on Lukes’ formulation of power, Gaventa’s framework 
enables analysis of power beyond the visible to a consideration of how other forms of power, 
i.e. power with and power over, interact to shape an agribusiness jurisdictional presence. 
Agribusinesses deploy their ‘power of presence’ to influence policy management around 
sugarcane expansion, acting as key facilitators of government/donor projects through their 
willingness to incorporate smallholders (Richardson and Richardson-Ngwenya 2014). 
National level domains reveal an agribusiness can exercise power with through 
synergies, public-private partnerships and collaborations with state and donor actors, enabling 
collective actions and alliance building (hidden power). Narratives around Vit.AF, and how 
the public health policy has been justified, shaped and implemented enables agribusinesses to 




agribusiness collaborations around sugarcane outgrower schemes under the donor-driven 
Zambia ZNSS have been regional and around ZaSPlc, enabling corporate influence. Within 
this context, state agencies restrict the power of municipalities (such as on water and land) 
through hierarchical mechanisms, or where responsibilities of national state agencies conflict 
with lower ones (for instance overlapping authorities) but maintaining agribusiness interests 
(Termeer et al. 2010). Closely linked are industry practices that shape sector strategies and 
policies including processes that underpin sugar price formation and transmission. 
Agribusinesses can hold power over expressed in an actor’s capacity to act. For instance, 
through financial power and investment scope, agribusinesses sign IPPAs which protect their 
industry position and strengthen their influence.   
These processes are by no means absolute but highlight interdependences between business 
and governments, which permits the former to enter crucial domains and influence the latter 
(Richardson 2010). Within such interdependences, agribusinesses may deploy diverse 
strategies to a countermovement at different levels including co-optation or closing spaces 
completely (West and Haug 2017). Some of these relate to financial and economic power seen 
in production expansion and industry capabilities. Actors such as NGOs and labour unions are 
some of the possible institutions that can confront the power of corporations and their national 
allies (Richardson 2018). However, agribusiness power expressions are problematic for 
genuine stakeholder participation and agriculture sustainability, as highlighted in national and 
sub-national domains. For instance, control in land tenure relations as well as labour regimes 
means resource-bearing communities remain peripheral in key production decisions, affecting 
local economic benefits. This is raises the need for greater diversification in land holding and 
crops in order to guarantee sustainable livelihoods.   
Agribusinesses influence policy management, and outgrower arrangements, challenging 
mainstream inclusionary narratives (Chapter 5) (Vicol 2017). Dominance in production 
accompanied by tight control over land and water as well as market channels highlight regional 
and local level power. While exploiting the publicly articulated focus on smallholders, in 
practice agribusinesses limit wider uptake of growers as can be seen in its continued dominance 
in primary agriculture in local domains (Figure 5.3) (Richardson 2010). Even where these have 
been integrated, different production systems split smallholders, affecting local cooperation 
(Chapter 5). This increasingly facilitates physical and economic exclusion of smallholders both 




agriculture (Spann 2017; Peluso and Lund 2011) (Chapter 5). Sustainable local development 
must be viewed in the context of how policy developments and practices induce land 
concentration among powerful agribusinesses and how governance is shaped (Elgert 2016).  
Policies and priorities for commercial agriculture produce an opposite effect, privileging an 
agribusiness at the expense of smallholder systems of agriculture as highlighted in national 
domains. For instance, the push for Vit.AF around an agribusiness reflect corporate power, 
enabling power of presence (Clapp and Scrinis 2017), whilst national policies adversely 
constrain local policies and practices, such as regulation and governance of outgrower schemes. 
While donor and state infrastructure create opportunities for smallholder integration, this 
support is problematic for agribusiness concentration and commitment to agriculture for 
development (Spann 2017). Agribusiness and sugar promotion in national policies conceal 
silent realities of industrial agriculture as high user of water, agro-chemicals and land, which 
undermines sustainability claims (Leguizamon 2016). Weak interaction between and among 
high-level national institutions and those at the local government level, highlight governance 
challenges in the latter, for example accountability, power, responsibilities and decision-
making.  
Global debates around ‘just sugar sourcing’ or ‘sustainable commodities’ increasingly deflect 
attention from agribusiness practices in countries that view LaSAIs as magic bullet for local 
development (Elgert 2016). In this research, regulation and monitoring failures from local 
authorities presents opportunities for unsustainable agribusiness practices (Giles 2017). A key 
governance challenge is the mandate of regional and local authorities to engage with 
agribusinesses. The way agribusinesses operate, oscillating between national and local level 
domains of power means that local authorities are merely spectators of developments in the 
sugar sub-sector, almost completely excluded from policy and institutional formulation, 
implementation and monitoring. This means agribusiness practices at different levels have 
potential to close spaces as well as invite actors in the promotion its interests (Gaventa 2006; 
Cornwall 2002). Evidence shows how the power framework illuminate scalar/governance 
mismatches, and the need for institutional arrangements to account for multi-level and multi-
actor interactions which shape outcomes. Drawing from mono-governance perspectives, the 
role of the local authority is thus unclear (Van Alstine 2014).  
There are clear mismatches between realities at local level and what national actors believe is 




legitimacy in the eyes of critical players at regional and local level (Cash et al. 2003). Powerful 
corporations in agriculture present difficulties for countries such as Zambia to leverage socio-
economic and environmental benefits. Some of this relate to lack of agribusiness social and 
economic embeddedness in the local economy, as discussed in regional/local domains 
(Richardson 2010). Although state officials can be enthused by the presence of an agribusiness 
at local level, their ability to regulate corporations is limited by an overlap in authority between 
national and local actors. District officials especially civil servants spoke of the difficult in 
monitoring and regulating agribusiness activities, compounded by national-level political 
involvement. There is little evidence that the local authority was acknowledged as a monitoring 
and regulatory structure by ZaSPlc. More widely, sugarcane issues, information sharing and 
decision-making processes are highly centralized, with the district level of governance often 
bypassed. As elsewhere (Van Alstine et al. 2006), a lack of local government involvement and 
increased government control means that authority is being implicitly (or even explicitly) 
transferred to foreign agribusinesses operating in the sector, raising social and ecological 
contradictions. 
7.8 Conclusion 
Agribusinesses are ‘emerging and new’ actors in African agriculture but never neutral. This 
chapter highlights five domains and how an agribusiness uses its “power of presence” within 
jurisdictional scale to shape sustainability in policy and industry practices in Zambia. State and 
non-state actors interact to shape domains underpinning agribusiness expression of power. One 
key governance gap identified from analyses of multi-level interactions and multi-level actors 
is weak regional and local government capacity. Governance gaps and limited capacity to 
monitor, regulate and influence in agribusiness were identified in three domains: agribusinesses 
embeddedness (or lack of it) in wider development processes; land tenure relations; labour 
regimes and practices. Regional and local-level practices reflect mono-centric governance 
perspectives which exerts state power and authority over regional and local economies as well 
as industry policy. This feature not only enables an agribusiness to oscillate between national, 
regional, and local levels but also permits enormous influence within the national scales, as 
exemplified in five domains: public health policy on Vit.AF; the donor-driven Zambia National 
Sugar Adaptation Strategy; access to investor concessions; sugar price formation and 
transmission; and national labour policy regimes. Through a combination of different sorts of 
power interplay, an agribusiness exerts control over the governance dynamics of an agro-




stakeholders. By identifying different domains around the sugar industry, analysis highlights 
the limits and importance of domestic institutions in framing LaSAIs as well as mediating 
corporate practices that will be required to provide a greater focus on sustainable agriculture 
and rural development. 
The chapter provides insights into the centrality of relationships between and among 
agribusinesses and development actors in determining realities and prospects for sustainable 
development, including industry-specific practices within which smallholders are implicated. 
Findings of this study enables us to reflect on the limits of what national and local institutions 
can achieve with regards sustainability and sets us to think about how scholars can enable a 
greater focus on sustainability at different governance scales and levels. Sugar related issues 
have been framed at national level through policy practices, but weak interactions with local-
level authorities produce crucial mismatches. Agribusiness expansion as pathway for 
delivering sustainable development is consequently problematic for agriculture, local 
development as well as sustainability. The top-down nature of sugarcane promotion and 
expansion, control over land and water resources raises problematic socio-economic and 
economic contradictions associated with LaSAIs.  
My use of the concept “power of presence” is novel in that it helps unpack levels and domains 
throughout an agro-industry chain within which agribusiness power unfolds. It shows how 
analyses can draw on Lukes expressions of power to integrate Gaventa and Rowland’s 
formulation to provide insights on an agribusiness power of presence. This shows how the 
exercise of power goes beyond the visible, i.e. the power that an agribusiness exerts on other 
actors to act in its interest simply by being in that domain, to a consideration of hidden and 
invisible formulations as they relate to power with and power over within a jurisdictional scale. 
In so doing, the chapter helps to extend the existing literature on power dimensions of LaSAIs 
and agribusinesses, by bringing national processes that shape investment outcomes and raising 
questions for future research around the realities and possibilities for agriculture and local 
development. The discussion of agribusiness power of presence shows a contested agro-
industry chain characterised by different sorts of power across all levels, enabling agribusiness 
control and influence. My analysis suggests that despite claims that LaSAIs can be inclusive 
and account for local realities (Deininger et al. 2011), regional and local participation is 
lacking. It shows that analyses that examine power dynamics within policy and industry 




with regards the push for sustainable development. Most importantly, the study highlights the 
need to examine the industry structure under which diverse actors operate and the power 
dynamics that shape actions and determine outcomes. This chapter has identified how the 
much-promulgated agriculture for development discourse and focus on agribusiness actors 
entrenches power of presence whilst concealing ecological and social contradictions related to 
LaSAIs. These findings are context specific but raise promising questions for further research. 
The fragmented governance of agribusinesses and LaSAIs in general challenges simplistic 
claims around the role of agriculture in international and regional policy management. The way 
an agribusiness deploys its power and influence across national, regional and local level 
domains present vital lessons for Zambia that the much-touted benefits of agriculture for 
development are far from automatic. And that any efforts towards generating greater benefits 
from agriculture will not require blind faith in LaSAIs. These lessons are drawn out and 
discussed in the following chapter, which looks in more detail at the interconnections between 




Chapter 8 Large-scale Agricultural Investments, Sugar Value-
chain, and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has explored how LaSAIs play out within the national context by looking at national 
policy and institutional processes governing investments; industry practices shaping 
smallholder inclusion and exclusion; livelihood impacts, strategies and pathways; and 
agribusiness power and influence across various domains. By looking at four related and multi-
level objectives in which LaSAIs are negotiated, governed and play out, this thesis has revealed 
the ways in which politics, power and institutional processes are insinuated in ‘land grabbing’ 
and in the national context, and what this means for agrarian change and rural social 
differentiation. Thus, whilst the interdependent nature of national, industry and local dynamics 
has been evident throughout the thesis, one of the central themes of this analysis has been the 
way in which politics, power and institutional processes are implicated at different levels. This 
discussion chapter integrates key findings from the four results chapters and establishes links 
between them as well as implications for agriculture and development, enabling a range of 
contributions to the current knowledge about LaSAIs. The chapter considers actors, 
relationships, and narratives in terms of politics, power and institutions; discusses how 
institutions and power dynamics shapes not only processes of value-chain participation or non-
participation, but also how these shape access and utilisation of land and water as well as labour 
dynamics; and power and influence of new actors – agribusinesses – within national, regional 
and local domains. Prospects for, and challenges of integrating multiple theoretical frameworks 
are reflected upon. In building on the analysis advanced in preceding chapter, one of the central 
arguments in this chapter is that critical reflection on national politics, power dynamics and 
institutional processes that underpin LaSAIs will be crucial in facilitating a more inclusive and 
appropriate governance of foreign investments that can deliver a more locally-rooted agro-
vision for agriculture and more sustainable and socially-just rural development. In what 
follows, research objectives are revisted with an aim of addressing the implications of the 
research.     
 8.2 Revisiting Research Objectives 
Policy, institutional and governance dynamics of LaSAIs were considered in Chapter 4. The 




to illuminate national politics, policy and institutional processes shaping LaSAIs. Whilst actors 
have been categorised in this research by their level of operation (e.g. national, industry, and 
local), actors assume multiple roles and are driven by multiple values, interests, and 
motivations. There is no one collective voice. However, evident across the preceding empirical 
chapters are contested narratives and different perceptions and extent to which actors advance 
or counter processes of LaSAIs. In the context of governance processes, coordination and 
collaboration challenges between and among state actors is evident in different advances such 
as narratives and views on water and land resources, raising competing framings of LaSAIs. 
These divergences at national level produces uncertainty in local contexts not only because of 
expanding LaSAIs but also because national politics, power and influence in institutional 
processes determine what local actors can or cannot do.  
Despite divergencies in narratives, and challenges of coordination, a narrative of agriculture 
for development driving LaSAIs amongst state, donor and private-sector development actors 
is particularly pursuasive, more so in relation to rural empowerment and development. 
However, the relative merits of LaSAIs, and the extent to which smallholders benefit, including 
the way land, labour and water resources are implicated in LaSAIs are contested by a range of 
actors at different levels. There is, for example, disagreements on how smallholders can be 
integrated into emerging value-chains on the one hand, and divergences between the narrative 
of agricultural expansion and caution around water and labour resources on the other. The 
nature of these challenges of collaboration and coordination between state institutions have 
been unpacked and problematised within this thesis and it is on the negotiation and decision 
making in these processes of agricultural expansion in response to LaSAIs that this discussion 
focuses on. 
Findings show how state institutions create possibilities of LaSAIs but that the state agencies 
seeking to administer land-based resources also limit their potential through competing 
authority and agendas. Tensions over decision-making and creation of new frontiers of resource 
control between and among different institutions have been heightened by a national focus on 
water and land resources as well as the flow of government and donor resources into 
agriculture. Particulalry when it comes to contenstations over perspectives on land and water, 
within LaSAI debates, economiclaly-oriented actors are quick to deligitimise environmentally-
oriented actors who might apply brakes on investments by advacing an anti-development and 




knowledge/narrative counts or not count is highly political, which means that comprehensive 
assessments of LaSAIs and the multiple risks that may be required to accompany such 
investments is neglected. These results bolster evidence that improved governance, policy and 
institutional cooperation and coordination are key in addressing some of the challenging 
aspects of LaSAIs such as transparency, tenure security and wider governance of the land 
sector, and improved conditions for local inclusion in emerging value-chains (Borras et al. 
2011). Findings illustrate the potential and limitations of the top-down nature of resource 
governance. They bolster critical perspectives on the centrality of bureaucratic and legal 
extensions of state power; principles and rules shaping foreign investments; state capacity in 
creating conditions for production and reproduction; and role of local participations in 
understanding national dynamics of LaSAIs (Fairbairn 2013; Wolford et al. 2013).  
Chapter 5 considered industry and local factors affecting smallholder participation in sugar 
value-chains including terms and conditions. The chapter was conceptually grounded in value-
chain dynamics such as market access avenues, institutional arrangements, and representation 
to reflect how inclusive agribuisinesses can be. There is a convergence of smallholder forms 
of participation in sugar industry with agribusiness-state-donor collaborations/initiatives but 
industry and local experiences remain problematic. Structural and non-structural factors 
combine to shape inclusion and exclusion, but play out to enhance an agribusiness control over 
production arrangements. Whilst the former activates the latter, these results illustrate that 
whilst advanced as inclusive forms of agribusiness expansions, smallholder outgrower 
arrangements enable corporate control over land and water including production, marketing 
and wider resources, which is problematic for local participation, livelihoods and sustainable 
development.     
Chapter 6 considered micro-level impacts of LaSAIs on livelihoods. The chapter was 
conceptually grounded in the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA). Evidence presented 
showed that livelihood contributions of LaSAIs and sugarcane uptake, and livelihood responses 
reflect causes and consequences of differences in the evolution, operation, and integration of 
outgrower schemes. Within this perspective, ougrower schemes that link smallholder 
production to other livelihood options as highlighted in Kaleya are effetive in employing labour 
and in the promotion of diversified and sustainable livelihoods. However, quality of 
employment and production remains low, which fails to produce significant path-changing 




capital, a focus on incomes neglects other equally important forms of capital, producing narrow 
as opposed to diversified livelihoods that enhance livelihoods on a sustainable basis. 
Livelihood pathways enable diversification away from sugarcane schemes but are forged 
within land-based and agrarian activities which interlinks with prior household wealth 
positions. The chapter shows that the way schemes are organised and structured alongside 
contractual arrangements have skewed the capture of benefits towards better-off households 
whilst aggravating inequalities. These results indicate uneven distribution of impacts between 
and within sugarcane schemes and communities as well as farmer groups. They also illustrate 
that households do not always switch to high-paying strategies. 
The final empirical chapter (Chapter 7) placed Chapter 4-6 within the wider structure and 
organisation of the sugar industry to explore how an agribusiness’ “power of presence” exploits 
national, regional, and local domains to exert control over an industry governance and influence 
sustainability. National investments and trade policy developments foster agribusiness 
expansion in sugarcane but neglect environmental assessments that expose social and 
ecological contraditions such as on competing water uses. Regional and local level donor-state 
relations enable smallholder integration in sugarcane as poverty reduction whilst 
agribusinesses are limiting their participation through tight control on resources and production 
systems. My analysis suggests current policy developments, social and political efforts around 
“agriculture for development” in Zambia entrenches power and interets of an agribusiness 
whilst neglecting industry expansion, competitiveness and sustainability. Power expressions in 
national and sub-national domains show possibilities of sustainable agriculture and rural 
development have been undermined by agribusiness practices. These results illustrate limits 
and importance of domestic institutions in framing LaSAIs as well as in mediating agribusiness 
standards and practices that will be required to provide a greater focus on sustainable 
agriculture and rural development.  
The picture roughly painted above is one which advances a variety of dynamics surrounding 
LaSAIs, underpinned by politics, power dynamics and institutional processes, which are 
differently deployed and exploited depending on actors. The following sections considers 
further the centrality of these key threads in LaSAIs, by making references to some key 




8.3 The Role of Politics, Power and Institutional Processes 
The four empirical chapters discussed in this thesis have referred to and shown the centrality 
of politics, power and institutional processes in LaSAIs at different levels, acting to shape 
narratives of governance and potential outcomes of investments. Whilst these processes and 
narratives shape national decisions and development discourse around LaSAIs, outcomes at 
local level point to prospects for value-chain participation and how land and water resources 
shape livelihood outcomes in investment hosting communities. Power is evident in approving 
LaSAIs, and in decision making around access to natural resources as well as environmental 
decisions/agency – the power to frame development agendas. Reflecting on Whitfield (2014, 
p.194), this exists in an even subtle way in the public sensitisation, which strongly promote a 
particular framing of LaSAIs as ventures to be promoted through facilitative regulation. 
LaSAIs are highly politicised in Zambian agriculture, with manifestation of these power 
dynamics emerging in wider development claims of the progressive nature LaSAIs, access and 
utilisation of land and water resources. However, institutional processes and their promotion 
of LaSAIs proceed whilst concealing power interplay and influence by key actors in the state, 
donor and private sector spheres, more so in industry and local settings. Across the empirical 
chapters there is a recognition that power underpinned by institutional processes manifest 
themselves in multiple and subtle ways. Thus, there is no one power, which makes predictions 
about patterns around who wins or loses within these debates less certain. This thesis has given 
examples of powerful actors across state, donor and private sector spheres, and at national, 
industry and local level, constructing narratives of change in agriculture, closing down 
alternative as well as counter narratives (e.g. on the nature and merits of LaSAIs, and public 
health narratives of sugar fortification). Clearly, the future of foreign investments, agriculture 
and smallholders in Zambia will remain contested and splitting for actors. In what follows, I 
draw on these concepts to reflect more closely on industry practices and impacts on land, water 
and labour and wider agrarian change and social rural differentiation.   
8.4 Linking LaSAIs, Governance Dynamics, and Local Livelihoods together  
This thesis explores the extent to which LaSAIs impact local development and rural 
livelihoods. Throughout this thesis, I have drawn on interdependencies at national, industry 
and local level, and shown how these have been shaped by national politics, power dynamics 
and institutional processes. Linking findings between and across each research objective 




8.4.1 Agricultural Investments, Institutional Cooperation and Coordination 
The concept of unbundling the state and the national political cultures that shape LaSAIs and 
outcomes introduced in Chapter 2 and 4 (Burnod et al. 2013; Wolford et al. 2013; Fairbairn 
2013) provide a useful way of conceptualising LaSAIs which draws on national actors to make 
crucial decisons about decisions. Literature has until now focused on global governance 
processes of LaSAIs, including land control  (see Schoneveld 2017; Peluso and Lund 2011). 
However, chapter 2 showed that perspectives for understanding governance dynamics and the 
role of the national state are still required, with the politics within national state institutions, 
extensions of political power and relationships remaining peripheral to the land-grabbing 
debate.  
In response to these gaps, this thesis drew from an understanding of state dynamics, delving 
into policy and institutional framework analysis to explore governance dynamics and tensions 
between policy and development actors involved in LaSAIs. Studies such as Peluso and Lund 
(2011) and Borras et al. (2011) reveal how national states actively promote LaSAIs and ensure 
land control. In extending this view, this thesis noted patterns of increased growth in LaSAIs, 
but went further to identify three key trajectories: 1) acquisition of existing companies; 2) 
resource, market and efficiency seeking strategies among firms; and 3) investments in primary 
production and output markets (i.e. transport and storage). Growth trends were also identified: 
1) diversification of existing and entry of new firms into agriculture; 2) increased demand for 
land, water and electricity; 3) increased tax receipts; 4) growth in agro-output, private-sector 
enterprises; and 5) increase in agro-processing. Whilst bilateral and international funding 
agencies as well as regional markets and politics drive LaSAIs, there is a particular domestic 
imperative to investments which is dominant in Zambia with five underpinning processes: 1) 
maize exceptionalism; 2) national politics and rural development; 3) legislation and tenure 
system; 4) investment and policy environment; and 5) investment promotion. Policy 
developments, social and political efforts have linked LaSAIs to job creation as empowerment, 
agriculture and rural development, as well as to increased cultivation and irrigated areas, but 
these have been driven largely by powerful national actors, who also shape dominant narratives 
around foreign capital. A focus on national level factors and analysis adds to the body of 
literature which has so far focused on international drivers and dynamics to explain what is 




By working to promote the smooth implementation of LaSAIs, state institutions have been 
invoked in narratives of LaSAI legitimation. Chapter 4 highlighted institutional 
processes/practices and how the presence of a LaSAI produces transformations in institutional 
arrangements enabling individual state institutions to promote and secure investments. As with 
Bottazzi et al. (2016), by expanding investment entry points, such innovations build tensions 
between and among state institutions, making structural change and shared goal attainment less 
likely. While LaSAIs draw on different actors and authority to facilitate investments (Figure 
4.1), state-donor relations drive the agricultural change narrative. One outcome has been 
expanding scope and power for certain state institutions to influence investment decisions to 
the exclusion of wider consultations which affects policy development and coherence (Kalaba 
et al. 2013). By drawing on different sorts of state power and authority, these processes allow 
different institutions to justify LaSAIs. However, multi-stakeholder and sector interaction that 
could possibly enhance institutional support and coordination remains weak. Pedersen (2016) 
reports from Tanzania that government actors are more in control of policy making than donors, 
the latter participating on financing than in reform design. In contrast, this thesis gave examples 
of how donors deploy financial power or otherwise to advance policy pathways around LaSAIs, 
shaping national decision making around land and water and the way national institutions 
respond.  
Power and institutional dynamics underpinning governance processes of LaSAIs in Zambia 
mean that collaborative and coordination efforts surrounding foreign investments are generally 
lacking, mainly for three reasons: 1) the nature of donor relations to state institutions; 2) 
tensions between and among state institutions; and 3) the role and influence of firms. For 
instance, emphasis on natural resources among national actors, accompanied by availability of 
public and donor funds seem to build tensions between and among various state institutions. 
Resource-based tensions such as those around water identified between the MoA and MoEWD 
reflect manoevres to monopolise state-donor resources. In particular, economic-related 
institutions highlight strong horizontal cooperation reflective of the dominant “agriculture for 
development” discourse (World Bank 2007). Recent research efforts show that whilst signaling 
negative implications for local development, these somewhat ‘path dependent’ practices 
neglect interaction with natural resource and environmentally-related institutions (Atela et al. 
2016; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2014). Deficits in inter-sectoral cooperation and collaboration 
heighten sectoral politics of power and authority and resource control, preventing possibilities 




Previous studies have focused on impacts of LaSAIs on majority groups such as smallholders, 
and how investments create positive configurations for smallholder leverage (Rutten et al. 
2017). Building on local development imperatives associated with LaSAIs, this thesis finds 
that the wider focus on export linked commodities such as sugar that are large-scale-biased and 
respond to regional/global demand limits smallholder interaction with such crops (Chapter 5). 
Where farmer integration has occurred, smallholders face an uncertain future as political 
rhetoric around outgrowers for instance remains oblivious to micro-level experiences such as 
threats of appropriation of land, water and local assets including local farmer investment 
initiatives. Within this context, power and influence of agribusinesses is thus strengthened 
(Chapter 7).  
This thesis demonstrates that ‘unbundling’ institutions and policy practices make more visible 
state politics, power and institutional processes governing LaSAIs and their potential effects. 
It shows that insufficient processes have been put in place to bring governing processes around 
LaSAIs up to speed with much effort being made in channeling market forces to favour foreign 
LaSAIs as well as facilitating foreign access to resources. This issue has both to do with state 
institutions, their power and influence as well as agribusinesses themselves. Clearly, the 
presence of an investment at national level sets into motion diverse policy and institutional 
processes that govern them. This raises questions about legal extensions of the state power 
(territory); national capacity of rulers to control the conditions of their own reproduction 
(sovereingty); political hierachy and related legal practices and how they shape LaSAIs 
(authority); and experiences of the citizens as subjects highlighted in Wolford et al. (2013). 
Combined, relations around LaSAIs may produce positive discourses around agriculture, 
underpinning bureaucratic structures and legal frameworks that shape regulation of customary 
land access and management. However, power relations between state and non-state actors 
influence conditions for land acquisition and dispossession, shaping the meaning of land and 
territory as well as articulation of categories of identities and belonging as they relate to 
LaSAIs.  
Wolford’s formulation shows how power flows through the various disaggregated levels and 
functions of the state, allowing for diverse actors to be drawn as critical actors in LaSAIs 
(2013). This thesis has revealed the challenge of how to clarify mandates, close overlaps, and 
build multi-stakeholder partnerships that can enhance decision-making around resources and 




LaSAIs and implications of the departure from the top-down nature of governance of land, 
labour and water resources which can be problematic for long-term sustainable agriculture and 
local development. At one level, these challenges relate to institutional strengthening, and how 
to attach long-term perspectives to land ownership, development and LaSAIs. At another, they 
relate to how to create strong collaborations so that the Zambian policy and institutional setting 
that govern LaSAI processes can reflect and adapt local aspirations and goals. As will be shown 
in the next section, the way national politics, power and institutional dynamics shape decision 
making around LaSAIs produces challenges and prospects for smallholder participation in 
emerging value chains.  
 8.4.2 Smallholder Inclusion and Exclusion in Value-Chains 
Much has been theorised about market mechanisms and smallholder coordination mechanisms 
at global level (World Bank 2009; Kruger et al. 1991), but connecting how national and sectoral 
processes shape inclusionary dynamics remain challenging. A key question facing LaSAIs is 
how to create conditions for linking smallholders into value-chains as inclusive businesses 
(World Bank 2008). Chapters 1 and 2 articulate how LaSAIs, outgrower schemes and value-
chains have been promoted as inclusive, less harmful and facilitating smallholder 
accumulation. Yet, critical perspectives show schemes present unequal power relations an 
important forms of land control (Vicol 2017; McMichael 2013). Inherent constraints in 
inclusive business often ignore institutional and power relations between the state, 
agribusinesses and smallholder communities, raising the need for more socially embedded and 
power influenced analysis as advanced in this research. This research drew on the specificities 
of institutions, industry, cultures and governance aspects in value-chains which have been 
intensified by LaSAIs to ask: who is dispossed; adversely incorporated and affected; who gains 
and why?  In so doing, power dynamics that shape bargaining processes, negotiability and 
flexibility within prevailing institutional arrangements are exposed. This was necessary given 
efforts that advance the inevitability of the co-existence of foreign capital and smallholders. By 
linking the understanding of GVC dynamics to LaSAIs, this research connects the missing 
elements in value-chain analyses – land – whilst adding chain elements to LaSAIs studies 
which until now has had limited understanding of the GVC dynamics (Nelson and Pritchard 
2009).  
Previous studies have distanced contract farming from land grabbing and from negative 




arrangements that favour smallholders – pointing to somewhat of a balanced relations and 
negotiability (McMichael 2013; Barret et al. 2012; Smalley and Corbera 2012). This research 
has shown how LaSAIs centre on local land and water resources as sites in which smallholders 
are constructed as interdependent entities in agriculture and economic activities – of unequal 
power relations, bargaining and institutional arrangements within which investments are 
enacted. Agribusiness control of land, water and production, as highlighted in Chapter 5 and 6, 
means smallholders depend on intermediaries to access the value-chain, creating what Adams 
et al. (2018) characterises as dependences. Evidence shows coordinating upstream and 
downstream nodes in the value-chain, permits firms to centrally or through intermediaries exert 
production and market requirements (e.g. standards, varieties, production requirements). 
Coordination scheme arrangements and vertical integration makes relationships between lead 
firms and smallholders indirect, complex and strictly governed. However, divergencies in 
production set-up produce variations in buyer-grower relationships, but which are broadly 
formalised and structured through various monopsonic dynamics of the dominant firm 
(Chapter 6).  
As chapter 5 highlights, whether land is owned by intermediaries or held under rental 
arrangements, tight control by firms ensures systematic alienation of farmers from downstream 
value creation/capture. Perceived low sugarcane returns, restricted access to natural capital 
within schemes and inadequate institutional support increasingly pushes farmers away from 
sugarcane schemes and, thus, their position as sugarcane farmers, jeopardising livelihoods, 
confirming reent reports (Dubb 2015). This research shows these have been shaped by 
configurations of market power and control in production spaces, generating clear processes of 
capital accumulation by firms which is inconsistent with inclusive development outcomes 
(Cohen 2013; Anseeuw et al. 2012). The presence of intermediaries make independent 
smallholder negotiations impossible – limiting of negotiability and exposes smallholders to the 
loss of land rights and autonomy over it (Adams et al. 2018; Hall et al. 2017). Through 
sugarcane supply agreements, intermediaries exert non-negotiable production, market and 
commercial requirements. Corporate land and production control places agribusinesses in 
powerful negotiation positions, as projected in sugarcane and water quotas as well as market 
dynamics (e.g. purchasing arrangements) (Chapter 5). Overall, this research has shown that 
terms and conditions for smallholder participation reflect both evolution, operation and 
integration of outgrower schemes, and how agribusinesses – their power and influence – 




Chapter 5 shows grower inclusion in value-chains relates to sugarcane promotion in national 
policies and political rhetoric around agricultural commercialisation, job creation and rural 
development. Inclusion also relates to value-chain coordination and governance, reflective of 
wider agribusiness power and influence (Chapter 7). Inclusionary dynamics are not 
homegenous, and chapter 5 tied these dynamics together by showing that different outgrower 
farming arrangements produce diverse, uneven, socially contested but interdependent 
hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion. Buyer-grower relationships vary across land ownership, 
production and contractual agreements, which can be entangling, and exclusionary for 
smallholders.  
This thesis showed structural (industry) and non-structural (local) factors converge to shape 
smallholder inclusion. For instance, “productivity enhancing” state-donor induced irrigation 
infrastructure provide the initial basis for smallholder participation in sugar value-chain or 
indeed non-participation (Chapter 7). Considerable regional advances in infrastructure 
development towards Mazabuka and around ZaSPlc facilitates firm power, accumulation and 
consolidates its industry position. However, this limits wider sugarcane expansion and 
smallholder integration, which faces technical, collateral, tenure security and infrastructure 
problems (as discussed in chapter 6). Socio-economic and political efforts clearly entrench 
sugarcane expansion and smallholder access to markets but positions agribusinesses as 
facilitators, which reflects smallholder position and possibilities in value-chains. Actual 
smallholder inclusion thus lies centrally with agribusiness actors who shape institutional 
arrangements for growers (Chapter 7).  
Non-structural elements play an even greater role in shaping inclusion. Chapter 5 reveals that 
value-chain inclusion reflects initial welfare status, contrary to some generalisations (Barret et 
al. 2008). Evidence shows smallholders relate to value-chains differently and participation is 
non-random as opposed to random. In Magobbo for instance, this thesis has show how local 
employment opportunities prioritised cane growers as land owners or remained limited 
altogether. To enable participation, smallholders must own land or directly inherit farms but 
these options have no easier escape routes for smallholders once land is trapped into 
commodity crops such as sugarcane. The dynamics of selling, swapping or losing land 
identified within communities and among farmers reflect diverse experiences directly related 
to processes of inclusion. The better-off farmers integrate and profiteer from sugarcane and 




women and youths – who neither inherit, swap, buy land/farms nor control household 
expenditure decisions – are clear losers as confirmed in recent reports (Hall et al 2017). These 
processes aggravate local inequalities (Briones 2015) and highlight the centrality of land in 
shaping the convergence between capital, land and local populations/subjects and determining 
rural social differentiation.  
Whilst previous studies attempt to distance contract farming from negative ramifications 
(Smalley and Corbera 2012), I have shown in Chapter 5 that buyer-grower 
networks/relationships are not entirely unproblematic. A deficit in resources, knowledge and 
capacity among smallholders builds a case for intermediaries. Intermediaries facilitate 
smallholder sugarcane production, but relationships are imbalanced. Sugarcane prices and 
expenses on inputs as well as tenure security (as shaped by institutional arrangements) produce 
high levels of mistrust between an agribusiness and local people and within communities, 
raising governance dynamics (Phillips 2014). That farmers cannot perform certain roles or lose 
control over their land means the argument for inclusion is much less convincing. A key 
contribution here is that there are clear implications for social relations, processes of rural 
differentiation and agrarian change but these are not only foisted on exclusion but also on 
adverse processes of incorporation (McCarthy 2010). 
Previous studies have shown inclusion simultaneously activates processes of exclusion (Tobin 
et al. 2016), which has been constructed as problematic. In showing that exclusion is not always 
problematic, this thesis gave examples of how excluded smallholders benefit from sugar 
growers as money lenders, reaping the benefits of value-chain activation in the community, but 
from the margins. This is potentially an important finding. Chapter 5 shows how exclusion 
relates to diverse factors including: 1) contractual arrangements and sugarcane quotas from 
ZaSPlc, interpreted as a strategy for maintaining dominance in primary production; 2) active 
farmer decisions; and 3) project selection. Farmer decisions link to fear of losing land and 
perceived unclear benefits of sugarcane among farmers, which is inconsistent with arguments 
that smallholders always perceive integration as beneficial (Tobin et al. 2016). Converting 
communal grazing land to sugarcane (Section 5.7) determines what the excluded can or cannot 
do. Differences between farmers with pastoralist interests on the one hand and those that 
prioritised sugarcane on the other highlight divergences among local growers and 
incompatilities of commodity crops with local aspirations. Whilst exclusion underpin landed 




always excluded equally (McKay and Colque 2016). That the direction of travel in land 
conversion prioritised sugarcane as opposed to the wider spectrum of smallholder interests as 
alternative farmer initiatives highlights rural politics, power and institutional arrangements on 
the one hand, and broad concerns of social differentiation, dispossession and the consequences 
of inclusion on the other. More crucially and unike previous studies (Barret et al. 2012), active 
decisions on exclusion are not always economic in nature and farmers face diverse complex 
arrangements and realities that shape local decisions.  
Conversely, exclusion relates to project selection factors, including 1) land constraints, 2) lack 
of opportunities to swap, and external involvement (limiting local participation) as well as, 3) 
degree of risk aversion in families (e.g. disagreements on land conversion). Displacements of 
people from their cropping fields and conversion of grazing land highlight ‘exclusion on 
disadvantageous terms.’ That farmers such as the landless, youths and widows enter into deals 
to work on estates on behalf of the better-off (to share gains) highlights diverse layers and 
crucial social implications for inequality in sugarcane (Phillips 2014). This situation is clearly 
gendered, raising design challenges on how to distribute benefits to a wide range of farmers 
without marginalising them. A key contribution is that intermediaries cannot always be 
harnessed progressively within a collaborative environment (Howard 2016).  
This research has shown governance processes are crucial in outgrower arrangements. Chapter 
5 shows farmer committees clamour for legitimacy, but even where institutional structures 
exist, financial incentives available to members heighten stakes for leadership, and thus elite 
capture (Box 5.6) (Harrison and Chiroro 2016). Chapter 5 ties this to an argument that silences 
and occasional actions by district officials and ZaSPlc to intervene in schemes reflect hidden 
power dynamics by state and corporate actors. A unique contribution here is that within 
households, a focus on sugarcane leads to multiple claims to land with one outcome being 
‘exclusion from within’ as powerful household members especially in polygamous households 
monopolise profits and dominate decision-making, raising challenges for rural social 
differentiation.  
Overall, this chapter has shown that going beyond simplistic narratives on commercial 
agriculture and ‘win-win’ arguments is a vital step towards more nuanced analyses of what 
inclusion and/or exclusion  means in reality. Current dynamics in LaSAIs and irrigation 
expansion have insufficiently been appraised in terms of effectiveness and the role of 




range of interaction between different actors and impacts of such interactions on grower 
engagements and institutional arrangements. As Woodhouse et al. (2017) note, some of these 
elements highlight conceptual short-comings of LaSAIs and outgrower initiatives in sub-
Saharan Africa that makes it difficult to engage effectively with smallholders as well as the 
importance and challenge of a multi-level analysis.    
8.4.3 Grower Livelihoods, Diversification and Pathways   
Previous studies have focused on livelihood implications of LaSAIs, social and economic 
differentiation more broadly and in different industry settings, with evidence of treating 
outgrower schemes as homegenous (Hall et al. 2017a; Matenga 2017; Matenga and 
Hichaambwa 2017). Less emphasised is how different scheme structure and organisation shape 
livelihoods. This could be overcome by examining differently structured schemes within the 
same industry setting, moving towards a greater understanding of the differences and 
effectiveness across diverse livelihood dimensions, as advanced in this research. Chapter 6 
considers consequences of differences in the evolution, operation and integration of outgrower 
schemes on livelihoods and response pathways within the sugar industry setting. Three key 
potentially umportant finds from this chapter suggest: 1) outgrower schemes that enable 
smallholders to access alternative livelihood assets and options produce greater livelihood 
impacts across financial capital and other dynamics, but these remain low quality, and fail to 
produce significant path-changing gains for smallholders; 2) Livelihood contributions of 
LaSAIs and sugarcane uptake reflect causes and consequences of differences in the evolution, 
operation, and integration of outgrower schemes; 3) Livelihood diversfication away from 
sugarcane schemes but forged within land-based and agrarian activities show smallholders do 
not always switch to profit maximising strategies, departing from dominant narratives that 
point to deagrarianisation (World Bank 2011). Overall, this thesis highlights the need to frame 
the agrarian question in terms of the politics of land and labour. It also raises the need to explore 
and understand complex intra-household decisions and how they undertake to leverage diverse 
livelihood. How value-chain implementation shifts power within households and how 
household members leverage decision-making remains an interesting area of resrarch (Barret 
et al. 2012). 
Livelihood contribution and experiences of sugarcane growing vary across  poor, medium or 
better-off household categories. Across the schemes, changes in financial capital were 




impacts related to LaSAIs and sugarcane uptake (Chapter 6). Evidence confirms institutional 
and scheme coordination arrangements as they relate to land rights shape value creation and its 
direction of travel (Hall et al. 2017). This is much more about the way land has been implicated 
in sugar value-chains, and rural livelihoods – a function of power dynamics and institutional 
arrangements shaping outgrower schemes. Recent studies show that these processes are 
complex, but have important implications for rural social differentiation and class formation 
(Pritchard et al. 2018). Economic benefits for farmers largely relate to crop production. 
Sugarcane is the main commercial crop while subsistence maize crops dominate  across all 
farmer groups. That sugarcane production accounts for the main source of income for the 
majority of smallholders results in significant absorption of household labour, heightening 
labour competition as highlighted in Kaleya (Chapter 6). Evidence suggests the arrangement 
in which farmers give away land to receive a share of dividends such as in Magobbo offer little 
benefits compared to the case where farmers directly cultivated sugarcane fields such as 
Kaleya. This study has shown that these farmers were more likely to report negative perception 
of LaSAIs and sugarcane uptake. Thus, beyond the much touted financial capital associated 
with value-chain participation, land remains an important marker of rural social differentiation, 
class formation and agrarian change. However, the study shows a wide-spread reliance and 
dependence on on-farm (sugarcane) income sources with very few (better-off) farmers being 
able to diversify in farm and non-farm activities. Where alternative land is accessed, the better-
off were able to combine livestock rearing (outside schemes) and engage in petty-trading. 
These were also more likely to cultivate larger plots, diversifying crop production and selling 
surplus but within agriculture, challenging simplistic narratives of rural development 
implications of agriculture (World Bank 2008).  
As with Donavan and Poole (2014), low incomes among poor households restricts initiatives 
to build and expand on-farm assets and economic activities. Farmed areas by poor and medium 
category households face insufficient labour, lack of inputs (e.g. fertiliser) and land constraints 
compounded by lack of resources to rent or purchase land. Poor labour and farm management 
means farmers face challenges of adjusting between different investment strategies, livelihood 
activities, and face different risks. Farmer responses to acquire land outside and away from the 
schemes highlight land scarcities, the importance of natural capital and the significance of 
independent farmer cultivation in local livelihoods. However, where the poor and to some 
extent medium category households acquired land, farmers face capital challenges for 




This research shows that pursuing livelihoods – amidst land, water, labour resource challenges 
– produces a narrow concentration of livelihoods as opposed to diversification, which is 
problematic for resilience (Harrison and Chiroro 2016). This has been compounded by 
inflexible sugarcane production regimes, and negotiation arrangements. As outlined in Chapter 
6, cropping patterns before and after sugarcane uptake reveal less diverse household cropping 
patterns. Reduction in livelihood activities such as livestock rearing – that enables subsistence 
consumption of protein, provide draught power and complement seasonal financial capital – 
highlight land and labour challenges and most importantly incompatibilities of sugarcane with 
alternative livelihood strategies. Rural livelihoods in sugarcane communities are clearly 
evolving and producing new configurations in resource control. However, land constraints and 
ensuing restricted access to ecosystem services limit local diversification processes, meaning 
farmers cannot always reproduce themselves through and within agriculture (Vicol 2017). This 
potentially important finding is inconsistent with dominant claims (World Bank 2008). 
Increasingly, farmers identify themselves and define agriculture around sugarcane, indicative 
of what has been described as fragile semi-proletarianised livelihoods within re-organising 
land, livelihood and social relations (Adams et al. 2018; Hall et al. 2017a). 
Analysis of seasonality reveals how income flow peaks during sugarcane harvest and payment 
periods. Some household members get opportunities to work on the plantations and estates but 
heavy industry reliance on seasonal and migrant labour means farmers face competition and 
restrictive opportunities (Richardson 2010). The losers are clearly women and the youths who 
neither influence household expenditure decisions nor find opportunities of wage employment 
and are landless, which entrenches local inequalities and social differentiation (Chapter 5). 
More crucially, smallholder participation, monetary gains and concerns about land rights, while 
important, have not been accompanied by a policy focus and investment on human and social 
capital within schemes. Trainings and opportunities for smallholders that potentially facilitate 
possibilities to engage and diversify livelihood portfolios are largely missing in scheme 
coordination. Once again, this highlights the importance of negotiability, politics of rural power 
and bargaining dynamics in outgrower schemes and challenge of livelihood diversification.   
Evidence sugests that smallholders in Kaleya generally face better response pathways and 
prospects than in Magobbo which faces serious land and water constraints within and outside 
the scheme. This research shows that smallholder livelihood response pathways depends more 




to engage in alternative production arrangements beyond sugarane. Again and as highlighted 
in Chapter 2, this shows the importance of framing the agrarain question of rural context of 
land and labour politics (Bernstein 2006; 2010). Evidence show that the poor households 
mostly in Magobbo were less likely to make new livelihood investments and recorded a poor 
asset profile – hanging in (Doward et al. 2009). These were typically the land-poor (e.g. 
widows, landless) confined to their dwelling plots or forced into precarious waged labour 
pathways, land-rental markets or sharecropping. Unlike previous studies, this study finds that 
the reliance on waged labour was clearly driven by circumstances as opposed to choice. Here, 
possibilities of diversification are largely hindered by land constraints and lack of requsite 
resources for investments. As with previous studies, evidence shows low education levels 
affects job opportunities whilst poor expenditure decisions condemn farmers to informal local 
lending system as risk strategy which includes sale of household assets, and borrowing (Ellis 
2000). 
On the other hand, medium category households were landed although they also faced 
challenges such as lack of requisite resources for investment and land development. There are 
attempts to diversify livelihoods through agriculture (e.g. crop production) and non-farm 
activities such as acquiring productive assets (e.g. hammer-mills) as well as engagement in 
petty trading and livestock rearing albeit at a limited scale – stepping-up (Doward et al. 2009). 
However, these continue to struggle within agriculture, exhibiting what Vicol (2017) 
characterises as “getting ahead but also frequently going backwards” (p.164). 
The chapter shows that the better-off farmers successfully utilised sugarcane incomes to 
acquire physical capital (e.g. vehicles, hammer-mills), and run businesses (e.g. grocery stores, 
transportation) within agriculture and non-agriculture economy. These are typically land 
owners who invest and combine own-account farming, producing food and cash crops, rear 
livestock including fish farming and property development. Diverse income sources enables 
social expenditure, including hiring of extra labour. Evidence further suggests that these 
farmers are educated and work in specialised duties on plantations/estates (e.g. in maintenance 
and light duties) and elsewhere (e.g. as civil servants). Household decisions are more shared 
allowing for good planning, building into successful efforts on stepping-out.  
It is clear that while some farmers deploy sugarcane incomes as launchpads for livelihood 
diversification, others face risks and challenges (Hall et al. 2017b). Diversification within 




food production and security (hanging-in), permitting engagement productive expansion 
(stepping-up), the value of which feeds into diversified livelihood activities (stepping-out) 
(Doward et al. 2009). However, these processes are never straightforward. They demand that 
one understands the politics of outgrower schemes, power and guiding institutional 
arrangements in local communities, and how these shape who does what, who gets what, who 
owns, and what do they do with it. Rather than straightforward, smallholders face both uptake 
opportunities, and barriers and challenges. Evidence shows that the main driver of sugarcane 
uptake among smallholders is financial capital. Natural factors such as rainfall variability, 
droughts and flood related challenges including price risks related to maize crop act as 
stressors. Previous studies in the sector report income benefits among growers (e.g. Matenga 
2017; Hall et al. 2017). This research contributes to these perspectives by revealing a striking 
low degree of income diversification. Rather than reducing ability to withstand shocks and 
seasonality (Ellis 2000), limited income diversification instead drove informal local-level 
lending systems – Kaloba. Whilst increasing indebtedness among growers, Kaloba presented 
lending opportunities among local people often non-cane growers, who seemed happy to make 
a living on the margins of sugar value-chains (Chapter 5).   
Evidence shows no claims of immediate household use of sugarcane and whether it directly 
enhanced natural, physical, human or social capital. Unlike other crops such as Jatropha 
Curcas with multiple household uses (Favretto et al. 2014), this research finds no such claims 
related to household use of sugarcane. Whilst financial capital from sugarcane sales is used to 
make improvements in physical and other types of capital, investment expansion and 
productive asset acquisition are confined to a few better-off farmers. As with previous studies, 
limited availability of human and physical capital further stifles effective exploitation of natural 
capital (Donavan and Poole 2014; Tobin et al. 2016). Compounding this is a lack of social 
organisations and networks that possibly offer wider support to local farmers. 
Meanwhile institutional arrangements and huge up-front investments act as barriers to entry 
while investments by intermediaries make sugar-related assets less transferable to other 
livelihood activities. Physical infrastructure investments for sugarcane means actual access and 
utilisation can be exclusionary for smallholders, further hindering on-farm improvements, 
physical asset accumulation and opportunities for deriving livelihoods. With reference to local 
knowledge, capabilities and skills (human capital), evidence shows intermediaries affect the 




asymmetrical information flow in the scheme adds to this problem. Smallholder lack of 
necessary expert knowledge for sugarcane production affects bargaining and gains, challenging 
inclusion. However, whilst important, intermediaries entrench corporate power politics and 
shape negotiability and bargaining processes in outgrower arrangements. I have shown in 
Chapter 7 how corporations exploit these arrangements. One key challenge facing smallholders 
includes how growers can leverage their negotiation and bargaining position to call for farmer-
based coordination arrangements.  
The way household labour is organised, allocated and managed enables members to access 
wage employment but produces intra-household disputes around priorities which negatively 
affects productivity and again the the ability to seek wage labour. Farmers face water, land and 
labour constraints including low sugarcane prices, lack of transparency and limited support 
from management companies. Designs thus require striking a balance between resources that 
feed into sugarcane and those that build subsistence production. This thesis suggests clarity on 
local rights and farmer support is central to the achievement of livelihood goals. 
More widely, in terms of vulnerability context, links, complementarities and limitations, 
farmers face poor rainfall patterns, floods, livestock diseases, pests and diseases, highlighting 
trends, hazards and elements of seasonality.  Growing national and international demand for 
farm-lands exert land pressures for smallholders (Sitko and Chamberlin 2016). Resulting 
changes in local access to natural capital affects local crop production, livelihood strategies 
and diversity. Unpredictable, variable, low and occasionally intense rainfall patterns disrupt 
pre-existing farming arrangements, highlighting risks of dependency on rainfall. These were 
seen to catalyse sugarcane uptake among smallholders. As already highlighted, farmers face 
narrowing cropping patterns, reducing local food availability as well as incomes (e.g. loss of 
cotton) but this has been made worse by low and fluctuating cane prices. Cane price dynamics 
relate to wider political economy challenges of accessing secure markets (e.g. the EU) and 
sugar competition from countries such as Brazil which combine to give a poor market outlook 
in southern Africa (Dubb et al. 2016).  
Clearly, alternative smallholder initiatives such as those related to subsistence play a crucial 
role in supporting wider livelihoods but have come under pressure due to sugarcane expansion. 
Chapter 6 noted how maize production including other crops parallels sugarcane cropping 
pattern, the latter mixing irrigation and rainfall water. The chapter also shows seasonal patterns 




offs of finding wage employment whilst maintaining household production. The former 
exacerbates labour shortages whilst the latter faces low wages and high variability in food 
prices. One outcome is that labour intensity and resulting shortages limit farmed areas and crop 
diversification as farmers prioritise sugarcane. Fragmented land-holding patterns outside 
schemes means most farmers cannot draw on social networks within schemes to support 
production or livelihoods away from schemes, thus entrenching sugarcane dependence and 
poor coping mechanisms. Some farmers cope by selling-off assets, forcing participants into a 
downward spiral of restrictive production, lower prices and poor gains.  
Overall, this thesis has shown that livelihood pathways can be both a cause and an outcome of 
smallholder integration in contractual arrangements and value-chains. It has highlighted a 
crucial dimension in rural livelihoods that integration alone is insufficient in guaranteeing local 
wealth accumulation and ensuring sustainable livelihoods and well-being. And that despite the 
wider attractiveness of contractual arrangements, farmers still carry risks. A key argument is a 
consideration of LaSAIs and smallholder production within broader production system of 
crops, livestock, household investments, income and expenditure decisions (Woodhouse et al. 
2017). Once again, my analysis challenges stereotypical views of smallholder initiatives as 
stagnant, less progressive and on the relegation battle (Collier and Dercon 2014). On the 
contrary, it reiterates the need to frame agrarian issues within the frames of rural land and 
labour dynamics and implications on social differentiation, class formation and agrarian 
change.  
8.4.4 Agribusiness Power of Presence, Industry Practices and Claims to Sustainability  
Previous studies have show how neoliberal policy developments over the past decade provide 
a source of power for agribusiness actors, with global governance institutions emphasising 
market access and increased global exports from developing countries such as those in sub-
Saharan Africa (Spann 2017; Weber 2014). However, despite widespread acceptance of the 
deepening role of agribusinesses in agriculture, understanding the sort of power and influence 
they exert in national and local settings and how they shape sustainable development remains 
problematic. Agribusinesses shape and influence policy and institutional dynamics (Chapter 
4); value-chains and smallholder participation (Chapter 5); and livelihood dynamics (Chapter 
6), and is a focus of Chapter 7. Understanding agribusiness power and influence was crucial 
given the main reason for ‘optimism’ in the agriculture for development discourse lies in 




this gap to reflect on my analysis of the perceptions of how an agribusiness deploys its “Power 
of Presence” to influence policy development and sustainability in regional and local pratices, 
and how politics and institutional arrangements act to enhance an agribusiness influence. 
Evidence presented in Chapter 7 shows that through a combination of different sorts of power 
interplay, an agribusiness exerts control over the governance dynamics of an agro-industry 
chain, whilst limiting its committment to social and economic sustainability. Whilst state-
donor-agribusiness relations were seen to dominate, possibilities of sustainable agriculture, 
rural and economic development are being undermined by actual agribusiness practices as 
exemplified in regional and local-level domains (Chapter 7). By identifying different domains 
at national, regional and local level through which which an agribusiness power and influence 
is perceiced, this thesis shows limits and importance of domestic institutions in framing LaSAIs 
as well as mediating corporate practices that will be required to enable a greater focus on 
sustainable agriculture and rural development. Thus, policy developments, social and political 
efforts; smallholder integration in value-chains; and rural livelihoods and response pathways 
closely relate to practices of an agribusiness, and to politics of power and the role of 
institutional processes.   
Throughout this research, it has been shown that in Zambia, the functioning of the sugar value-
chain has much to do with industry organisation as shaped by state-donor-agribusiness 
dominant relations. It also has to do with how donors and state actors deploy sugarcane to 
reframe national problems at the micro-level through policy support, land and water rights. 
This could potentially be an important finding. State institutions still retain close relationships 
to industry, entrenching expansion through public spending on agriculture. State-donor 
relations promote “productive alliances” between firms and smallholders through 
infrastructure, advertising possibilities of exploitation of land, water and labour resources for 
promises of jobs, national and local development. As with previous reports, this means that 
expressions of property rights are politically instituted in markets – and with state involvement 
– reshapes tenure and agrarian relations (McMichael 2012). In practice, however, firms exploit 
opportunities in sugarcane using two strategies. The first is through their power and influence 
to shape national policies such as those on public health, investment protection, labour and 
trade regimes. As Chapter 7 shows, that strong corporate actors negotiate sector-specific 
discounted minimum wages suggests state neglect of labour legislation, and is illustrative of 




incorporation of smallholders in institutional arrangements that advance unequal power and 
bargaining relations in line with state-donor initiatives whilst ensuring their own endogenous 
agro-expansion. Smallholder integration into sugar value-chains relates directly to an 
agribusiness power and strategy as well as prevailing industry politics and institutional 
arrangements as outlined in chapter 5. Chapter 5 and 6 showed that one outcome has been tight 
corporate control over land, water, market channels and production which proves restrictive 
for local participation and diversified livelihoods. More widely, national politics that shape 
industry organisation, and firm practices act to produce near monopolies. Agribusiness 
domination of the market and influence over policy suggest limits to state power, affecting 
state-business relationships, smallholder positioning and possibilities in outgrower schemes.    
Overall, donor and state actors clearly exploit power dynamics and institutional processes to 
promote sugarcane in relation to development objectives but efforts remain somewhat 
disappointing. Priorities of poverty reduction, rural and economic development seem 
incompatible with the way sugar has been promoted in the national context. Promotion tends 
to not only be narrow at the macro-level but also restrictive to wider smallholder integration at 
the local level, thereby producing crucial disconnects such as on claims of agriculture and rural 
development. Across all empirical chapters, it has been shown that outgrower schemes seem 
to serve as conduits not only for justifying state expenditure and reorganising sector and trade 
policies but also rendering land and water resources to corporate expansion – of power, politics 
and institutional processes. 
8.5 Reflections on Integrating Local Livelihoods in Transforming Value-Chains 
Each empirical chapter in this thesis draws on its own theoretical framework. Multiple 
theoretical frameworks were deployed in this research in order to highlight the nature and 
character of converging elements in LaSAIs, which are not only complex but also render such 
a phenomenon to multiple analysis and interpretation. Whilst the general argument for cross-
scale integration of different theoretical frameworks point to increased insights on the 
phenomenon under investigation, maintaining the visibility of somewhat disparate theories 
throughout the study is not always practical, effective and straightforward. Throughout this 
thesis, the Global Value Chain (GVC) and the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) have 
been integrated and deployed to recognise power, politics and institutions shaping LaSAIs and 




In my application, the GVC helped explore industry growth and expansion; governance and 
institutional structures and power dynamics in relation to production and local participation. 
How these shape land and labour relations and class dynamics as social differentiation drew on 
SLA, which was stretched to include micro-detailed analysis of household strategies and 
pathways. In Figure 3.1 for instance, vertical elements considered industry power relations and 
how they shape purchasing arrangements, and local participation. While important, these 
production related processes insufficiently explained resource access and availability on which 
smallholders draw on in their pursuit of a sustainable livelihood. In Mazabuka, smallholders 
mainly participate in primary production – as an avenue for market access, and income 
generation which also act as a conduit for wider trends, patterns (e.g. prices, quality standards, 
chain governance) and shocks (e.g. rainfall). Combined, these elements shape not only 
competitiveness of the chain but also prospects for grower participation in it. Within this view, 
terms and implications for smallholder integration into value-chains can only be understood 
from how land has been implicated in the sugarcane schemes and how these shape agrarian 
dynamics. While both approaches embody weaknesses, and that integrating them presents an 
opportunity to complement and address limitations of individual theoretical perspectives 
(Challies and Murray 2011), narrating these processes in a conceptually coherent fashion 
remains difficult.  
LaSAIs as an unfolding global phenemonon driven by agribusinesses in value-chains organise 
and adapt within national and industry levels. This focus on industry level dynamics helps 
explain structures and business organisation within value-chains, providing somewhat of a 
vertical construct (Challies and Murray 2011). The application of the GVC framework in this 
research is clearly not global. However, this research used the core elements of the GVC to 
carefully tease out LaSAIs elements at different levels that helped illuminate industry structure 
and organisation; institutional context and chain governance dynamics as they relate to 
smallholder value-chain participation. The governance dynamics and institutional focus of 
GVCs allowed me to explore industry practices and refelct on the idea of power, politics and 
institutions as they relate to land and labour relations, illuminating agrarian change dynamics. 
The GVC processes presented value for this research by shedding light on how land has been 
integrated into sugar value-chains and the power dynamics and institutions shaping labour 




I realised GVC dynamics were important but insufficient in explaining how livelihods are held 
together, and how land and labour relations shape processes of rural social differentiation. The 
horizontal focus on livelihood dynamics was lacking, despite recent efforts (Bolwig et al. 
2010). Thus, the application of GVC failed to give me a sense of how land factors in livelihood 
strategies and aspirations in diverse ways, and distinct dynamics between land and livelihoods 
– a somewhat wider criticism against international political economy contemporary 
applications (Richardson 2013). Frameworks were needed that provided a horizontal construct, 
important in capturing diverse, complex, multi-dimesnional portifolios of livelihoods at local 
level. The broader signifiance of the SLA is that it offered theoretical extensions into different 
farmer groups and how they engaged in different livelihood activities. Its strength in providing 
a detailed framework for analysing resources at household disposal, capabilities and choices as 
they exist within wider institutional, organisational and social relations added to its advantages. 
In isolation, however, this framework insufficiently interacts with industry, market, 
institutional and governance dynamics (Ellis 2000).  
While politics, power and institutions as they relate to social differentiation have been central 
in SLA (e.g. transforming structures and processes, institutions and processes, mediating 
institutions and organisations, drivers to change etc.) (Scoones 2015), the SLA remained a top-
down, formulaic understanding of diverse context-specific realities that shape how people 
attempt to sustain their lives – a broad brushstroke macroanalytical framing. However, as 
Pritchard et al. (2017) argue, framing and explaining top-down macro-type processes of rural 
social differentiation requires micro-details of strategies and decision-making for specific 
groups of people. These suggestions opened possibilities for the middle-ground framework, 
which was used to inform conceptual understanding of agrarian changes (Dorward 2009; 
Dorward et al. 2009). The value of this integration in this research is also that it allowed 
understanding of livelihoods as contingent – linked on what households are able to do, allowing 
a departure from instrumentalist renditions associated with SLA (Pritchard et al. 2017; Scoones 
2015). The use of SLA alongside livelihood pathways analysis both in relation to industry 
power, politics and institutions marks a conceptual and methodological contribution to the 
literature on agrarian political economy and how rural livelihoods change alongside capital 
incursion. Previous studies discuss livelihoods in broad sense with emergent dynamics of rural 
social differentiation and class formation as they relate to power, politics and institutions 
largely ignored (Hall et al. 2017; Adams et al. 2018). The theoretical integration advanced in 




structural contexts (Tittonell 2014; Pritchard et al. 2017). This allowed me to explore the 
fluidity of land and labour relations as central elements in rural livelihood transformation, 
which relates to diverse livelihood circumstances, aspirations and strategies, that cannot be 
appreciated from the ‘macroanalytical’ SLA frameworks.    
However, collecting information and building a sense of livelihood strategies and pathways 
relied on social groups defined by focus group participants. Evidence that farmers were 
increasingly building livelihoods away from sugarcane schemes means that focus groups 
participants might not always have full knowlege of assets, livelihood strategies and hence 
social categories of scheme members. Compounding this was the somewhat narrow and 
restrictive schema proposed by Dorward, which entailed folding households in three categories 
of hanging in, stepping up and stepping out as opposed to allowing flexibilty of local 
definitions of livelihood groups and categories. As Pritchard et al. (2017) argues, Dorward’s 
schematic illustration fails to account for the diversity of livelihood starting points, and the 
multidimensionality of livelihood pathways that I identified from my fieldwork. In extension, 
how and why certain households devise upward livelihoood trajectories while others remain or 
descend into more poverty remains problematic. Departing from the landed households that 
Dorward considers, I saw a need to introduce new categories such as those related to the 
landless and those that entered into labour market agreements with the better-off households 
as local elites. Some family members worked sugarcane plots whilst others within the same 
household engaged in the non-farm economy, what Pritchard labels ‘one-foot sideways.’ In its 
application, whilst the micro middle ground offered me an opportunity to see what sort of 
activities smallholders enter into, it faced challenges of how to fully appreciate the messy 
realities of household livelihood decision-making – why they do what they do – and how they 
leverage not only land-based activities but also non-farm activities – capturing the complexity 
of land-labour relations. Efforts are now emerging to expand Dorward’s conceptualisation to 
incorprate new categories such as ‘dropping out’ to reflect backward and muddling households 
under distress (see Mushongah 2009). In such situations, it was clear that the effectiveness of 
household definitions and categories as they relate to providing insights on household assets 
and pathways may have been reduced. One way to increase efffectiveness of such categories 
may have been through a procedural confirmatory process that combined both focus group 
categories and individual household asset profile (see Pritchard et al. 2017 who have used asset 
profiles). More widely, some of these challenges relate to the need for longitidunal surveys that 




For poor countries advancing LaSAIs and commercialisation of agriculture such as Zambia, 
sustainable smallholder integration in value-chain in move to enhance value capture in local 
spaces must aim to support locally diversified livelihoods. Drawing from my study, sugarcane 
expansion among smallholders within neoliberal policy strategies that are outward looking can 
mean struggles for local participation and across land and labour relations. This is particularly 
problematic for commodities such as sugarcane that have a “large-scale bias” but are foisted as 
smallholder outgrower schemes. Attention must be paid to processes of rural social 
differentiation and what this means for agrarian change.  Thus, any meaningful value capture 
and sustainable inclusion will require policy interventions that influence national and industry 
level politics, power and institutions in support of smallholders. Some of these relate to support 
for locally-driven smallholder initiatives and policy discourses for agriculture for development. 
In making such a claim am aware that there is nothing inherently egalitarian about locally-
driven smallholder initiatives to raise agricultural productivity, and guarantee rural 
transformation, which are likely to face agribusiness power of presence that limit policy 
effectiveness and precipitate socio-economic differentiation (Woodhouse et al. 2016). 
However, the centrality of this thesis points to the need to understand the way LaSAIs and 
value-chain development plays out at macro level in order to enrich debate at meso and micro 
levels. Central to this conceptualisation is how power, politics and institutions intersect within 




Chapter 9 Conclusions 
The discussion presented above reflects on the findings from the four empirical chapters and 
draws lessons from the value of using multiple frameworks. The thesis as a whole engages with 
a variety of narratives of LaSAIs and value-chains, which are shaped in power, politics and 
institutional dynamics as underpinning processes. These narratives are clearly contested at 
different levels, and by different actors. A key challenges in LaSAIs and value-chain expansion 
is how to integrate multiple perspectives in a conceptually coherent manner and to draw lessons 
that can reflect local narratives, aspirations and realities, whilst being open to multiple 
possibilities and alternatives. This thesis has been grounded in an interdisciplinary case study 
strategy that integrates the GVC framework and the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) 
across multiple levels to explore the extent to which LaSAIs impact local development and 
rural livelihoods aming sugar growers in Zambia. This thesis has shown that addressing 
challenges of local development and livelihoods depends on forming judgements about 
national experiences of LaSAIs. While there is a LaSAI visibility and drive in international 
policy, meeting national and local development objectives depend on the willingness of policy 
actors to pay systematic attention to investigating diverse initiatives and needs among 
smallholders, and responding to what is then revealed from their experiences and perspectives 
about LaSAIs, value-chain integration, livelihoods and poverty reduction.   
The research presented demonstrates how multiple frameworks can be integrated as means to 
explore how LaSAIs play out at different levels and the value of such compatibilities. 
Methodologically, the mixed method research design allowed flexibility in studying diverse 
issues across national, industry and local levels and their interconnections. By taking a multi-
level-framework approach, this research offers new insights not only in the different narratives 
and realities around LaSAIs, but also how difficult it is to study such a phenomenon from a 
single perspective. This has implications for addressing opportunities and challenges 
associated with LaSAIs. Studies such as this that can unpack realities at different levels and 
from different perspectives and set about addressing linkages between them are valuable in 
providing a basis from which to comprehensively understand and explore LaSAIs.   
LaSAIs sustain a longstanding international development vision that capital investments in 
agriculture can drive the agenda for development and poverty reduction in poor countries such 




development practitioners encourage more and better LaSAIs (World Bank 2011), conflating 
foreign corporate expansion and national and local development. There can be no doubt that 
LaSAIs do offer opportunities for smallholders to enhance incomes and improve their 
livelihoods. This thesis has highlighted the dynamics of how LaSAIs play out within the 
national context, and examined possibilities and barriers at different levels. This is not an easy 
feat, especially in an environment where taking a position against foreign LaSAIs is almost 
heretical with different actors drawing selectively on development debates as they relate to 
agricultural developments in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2011; 2007). Rather than take 
reports and statistics about the success of LaSAIs on trust, any prospective optimism at the 
heart of LaSAIs should account for country-specific dynamics of measuring what foreign 
capital really offers and then the experiences of local production, development and deprivation 
that arise alongside it. 
Researchers in contemporary land-grabbing debates are called to engage the roles played by 
national actors. However, there is need to reflect critically on the sort of vision that LaSAIs 
implant in host countries appreciating the aspect that claims of success might implicitly conceal 
the unsavoury perspectives of LaSAIs and create false impressions about the nature of 
agriculture and development (Peters 2013). Some of these efforts point to the need to account 
for power, politics and institutional processes, and how they act to facilitate or constrain 
LaSAIs. Efforts are still needed on how LaSAIs build local visions or indeed destroy them, 
including how to better implement foreign investments from a national perspective. This 
research exposed crucial mismatches between policy possibilities at national level and 
livelihood expectations at local level. It shows how the policy effectivness and possibilities of 
agriculture and rural development are limited by an agribusiness power of presence, shaping 
discourses, governance and institutional dynamics, and affecting resource access for local 
livelihoods.  
Knowledge generated from this study can have general national and regional application. This 
can start by avoiding the danger of framing LaSAIs in a way that defeats opposing alternative 
explanations of lived local experiences. How can one be against ‘FDI’ in regions that have 
“abundant,” empty,” under-utilised,” “marginal” land and natural reources in investment 
starved sectors is the frequently asked question. This thesis in no way attempts to paint LaSAIs 
with one broad brush of failure. Rather it advances an idea that any claims of success associated 




identification of gains and their direction of travel. Conceptualising LaSAIs as sites of politics, 
underpinned by diverse power dynamics (fluidy as they might be) and institutional processes, 
this research has shown that outcomes of LaSAIs are complex and never straightforward. 
9.1 Key Knowledge Contributions  
In this thesis, contributions to the evidence and knowledge of the way LaSAIs play out and the 
way they impact development aspects at different levels have been made in four ways. 
• The thesis provided empirical evidence on the national governance dynamics in policy 
and institutional processes within national politics that have insufficiently been 
explored in the LaSAI literature. A focus on possibilities for LaSAIs alongside 
competing state authorities, legal and bureaucratic competences and capacity is 
potentially an important contribution. This contribution points to the need for improved 
legal and bureaucratic competences  and capacity lacking in the way LaSAIs and 
resources are administered across sub-Saharan Africa.      
• The research has also provided detailed perspectives on how industry relations and local 
factors facilitate as well as limit smallholder participation in sugar value-chains. This 
thesis emphasised the centrality of agribusiness-state-donor relations in shaping power 
relations, barganining and negotiability processes, and most importantly local 
participation. In conceptualising value-chains in terms of power dynamics and 
institutional processes, and that integration does not always improve livelihoods, and 
that exclusion does not always signify a problem is potentially another important 
knowledge contribution.   
• This thesis emphasised the importance of causes and consequences of differences in the 
evolution, operation and integration of smallholder outgrower schemes in shaping 
livelihood outcomes. A crucial insight has been that smallholder outgrower schemes 
that link participants and other livelihood assets and options are effective in advancing 
progressive labour relations, promotion of diversified and sustainable livelihoods. 
However, livelihood outcomes, industry processes shaping smallholder partipation in 
value-chains, national policy and governance dynamics need to consider power and 
institutional processes as underpinning elements an dhow these shape agrarain changes.  
• Finally, this thesis provided crucial insights into how dominant agribusinesses exercise 
their power in different domains to limit smallholder participation whilst exploiting 
industry and national level domains to their advantage. Across sub-Saharan Africa, 




and relations for land and water resources. To understand the contributions of a LaSAI 
fully, it is necessary to first understand an agribusiness influence at different levels and 
how these play out to shape committments to rural development and sustainability. This 
study provided insights on this front.  
9.2 Policy Implications 
The four empirical chapters have shown a number of opportunities for addressing challenges 
and improving outcomes of LaSAIs. A number of policy implications are highlighted here.  
• Chapter 4 highlighted problems arising from highly fragmented national policy and 
institutions, some of which relate to lack of coordination among national stakeholders. 
There is scope for donor and government agencies to cooperate in asking how various 
actors within the national context can enhance the implementation of LaSAIs. Here the 
mandates, overlaps and responsibilities could be made clear and easy to follow for state 
institutions, including crucial decisions surrounding natural and donor resources. 
Clarifying mandates and authorities can help deal with the top-down nature of LaSAIs 
governance as well as enhance collaboration and coordination of LaSAIs at different 
levels. The role of the Industrial Development Corporation under the Ministry of Finance 
can be strenghthened for this purpose and in order to create an enabling environment for 
the formulation and enforcement of progressive policies for successful implementation of 
LaSAIs. 
• Chapter 5 examined industry dynamics and factors shaping smallholder participation in 
value-chains. The chapter revealed agribusiness expansion and industry structure can 
limit smallholder integration into commodity value-chains, affecting value capture at 
local level. Whilst smallholders can be involved in LaSAIs, there are not so many 
participants as one might expect or hope for given the narratives on agriculture for 
development, and many of those involved have limited benefits. To realise the benefits of 
LaSAIs, national policy developments must clearly outline the roles and expectations of 
LaSAIs. A blended agricultural strategy that clearly outlines the roles of smallholders in 
the emerging agro-vision as opposed to presenting them as part of corporate strategies – 
often of corporate social responsibility – is important. This will ensure that smallholders 
become part of the agriculture and development agenda, an element that could possibly 
have greater impacts at the local level. Donor and government support in local spaces 




enhance wider consultations and strengthen capacity in farmer organisations which can 
then ensure smallholder groups fulfil their roles within a supportive framework, and 
maximise market imperatives.  
• Chapter 6 addressed opportunities for rural livelihoods, and highlighted the need for 
stakeholders to enhance resource access among smallholders for livelihood diversification 
(e.g. food security, livestock production) whilst ensuring sugarcane production. This two-
way strategy should ask what sort of coordination schemes deliver on economic efficiency 
whilst ensuring greater socio-economic development and wider transformative changes 
in local communities. For instance, enhancing resource access as well as preservation of 
parcels of land for non-sugarcane activities could greatly facilitate livelihood 
diversification and improve rural welfare. Outgrower schemes that not only preserve 
parcels of land for non-sugarcane activities and permit household production of value-
chain commodities should be encouraged in order to build diversified livelihoods and 
improve value capture by smallholders. The role of agribusinesses, state and donor 
agencies as well as NGO support to local livelihoods through market linkages (e.g. for 
livestock and crop production) should be strenghthened for this purpose. This can also 
include establishing social organisations which smallholders can draw on in support of 
their livelihoods.  
• Chapter 7 highlighted how agribusiness power shapes institutional processes and 
outgrower arrangements, which affects the extent to which smallholders can benefit. 
Within this perspective, labour relations are crucial to rural livelihoods and ability for 
smallholders to accumulate. Workers unionsand NGO actors should be encouraged in 
order to look into contractual arrangements, working conditions in outgrower schemes in 
general, and across gender dynamics. This can help address inequalities and exploitative 
outgrower arrangements.  
9.3 Future Research 
Empirical data provided in this thesis assists in the advancement of knowledge about how a 
LaSAI can contribute to regional, national and local development in Zambia. However, further 
understanding of LaSAI processes and potential outcomes within the agriculture for 
development discourse can greatly benefit from the following identified gaps:  
• Determination of the role of smallholders within evolving LaSAIs and value-chains 
and how their promotion can be harmonised across other sectors. This is important in 




must be paid to the materiality of commodity crops, e.g. sugacane which limit 
transferrability of some practices to other commodities.   
• Establishing how the promotion of LaSAIs and value-chains can be made alongside 
improvements in resource governance and smallholder participation. Finding that fine 
balance can make a difference between successful implementation of LaSAIs or not.   
• Working to develop frameworks for supporting smallholder participation in value-
chains. The prospects for agriculture and rural development in many countries in sub-
Sahara Africa either for employment, promotion of diversified and sustainable 
livelihoods or for catalysing local economies through linkages and multiplier effects 
reside very centrally in the models of agricultural commercialisation. Which models 
delivers what outcomes and how they, for instance, shape labour regimes, land 
relations, livelihoods and local economies is a key question for the future. Some of 
these elements have been emphasised in this research. 
• Determining how LaSAIs can be made to account for social-economic and cultural 
aspects in rural geographies is also important. Frameworks for guiding LaSAIs have 
tended to take a global perspective and adaptation in host nations remains challenging 
for various reasons. How investments can be made to be responsible across many 
socio-economic and cultural dimensions remains crucial for sustainability.  
• LaSAIs and value chain expansion are clearly altering gender norms and relations such 
as those around patterns of work activities among household members. This research 
has shown that women are now breaking away particularly in Magobbo to work on the 
platforms. Efforts are needed into how this shapes household power dynamics and 
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Appendix 2: Study Participants to Chapter 46 
Interview codes: Z = public institutions; G=research institutions; P=private-sector experts; Q=NGOs; N=farmer 
organisations; K=donors; and D=district/sub-district.   
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Code Position/Institution  Date Place 
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D5 Official *a 08.01.16 
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GDK1 Farmer Group Discussion – Mixed  06.15 
GDK2 Farmer Group Discussion – Community representatives  13.01.16 
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X1 Manager (Kafue Sugar Plc) 28.01.16 Mazabuka 
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X3 Group Discussion – Association representatives (Manyonyo 
Sugarcane Project) 
27.06.15 
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X5 Official (MoA) 29.06.15 Lusaka 
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District Level Interviews 
Code Position/Institution  Date Place 
D1 Officer – MoA (Zimba) 14.11.15 Zimba 
D2 Parliamentarian 11.06.16 Mazabuka 
D3 Chief*a 27.11.16 
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ZaSPlc2 Senior Manager (Smallholder), ZaSPlc  06.15 
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CSK4 SDK: Household 2 
 Poor Category: 
CSK5 SDK: Household 1 
CSK6 SDK: Household 2 
Magobbo Scheme 
SDM1 Settlement Committee Representative  21.01.16 Magobbo 
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Appendix 5: Participants to Chapter 7 
Interview codes: Z = public institutions; G=research institutions; P=private-sector experts; Q=NGOs; N=farmer 
organisations; K=donors; and D=district/sub-district.   
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D1 District Agricultural Officer  14.11.15 Zimba 
D2 District Agricultural Officer   Mazabuka  
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D5 Senior Manager (Smallholder), ZaSPlc 06.15 
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Appendix 6: Data Collection Tools  
 
6.1 Information Sheet 
 
Project title:  
Large-scale Agricultural Investments and Livelihood Transformation among Sugar Producing Smallholders in 
Mazabuka District of Zambia research project 
 
Invitation: 
You are being invited to take part in a research project: Large-scale Agricultural Investments and Livelihood 
Transformation among Sugar Producing Smallholders in Mazabuka District of Zambia. Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and feel free to discuss it with either the researcher or others if you wish. 
Ask us if there is anything that is unclear or if you would like more information. Take time to reflect and decide 
whether or not you wish to take part in this research project.  
 
Purpose:   
We are conducting this study in order to understand and explain how rural livelihoods are transformed as a 
consequence of large-scale agricultural investments among rural sugar producing households in Mazabuka district 
of Zambia. Four specific objectives are used to guide this purpose: 
1. To explore and understand specific policies, institutions and processes shaping large-scale 
agricultural investments in the sugar sub-sector of Zambia.  
2. To understand and explain the evolution and current configuration of the sugar value chain 
in Zambia.  
3. To investigate how large-scale agricultural investments and value chain development for 
sugar affects livelihood aspects for rural households in Mazabuka district of Zambia    
4. Integrate objectives 1-3 by analysing and explaining how large-scale agricultural 
investments and sugar value chains can be structured to ensure livelihood benefits for 
smallholders are optimised in Zambia. 
 
Participant selection: 
You have purposively been selected to participate in this study. Selection took into account the researcher’s 
judgement about your ability to provide relevant data to the study considering your position, nature of work, and 
experience. We anticipate at least 17 expert interviews at national level and 13 in Mazabuka district –the focus of 
the study. Meanwhile, we further expect 270 survey questionnaires and about 16 Focus Group Discussions at 
community level in Mazabuka district with farmer groups.   
 
Voluntary participation: 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you will be given this information 
sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. Even if you decide to participate now, you may change your 
mind and discontinue your participation at any point in the study. You may also choose not to answer questions 
for any reasons you might have without necessarily telling us why. Once you choose to discontinue or not to 
respond to specific questions, no negative consequences shall be placed on you.  
 
Procedures:  
Participation in this study will involve answering questions related to large-scale agricultural investments, sugar 
value-chains and rural livelihoods. These will include policy processes and institutions guiding large-scale 
agricultural investments and sugar value-chains in the case of semi-structured interviews and livelihood elements 
in the case of smallholders. We anticipate that expert interviews will require 45 minutes, and 60 minutes for survey 
questionnaires. An additional 60 minutes in the case of focus group discussions is further expected. Respondents 
are free to either request recording or note taking during data collection process. Whereas semi-structured 
interviews and focus group discussions will involve general exploratory questions, survey questionnaires will 
generally involve collection of quantitative data on livelihood asset and intra-household dynamics. You must be 
knowledgeable about policy processes and practices shaping large-scale agricultural investments and sugar value-
chains at national/district level to participate in expert interviews; and a cane or non-cane grower in target 
communities to participate in household survey questionnaires and Focus Group Discussions.   
 




The study involves minimal risks. Participants might feel distressed, discomfort and inconveniences associated 
with relatively longer data collection processes. Some participants might find certain questions a little bit sensitive 
and thus upsetting. Although there are no immediate benefits for those participating in the project, it is hoped that 
the study will present an opportunity for smallholders to tell their story about rural livelihoods, how these interact 
with large-scale agricultural investments and what this means for policy. It is hoped that an opportunity emerges 
to explore how large-scale agricultural investments and sugar value-chains can be structured and governed in 
Zambia and benefits optimised among participating small-scale farmers. It is further hoped that recommendations 
that will emerge from the study present value for policy making and practice at national and district level in 
Zambia in general as the country endeavours to reduce rural poverty and agricultural transformation. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity: 
All information and specific responses that will be collected about you during the course of this study will be kept 
anonymous and confidential. Direct or indirect identifiers that might be associated with you will be removed. You 
will thus not be able to be identified in any of reports or publications of the study. Only the researchers involved 
in this study and the people providing research oversight will have access to the information you provide. 
Collected information will immediately be secured in safe location and any electronic information will 
immediately be loaded on secure University system for managing data.    
 
Research Funders:  
This research is being funded by the British Council through the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Final remark:  
Thank you for taking time to read through this information sheet.  
 
Contact for further information:  




Appendix 6.2: National Level Data Collection Guide 
Expert Interview Guide (Government Ministries, Department, Agencies) 
 
Initials of interviewer  Interview # Date of 
interview 
Starting time End time Location  
      
 
A: Basic details: 
A1.  Ministry/department of agency   
A2 Year of establishment   
A4 Respondent   
A5 Designation/position  
A6 Physical address  
A7 City/Town   
A8 Email address:  
 
B: Policies, trends in agricultural and sugar invetsments 
 
B1: Main functions of your ministry/department/agency (e.g. investments promotion, land allocation etc). What are your 
functions or duties?  
 
B2: What are your priorities as a ministry/department/agency and why? Or what would you characterise as the key most 
area of your ministry/department/agency?  
 
B3: Do you have influence on land access and utilisation? Explain the ways in which you exert this influence.  
B3.1: How do agro-investors invest and access land in Zambia? 
B3.2 Key players/institutions guiding land access and use in: Agriculture      b)sugar sub-sector? 
B3.3: Why is the government encouraging LaSAIs? Incentivising sugar expansion? (probe: food and energy; poverty 
reduction)  
B3.4: Who are the key actors and institutions in investment/agricultural promotion? What issues are required of potential 
agro-investors? How are these defined? [who participates, who decides on them?] 
B4: How would you describe trends in large-scale agricultural investments in Zambia? 
a) How would you describe trends in sugar agricultural investments in Zambia?  
b) What are the key policies, processes, institutional provisions that make Zambia attractive to:  
i) LaSAIs  (ii) Sugar investments    
c) Different incentives offerred to large-scale agricultual investors:  
i. Generally   
ii. Specific to the sugar sub-sector in particular 
iii. Why are agricultural investmenets being encouraged? What are the broader 
government plans or prorities? 
d) Describe growth of the sugar sub-sector in Zambia 
e) What range of factors do you think explains growth of sugar sub-sector in Zambia? [When prompted: 
e.g. easy access to land, trade/tax incentives etc].  
f) What are some of the factors you think might have played an influential role in constraining growth 
of the sugar sub-sector in Zambia? 
B4.1: What are the key policies that guide:  
a) LaSAIs  
b) Sugar investmets  
c) How are these defined? What are the considerations? 
d) How can these policies be better structured to optmise the outcomes for growth and poverty 
reduction among  smallholders?  
B4.2: What are the key institutions guiding:  
a) LaSAIs b) Sugar investmets 
b) How can these policies be better structured in order to optmise the outcomes for growth and poverty 
reduction among smallholders?  
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B4.3: What have been major challenges associated with:  
a) Agricutural investment promotion  
b) LaSAIs in Zambia 
c) Sugar investments in particular  
C: Invetsments and Firm Guidelines 
 
C1: Where are most investments coming from? Into which commodities? What are the drivers?. How significant are 
Chinese and Brazilian investments in agriculture? Are there existing programs/plans to acquire Brazilian technology and 
expertise in biofuels/bioethanol 
C2: Any regional sources of LaSAIs? 
C2: Legal and policy provisions for coordinating and organising LaSAIs? How are these enforced? 
a) Are there challenges to this enforcement, coordination and organisation? 
C3: Do agro-investments guidelines in the sugar sub-sector or in general make reference to standards? What are these 
standards? (National and International).  
C3.1: How do you ensure agricultural expansion whilst mitigation negative impacts of such expansion? 
 
C3.2: Do you perceive agribusiness power and influence across agriculture generally ans sugarcane in particular? In what 
ways are these sorts of power and infuence expressed and perceived?  
 
D: Future Direction  
D1: How do you think LaSAIs can be well structured to ensure growth and rural development?  
D2: Who do you consider key players/stakeholders in the sugar sub-sector? 
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Appendix 6.3: Industry Data Collection Guide: Sugar Companies/Service providers/Processors/Buyers 
 
Initials of interviewer  Interview # Date of 
interview 
Starting time End time Location  
      
 
A: Company details: 
A1.  Name of the company  
A2 Year of establishment   
A3 Name of owner(s)  
A4 Respondent   
A5 Designation/position  
A6 Address  
A7 City/Town   
A9 Email address:  
A10. Company ownership  
A11. Number of employees and distribution on categories Number  
a). Total number of employees (permanent and casual)  
b). Permanent staff  
c). Permanent female employees   
 
Firm-smallholder/service provider relationships  
 
B1: Drivers to sugarcane investment in Zambia?  
B1a). Main business area (main product lines/areas)  
B2: Land acquisition. Processes of acquiring land for estate/smallholder production.  
B3: How are local small-scale sugar producers or service providers organised and linked to your comapny? What 
contractual arrangements do you have with: 1). Service providers  2). Small-scale cane producers? How are these 
determined/defined?  
 
B4: Specific requirements for smallholders or service providers as input providers? (terms and conditions, agro-practices, 
quality controls).  
B5: Impact of your company on local livelihoods.  
 4B4a). Equal opportunities for all (e.g. in terms of employment?) 
 B5a). In ensuring sustainable agricultural cultivation, what steps has your company put in place?      
   
C: Drivers of, and barriers to success of the company 
 
C2: Factors driving company/industry growth.  
C3: Factors constraining company/industry growth.  
C4: Organizational and physical assets differentiating your company from other companies in the industry?   
C5: National and international standards (or certifications) the company adheres to (e.g. Zambia Bureau of Standards). 
Policy guidelines shaping firm practices.  
 
E: Markets and Networks of the Company 
 
E1: Product and market distribution: domestic, regional and the rest of the World? 
E2: How significant are local inputs to your production? Quality of inputs you receive from other firms or smallholders 
as part of the supply chain? What are the major challenges and opportunities? How can this be better structured and 
organized so that inputs from other small firms/smallholders can meet your expectations?  
E3: Terms and conditions for smallholder supply.   
E4: Support schemes/programs for smallscale producers linked directly or indirectly to your company? 
F: State-Business Relations (regulations, policies and business associations) 
F1: Describe state-business relationship in Zambia? Convergences and Divergences?  
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F2: Are there trade incentives (for import/export or for sourcing local inputs in your business area? Have you been granted 
any?  
F3: Industry or trade related regulations and effects on business?.  
F4: Key players/stakeholders in the sugar sub-sector?
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Appendix 4: District Data Collection Guide 
 
KII: District/Government Departments 
Guiding Questions: 
1. Your position and role in the district?  
2. Major development challenges facing the district (e.g. land, water, infrastructure, seasonal workers)  
3. Role of agriculture in the local economy (e.g. incomes, livelihoods etc) 
4. What is your opinion about: 1) sugar production in general in the district? 2). Sugar growing 
smallholders? District-business relations?  
5.  Specific formal processes aimed at guiding sugar production in the district (either at small-scale 
farming level or company level)? How are these enforced? Which ones are prioritized?   
6. Major challenges and opportunities for smallholders associated with sugar production?   
7. Positive or negative impacts of sugar growing in the district, in sugar growing communities and among 
cane-growers themselves  
8. Challenges and opportunities for the district in general associated with sugar production   
9. Perceived power and influence of an agribusiness in the district (probe specific areas/cases)  
10. How important is the sugar industry in the region?  
11. How might district-agribusiness relations be improved?  






Appendix 6.5: Sub-District Level Interview Guide 
 
Objectives:  
     1. To explore and understand the factors affecting farmer’s participation in sugar as a livelihood 
enhancement strategy in rural Zambia  
     2. To understand and explain how large-scale agricultural investments and value-chain development for 
sugar affects household and community livelihood aspects in rural Zambia?  
Human Capital (Skills, knowledge, capabilities) (15 Minutes)  
a. How do people participate in sugar value-chains? (as weeding, cane cutters, suppliers, irrigators etc?)  
b. Any training in what they do? Education levels? Who provides these trainings?  
c. Labour demand in the year?  
d. What is the source of technical advice on sugar production? On what do farmers rely on as their source 
of technical advice?  
e. Does the company help with information and advice? How? Who provides technical advice on sugar 
production? Market information? Avenues for training (with ZasPlc, service providers, or independent 
training opportunities?) 
f. The role of service providers? How are they engaged? By who? What are their conditions? Who givens 
them?  
g. Are you happy with these conditions? 
h. Do you consider yourself knowledgeable and equipped around the business of sugar production?  
Social dimensions (10 Minutes)   
a. Social groups exist in the communities (e.g.  churches, clubs, cooperatives etc)? which ones are you 
member to?  
b. Describe reciprocity among households?  
c. Social cohesion among households or community members? 
d. Negative or positive aspects of sugar production? (Across women, men and succession, sharing of 
proceeds) 
e. Grievance mechanisms? Through whom can members of your community present these needs?  
f. Are your opinions respected in the scheme (e.g. running of farmer groups, social institutions) 
        i. Participation of women and children in productive activities. In which new productive  
            activities (on-farm and off-farm) have women participated most?  
Natural dimensions (15 Minutes)  
a. Water availability, access and utilisation (water sources/points in the community)  
b. Availability, access and utilisation of eco-system services (changes overtime; what has changed; 
internal and external factors) 
c. Land (quality of land, environmental sustainability) 
a. Generally who is renting or selling land in the community? What are the conditions? (prices, 
sharecropping etc) 
b. What is the extent of informal land transactions? Sales prices? Any disputes?  
c. Have you recently bought, sold or tented land? 
d. Issues of renting in and renting out land  
e. Quality of rented land (fertility? Do you need to apply fertiliser)? 
f. Costs of buying? Terms and conditions of renting?  
g. What is it used for (crops/animals)? Which is your most important crop now? Why? 
d. Role of district in land allocation for investments and people? 
e. Role of traditional leaders in land allocation for investments and people? 
f. Do you sometimes feel you have tenure insecurity since sugar production was introduced?  
g. What do you sell, and what is for your own consumption? Where do you sell your produce? What 
prices do you receive for your other crops? Are these prices variable or stable? 
Physical dimensions (10 Minutes)   
a. Do you think there have been changes to physical infrastructure since sugar crop was introduced in this 
community? Road, bridges 
a. Public transport  
b. Telecommunications network  
c. Electricity supply  
d. Water supply  
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e. Irrigation facilities  
f. Banking services  
g. Drainage systems (are these better than before? Flooding cases?) 
b. What other areas do you think need improvements?  
c. How is infrastructure set up? To aid sugar production or business enterprise and market functioning?  
d. Look for physical evidence of enterprise in the community; transect walks, observations etc. 
Financial dimensions (15 Minutes)   
a. What range of farm and off-farm IGAs do people engage in?   
b. What do women engage in? What do men engage in? Which activities are pursued? Any multiple 
functions to it?  
c. Non-Farm IGAs (significance to rural HHs?); why do they consider non-farm incomes? (determinants) 
d. Access to credit facilities?  
a. Have you or your family sold any land in the past? Who to? Why? 
b. Are you able to borrow money against this land? 
e. When do you have most income – at what time of year? 
f. Is it possible to find work around here? When, where, doing what? 
g. Perceptions around commodity prices in the community  
h. Insights into factors that enhanced or affected asset building at HH level? (e.g. poor incomes, transport 
costs, prices, family burdens, debts etc) 
i. What are some constraints that impede livelihood enhancement in this community? 
j. During the past three years, what activities were reduced or abandoned or indeed enhanced as a result 
of sugar production? 
k. In which productive activities (on-farm and off-farm) has the household depended on in the past three 
years? 
l. Do you think that generally your financial situation has improved as a result of adopting sugar 
production?  
Institutional dimensions (15 Minutes)   
a. Relationships with service providers (institutions that guide sugar production: MCGA or MCGT; ERC; 
ZaSPlc. etc) 
b. Supply chain relationships with service providers; institutional arrangements and costs of transactions/ how 
are prices communicated? By whom? Through whom? How have prices change overtime?  
c. What arrangement do you have with the buyer? Do you have an advance contract?  
d. Who has responsibility for the various tasks in the sugar plot (planting, pruning, spraying harvesting etc.)?  
e. Does the company/buyer require any specific practices on the farm? What are they? How easy are they to 
follow?  
f. What inputs are required to produce sugar? Where do you get them? How easy are they to organise?  
g. What sort of support do you receive from your service provider? Are you happy with this?  
h. What aspects of sugar production does the service provider consider as good/bad practices in sugar 
production among smallholders? 








Appendix 6.6: Household Survey Tools  
 
Household Survey Instrument (Cane growers) 




Starting time End time Location  
      
 
A: Background information   
Kindly provide the following background information about your household.    
A1: Household ID  A2: Name of HH   A3: Sex  
A4: Age  
A5: Marital status 
of the HH head 









 A4.1: Relationship to 
A2  
 A4.2: Sex A4.3: Age 
  
A5: Other present 
at interview 
 A5.1: Relationship to 
A2 
 A5.2 Sex A5.3: Age 
  
A6: What is your 
main occupation?  
1). Agriculture  2).Business  
3). Other (specify) 
A7: Marital status of 
the respondent  
 
 
A8: Name  Position in the HH 
1= Husband  
2= Wife  
3 =daughter/son 
4= Other relative  
5= Non-relative  
Sex Age  Education 
(Grade) 
Literacy 
1= read only  
2= Write only  
3= Read and write  
4= Neither   
      
      
      
      
      
      
A9: Number of school-aged children/dependants  
 Primary level  Secondary level  University level  
Attending school now     
Stopped    
B: Crop production, diversification and asset acquisition    
B1: Main source (s) of livelihoods before and after you started growing sugar? Tick and rank according to 
importance (1= very important, 2= Important, 3= Less important)   
 Before you started 
growing sugar  
After you started 
growing sugar 
Tick  Rank  Tick  Rank  
1= Own farming  
a) Crop production  
    
b) Livestock production  
    
c) Mixed farming  
    
2. Non-farm  
    a) Petty trading (e.g. tuntemba)  
    
   b) Food/cash for work      
   c) Food aid      
d) Safety net (e.g. cash transfer)  
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e) Remittance (e.g. child working elsewhere) 
    
f) Other businesses (specify)________________________ 
    
3. Hired farm worker      
4. Other ) (specify)____________________________________     
B2: What crops have you grown before? What crops do you grow now? (crop diversification) 















8. Other (specify) 
  
B3: How much land is used to grow sugar cane? (circle accordingly) 
1. 0-5 ha 
5.5-10 ha Above 10 ha Other (specify) 
B4: What facilities do you have for growing sugar? 
1.  2.  3.  4.  
5.  6.  7.  8.  
9. How easy are these facilities to organise?  
1. Very easy 2. Very difficulty  3. Difficult to tell/I don’t know  
B5: How much land was/is allocated to the following crops? Then Now 
  
1. Maize  
  
2. Cotton  
  
3. Beans  
  
4. Pumpkin  
  
5. Groundnuts  
  
6. Sweet potatoes  
  
7. Cabbages  
  
8. Other (specify) 
  
B6: Can you easily change land allocated to sugar to other uses?    
1. Very easy to change land-use from sugar to other crops 
  
2. Very difficult to change land-use from sugar to other crops 
  
3. Cannot tell/ know 
  
B7: Land for food crop production has:  
1. Increased  
 
2. Decreased  
 
3. Remained the same 
 




5. Other (specify) 
 
  
 B8: What sort of assets do you have? (Tick where applicable)   
1. Iron sheet roofed house 
 
2. Thatched house 
 
3. Bed  
 
4. Mattress  
 
5. Radio  
 
6. TV set  
 
7. Mobile phone  
 




10. Hoe  
 
11. Ox-cart  
 
12. Cattle  
 
13. Pigs  
 
14. Goat  
 
15. Poultry  
 
16. Water pump/point 
 
17. Other (specify)  
 
C: Participation and processes in sugar production 
C1: How long has your household participated in growing sugar?   
C2: What factors influenced you to start growing sugar? (Tick and rank importance: 1= Very important, 2= 




1. Food insecurity  
  
2. Low incomes  
  
3. Drought (shortage of rainfall)  
  
4. Pressure from friends/others   
  
5. Pressure from family  
  
6. Availability of idle land 
  




1. Fellow farmers  
  
2. Sugar cane service providers (e.g. Magobbo or Kaleya) 
  
3. Sugar cane buyers/processors (e.g. Zambia Sugar) 
  












1. Pay someone 
  
2. Register with local scheme 
  






C5: How were you made aware about prospects of growing sugar?  
1. Local NGOs 
  
2. Local government departments  
  
3. Fellow farmers  
  
4. Service providers/sugar growing companies 
  
5. Other (specify) 
  
C6: What did the sugar service providers/buyers/processors do or enter into in order for you to consider growing 
sugar? (probe conditions attached and how they were made aware of these)  
 Tic
k  
Rank 1=Fulfilled, 2=Not fulfilled, 
3=Somehow fulfilled. 4= Difficult to 
tell 
1. Promised employment 
   
2. Promised good incomes 
   
3. Promised food security  
   
4. Promised agricultural support  
   
5. Other 
(specify)________________________________ 
   
C7: Do you have any member of your household working on plantations or sugar estates?  Yes  No 
C8: Did you undergo/have you undergone any training before and/or after starting growing sugar?  
 Before/nature of training (e.g. 
agricultural practices, market 
information  ) 
After/nature of training (e.g. 
agricultural practices, market 
information ) 
1. As sugar producing farmers  
  
2. As employees of a sugar 
growing company  
  
3. As a sugar producing 
community  
  
4. As farmer group leader  
  
5. Other (specify) 
  
C9: Who made the decision to start growing sugar in your household?  
1. The head of household         [    ]                                                                         3. Wife and husband 
together   [    ] 
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2. Shared household decision among all household members    [    ]                      4. Other (specify)                      
[    ]  
C10: Generally, what challenges/costs did you face/incur in starting to grow sugar scheme?  





C11: What is your opinion about processes of starting to grow sugar? [circle accordingly]   
1= Very easy   2=Fairly easy        3= Very difficult       4= difficult/difficult to tell  
 
D: Sugar output, markets and market linkages challenges and pathways  
D1: Now kindly tell us about your production and price estimates in the past three years 
 2013 
(Monthly X times 
harvested) 
2014 
(Monthly X times 
harvested) 
2015 
(Monthnly X times 
harvested) 
production estimate (tons):     
Estimated prices/ton (ZMK)    
Researcher to calculated:  
Estimated annual production     
Estimated annual income     
    
What main inputs do you need in order to succesfully produce sugar?  
1.  2.  3.  
4.  5.  6.  
How do you organise these? Rank these accordingly: 1=Less important   2= Quite importnat     3= Very 
important  
1.  
Tick  Rank  
2. Buy on your own  
  
3. Covered in contractual agreements  
  
4. Borrowed with a view to repay later  
  
5. Other (specify) 
  
 
Would you be in position to organise your own inputs if service 
providers/other discontinue input supplies to your household? 
Yes No 
  
D2: Where do you sell your sugar harvest? Tic
k  
Rank importance 
(1=Less important  
2= Very important   
3=Difficult to tell/don’t 
know   
1. Sell via a service provider  
  
2. Direct to the processor  
  
3. Other (specify) 
  
D2.1 Who decides where to sell your sugar?  
1. You as a farmer  
 
2. Scheme committee  
 




4. Other (specify)  
 
D3: What are yours means of transporting your harvest to the market place? 
Own transport   
Hired transport   
Hired labour   
Family labour  
Collected by the service provider   
Other (specify)  
D4: What THREE main specific firm practices does the service provider/buyer/processor require on 







D5: In your opinion, are these requirements:  
Category  Comment (Why do you say so?) 
1. Easy to follow  
 
2. Difficult to follow  
 
3. Cheap to adopt  
 
4. Expensive to follow  
 
5. Other (specify) 
 
D6: Mention three most market related challenges that you face or have faced before in gaining market 
access of sugar? Rank them: 1= Frequently faced       2=Not frequently faced        3= Faced only once 
in a while  
 Tick  Rank  
1. High transportation cost  
  
2. Problems of storage  
  
3. Low/fluctuating output prices for the harvest  
  
4. High input prices 
  
5. Unclear transaction costs  
  
6. Other (specify) 
  
   
D7: Kindly state the five factors that you consider to be most influential in constraining the further growth of your 
household in terms of sugar production, with 1=most important, 2=second most importnat, 3 third most important, 
4=fourth most important and 5=fifth most important factor.  
Factors Rank How have you dealt with these factors? 
Weak managerial capabilities at household level   
Lack of qualified man power (labor) within the 
household 
  
Limited access to technology   
Limited access to information    
Lack of adequate financial resources    
Low market prices    
Stringent farm practices required by the buyer/processor   
Competition is restricted by dominant schemes/farmers   
High input costs undermine ability to compete   
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Non-existing and/or incapable business 
associations/farmer organisations 
  
Poor services from service providers/buyers/processors   
Lack of support from local NGOs   
Poor Infrastructure e.g. roads   
Other, kindly state   
 
D8: How long have you been a member of this scheme?  
What kinds of support does your membership to this scheme bring to your household?  
1. Inputs   
2. Guidance on farm practices   
3. Technology   
4. Training opportunities   
5. Market specific information e.g. prices    
6. Other (specify)  
D9: Kindly state THREE most important support schemes/cooperatives/organisations you are a member and those 
that guide and support sugar production among smallholders in your area? Then kindly add whether you/your 
household benefitted from the support, the importance of the support scheme as well as the relevance of these 
schemes/organisations to your household? 
Names of support 
scheme/organisation/co
operatives  















growing needs (1 
(very limited-5 
very high extent) 
     
     
     
D10: Do you participate in these schemes/cooperatives/organisations?  Yes  No 





Nature of participation Importance  
    
    
    
D10.2 Do you think you have any influence on processes in these organisations within your area?   Ye
s  
No 
D10.3 If yes, kindly explain in what ways. If no, explain why you think so (probe effectiveness of leverage or 





   
D10.4 If NO to question D10.2, to what extent do the following factors hinder your participation? 
(1=To a larger extent, 2=To a lesser extent, 3=No influence at all.   
Tick  Ran
k 
1. Age    
2. Gender relations (e.g. because its male biased)   
3. Intra-household negotiation (e.g. choice)   
4. Difficult entry/participation requirements   
5. Distance   
6. Trade-offs and conflict   




E: Production, land and land-use dynamics and household responses  
 
E1: How much land is/was available, 
accessible and utilized? In relation to 
large-scale agricultural investments and 










      
E2: How much land do/did you have? 
What was/is the legal status of this land? 













   
E3: Of the land you have/had access to, how was it acquired?   
1. Given by the chief 
  
2. Given by the headman 
  
3. Given by relatives 
  
4. Inherited  
  
5. Purchased without title 
  
6. Purchased with title   
  
7. Rented  
  
8. State land given to the farmer 
  
9. Other   
  
E4: Land-uses before and after you started participating in 
growing sugar 
Indicate in ha/acres 
Then Now  
1. Cultivated by the household  
  
2. Rented  
  
3. Grazing land  
  
4. Other (specify) 
  
E5: What improvements have you made to your land since you started growing sugar?  
1. Built secure shelter  
  
2. Built other building (e.g. poultry house) 
  
3. Erected own water point  
  
4. Connected household to electricity  
  
5. Other (specify) 
  
E6: What is your opinion about land availability, accessibility and utilization for your household in relation to 
growing sugar?  
1. Has reduced  
 
2. Has increased  
 
3. Has remained the same 
 
4. Difficult to tell/don’t know 
 
E7: How have you responded to these dynamics of land availability, accessibility and 
utilization?  
Tick  Rank  
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1. Reduce crop production  
  
2. Reducing number of livestock 
  
3. Bought extra land   
  
4. Rented    
  
5. Sharecropping    
  
6. Relocated   
  
7. Other (specify) 
  
E8: In what ways have land-use dynamics affected your way of life? Tick  Rank  
1. Reduced food production (including gardening)  
  
2. Reduced livestock  
  
3. Reduced incomes  
  
4. Reduced access to water  
  
5. Reduced to eco-system services (e.g. fruits and natural foods from the forests) 
  
6. Other (specify) 
  
E9: Do you have plans or have thought about buying/acquiring more land in the future?  Yes  No 
  
E10: On what do you intend to use this land for? Rank factors accordingly: 1= Very Important    2= Important    
3=  
1. Production on food crops   
  
2. Production of cash crops  
  
3. Grazing land  
  
4. Cattle raring  
  
5. To carter for growing household size 
  
6. Other (specify) 
  
E11: Do you/did you have access to irrigation services/opportunities 
for irrigation e.g. gardening? 
Then  Now 
  
E12: Compared to before you started growing sugar, the irrigation and access to water has:  
1. Increased  
 
2. Decreased  
 
3. Not changed  
 
4. Not applicable  
 
E13: Do you have adequate access to water when you need it?  Yes  No  
E13.1 If NO, what do you attribute this to?    
   
E14: How have you responded to these dynamics of irrigation and access to water?   
1. Developed own water points  
 
2. Access distant water points  
 
3. Reduced/stopped gardening  
 
4. Other (specify) 
 
 
F: Income sources, expenditure and expenditure decisions 
 
264 
F1: Has any of your household member/s worked outside your farm in the past year or conducted 
business? 
Yes   No  
F1.1: If yes, tell us about the nature of their work, how long they worked and estimated 
incomes  
  










Full-time On other farms       
Non-agricultural      
Part-time  On other farms       
Non-agricultural      
Business       
Nature of 
business 
Within community       
 Outside the 
community 
     
F2: What would you consider as your normal sources of income Then  No
w  
1. Selling cash sugar 
  
2. Selling food crops  
  
3. Selling poultry  
  
4. Selling cattle  
  
5. Selling other animals   
  
6. Petty trading    
  
7. Other (specify)  
  
F3: How much do you earn from each of the said sources of income per year? [estimate from 
past year]   
In Zambia 
Kwacha 
1. Selling cash sugar 
 
2. Selling food crops 
 
3. Selling poultry  
 
4. Selling cattle  
 
5. Selling other animals    
 
6. Petty trading   
 
7. Other (specify) 
 
F4: Who keeps the money in your household?    
1. Husband  
2. Wife  
3. Either husband or wife  
4. Other (specify) 
  
F5: Who makes expenditure decisions in your household?   
1. Husband only   
  
2. Wife only  
  
3. Both husband and wife  
  




5. Other (specify)  
  
F6: What are the areas where expenditure decisions are mostly shared?  Tic
k  
Rank  














8. Other (specify) 
  
F7: What areas does woman (wife) participate in making expenditure decisions? Rank: 1=Not 




1. Food  
  
2. Education  
  




5. Asset acquisition  
  
6. Savings  
  
7. Gifts  
  
8. Other (specify) 
  
F8: How do you use your income? After listing, kindly rank accordingly. [Give respondent/s 20 marbles and 
ask them to share them among the items they say they use the cash for, giving more stones to the most 
important etc.] 
  Tick  Rank  
1. Food  
  
2. Education  
  
3. Health  
  
4. On farm up-grading   
  
5. Buying poultry  
  
6. Buying goats/pigs 
  
7. Buying cattle  
  
8. Income generating activities  
  
9. Buy phones 
  
10. Building/repairing your house  
  
11. Extended family   
  
12. Church  
  
13. Saving  
  
14. Gifts  
  




16. Other (specify) 
  
F9: In your opinion, do you have any new obligations since you started growing sugar that 
you never had before? [probe new ones)  
Yes  No  
  
What assets have you specifically bought with incomes from sugar? (e.g. farm tools, radios, sofas)  
1.  2.  3.  4.  
5.  6.  7.  8.  
 
G: Well-being and Intra-household dynamics 
G1: What things do you need in order to be happy? Rank whether the listed element is: 1= Necessary  2=Not 
necessary    3= Very necessary    
No. Need Scale   Need  Scal
e  
1.   31.   
2.    32.   
3.   33.   
4.   34.   
5.   35.   
6.   36.   
7.   37.   
8.   38.   
9.   39.   
10   40   
11.   41.    
12.    42.   
13.   43.   
14.   44.   
15.   45.   
16.   46.   
17.   47.   
18.   48.   
19.   49.   
20   50.   
21.   51.   
22.    52.   
23.   53.   
24.   54.   
25.   55.   
26.   56.   
27.   57.   
28.   58.   
29.   59.   
30   60   
G2: Considering yourself, how satisfied are you with actual needs attainment? Rank on satisfaction scale:  
0= Don’t have   1=Bad        2=Fair             3=Good                    
1.  Scale  31.  Scal
e  
2.    32.   
3.   33.   
4.   34.   
5.   35.   
6.   36.   
7.   37.   
8.   38.   
9.   39.   
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10   40   
11.   41.    
12.    42.   
13.   43.   
14.   44.   
15.   45.   
16.   46.   
17.   47.   
18.   48.   
19.   49.   
20   50.   
21.   51.   
22.    52.   
23.   53.   
24.   54.   
25.   55.   
26.   56.   
27.   57.   
28.   58.   
29.   59.   
30   60   
G3: Considering all the resources at your disposal, do/can you get the following goals? Rank on a 
resource scale:  
1= Never         2= Sometimes            3=Often (or a lot of time)  
 
No. Goal  Scal
e  
3. To have sufficient food   
 To have improved household nutrition   
4. To have sufficient incomes   
5. To have good protective shelter   
6. To educate children   
7. To have access to good health services   
8. To have a good relationship with everyone in the family   
9. To have adequate clean water   
10 To have adequate sanitation   
11. To have good protective shelter    
12.  To be economically secure   
13. To have increased productive assets   
14. To make sufficient investments   
15. To have a planned/predictable future   
16. To be a respected member of the family  
17. To be a respected member in the society  
18. To be a valued member in the community  
19. To build livelihood diversification (e.g. more fall-back strategies)   
20 To become more livelihood resilient  
G4: What would you consider to be enabling or preventing factors as they relate to your goals  
1. Lack of good incomes that meets your demands   
 
2. Lack of good market opportunities (e.g. prices) 
 
3. Reducing access to land  
 
4. Poor social networks within the community  
 
5. Poor government support  
 




G5: Now tell us about how satisfied you are with existing large-scale agricultural investments and your 
participation in sugar production. Using a scale of 1-3, indicate the extent to which you agree: 1= Agree       2= 
Neither agree nor disagree       
3= disagree   
1.  The quality of life of my household is improving   
2. The quality of life in the community as a whole is improving   
4. I am relating better with my spouse than before   
5. I am relating better with other members of the community   
6. I am now a respected member of the community   
7. I am not a valued member of the community   
8. The number of meals my household eat has increased   
9. I am confident that my children/dependants will continue school   
10. The nutritional status of my household has improved   
11. Health status of my family has improved   
12. I am now able to support other people in the community   
13. I am now able to remit resources to family members, relatives etc.   
 
H: Household coping strategies 
H1: Does your household have access to adequate amount of food all year round?  Yes  No  
  
H1.1: If NO, what do you consider your important strategies to overcome food shortages?   
 Tick  Rank  
1. Cutting number of meals 
  
2. Choosing to give the little food to children only  
  
3. Choosing to give the little food to the head of the household only  
  
4. Borrowing food 
  
5. Borrowing money in order to buy food  
  
6. Receive assistance from neighbours  
  
7. Receive assistance from relatives 
  
8. Remittances from someone (e.g. child) working in town/elsewhere  
  
9. Do piece-works (involvement in off-farm activities) 
  
10. Do piece works (involvement in non-farm activities) 
  
11. Migrate to urban areas to seek new pathways     
  
12. Migrating to other areas within the district  
  
13. Praying and hoping the situation changes 
  
14. Sale of household assets  
  
15. Sale of livestock  
  
16. Food aid 
  
17. Surviving on fruits and other edible products from the forest  
  
18. Other (specify) 
  
Compared to before you started growing sugar cane, your household food security position have generally:  
1= Greatly improved     2= Somewhat improved   3= Remained the same    4= Somewhat deteriorated  
5= Greatly deteriorated    6= Difficult to tell/don’t know      
H2: Compared to before you started growing sugar, indicate average number of meals per day: 





H3: What household livelihood shocks have you experienced in the past year? Indicate how the household 
responses for each experienced shock/stress 
Shocks/stress  Frequency/year  Household responses  
1. Death of bread winner  
  
2. Bereavements  
  
3. Being stolen from/theft  
  
4. Loss of crops 
  
5. Natural disasters (e.g. 
flooding, droughts) 
  
6. Loss of land 
  
7. Other (specify) 
  
H4: Are changes made to the following elements as a coping strategy in response to livelihood shocks?   
 Specify  
1. Food consumption (e.g. reducing 
number of meals) 
 
2. Access to education (e.g. asking 
certain members to stop schooling)  
 
3. Access to health services 
 
4. Household economic responses (e.g. 
selling off assets) 
 
H5: During difficult times, how likely are you to receive assistance from outside? Rank 1= Less likely    2= 
Difficult to tell/don’t know         3= Most likely  
From your neighbours/members of the community?  
From your relatives?  
From members of the community   
From organisations your are a member   
Other (specify)  
 
I: Views, perceptions and opinions about large-scale agricultural investments and sugar production  
The following summative rating requires that you give your views and opinions about LaSAIs, participation in 
sugar and livelihood changes. Respond according to five possible options: 
1= Strongly agree   2= Slightly agree  3 Don’t know/undecided  
4= Slightly agree   5= Strongly disagree 
1. We received adequate training and information about sugar production before I/we commenced 
production.   
 
2. We received adequate training and information about sugar production during the period we 
started growing sugar 
 
3. People’s views and opinions were heard and properly responded to before participating in sugar 
production  
 
4. People’s views and opinions are being heard and properly responded to during sugar cane 
production.  
 
5. Terms and conditions for producing and selling sugar to service providers/buyers/processors are 
clear and straight forward. 
 
6. I have an influence on the terms and conditions for growing and selling sugar.  
7. I am free to produce and sell the sugar to any buyer/processor/buyer 
 
8. Given your household situation before, sugar cane production was the only feasible crop 




9. Growing sugar has led to more asset acquisition than before.  
 
10. Participation in sugar production has improved household food security than before. 
 
11. Participation in sugar production has improved household incomes than before. 
 
12. Participation in sugar production has improved household access to land  
 
13. Participation in sugar production has improved household access to eco-system services than 
before. 
 
14. Participation in sugar production has negatively affected food production than before 
 
15. Participation in sugar production has led to livelihood diversification than before. 
 
16. Participation in sugar production has led to more planed spending and expenditure decisions than 
before.  
 
17. Participation in sugar production has led to more household shared decision making than before. 
 
18. Participation in sugar production has led to more household responsibilities than before (e.g 
increased demands from relatives or community).  
 
19. There are more social and organisation support received for growing sugar than before.  
 
20. Participation in sugar production has enhanced good relations and support in the community 
 
21. There are plenty of opportunities (e.g. employment) for women in sugar cane production schemes 
 
22. Women’s voices are being heard and well responded to in sugar cane schemes  
 
23. Opportunities for growing sugar are open to both men and women.  
 
24. Growing sugar remains a good business than what you grew before  
 















Appendix 6.7: Sub-district Data Collection Tools  
 
Focus Group Discussion Guide 
To begin after Transect walks that will point to: crops being grown; natural capital; location of specific 
resources.  
FGDs with Sugar Producing Participants: Men and Women Combined 
Discussion Issues 
Quality of Life  
1. What things do we need to have and do in order to live well in this community? (List as many as 
possible)  
2. Which of these are the most important? (Participants should rank these either by voting or using 
stones).  
Oral history/time lines  
1. How did we get where we are today? [Probe main historical events, way of life/livelihoods) 
Using a large piece of paper, let participants indicate major historical events.  
Sugar growing and scheme participation in the community 
1. How long has the community grown sugar? How did ideas of growing sugar change to become 
actual sugar project? What are/were the motivations?   
2. How is sugar produced? Scheme organisation?  
3. How were sugar growing households selected to join these schemes?   
4. Livelihood impacts of sugar growing in this community [probe land access, production, incomes, 
food security, do they feel less vulnerable to livelihood shocks) 
5. How are terms of engaging service providers/buyers/processors defined? How have these changed 
overtime? In what ways do farmers influence these processes and outcomes? How is information 
shared? Who shares?   
7a) Are there buyer practices you would consider bad/coercive/detrimental to livelihoods? (e.g. unfair 
payments?) 
7b) Are you able to refuse/avoid these? Why? (probe ability to make own informed local decisions) 
7c) How do you consider your participation and representation in this intermediaries? Accountability? 
Monitoring whats going on?  Are you happy with overall governance? How can these be better structured to 
ensure you are happy with these intermediaries?     
6.  Are there any grievance mechanisms for those who are not happy with these terms of engagement? 
Describe how they work?  
7. Key actors influencing decisions around sugar growing? [Probe: individuals, intermediaries and 
district level actors].  
Wealth ranking/Social/Resource mapping. 
a. Wealth categories (Proportional pilling as households) (Probe local/household 
characteristics/categories for wellbeing)  
b. Key land marks/resource points/areas: villages/where people live, schools, clinics, 
churches, boreholes, dams, shopping centres etc.  
c. An organizational map should aim to show different active institutions in the 
community/area [e.g. government, NGOs, CBOs, Churches, traditional leaders, political 
leaders etc. 
Main problems in the community/vulnerable groups  
1. What are the main problems faced by this community? 
2. Which of these ate the most important/crucial ones?  
3. What are the different vulnerable groups/individuals in the community? 
4. Which of groups are most affected by the problems highlighted? 
5. What coping strategies do households utilize to deal with livelihood shocks (start first by getting a 
list of livelihood shocks)? (Past 3 years) 
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Appendix 6.8: FGDs with Sugar Producing Participants (Men or Women ONLY) 
Quality of Life  
1. What things do we need to have and do in order to live well in this community?  
2. Which of these are the most important? (Participants should rank these either by voting or using 
stones.  
Sugar growing and scheme participation in the community 
1. How are women/men engaged in sugar production? (as labour, as employees, as committee 
members). 
2. How do/did households decide on growing sugar? What is the role of men different from women 
in sugar production? 
3. Are there specific challenges to growing sugar peculiar to men/women in this community?  
4. Challenges/opportunities associated with the way smallholders are organized that present 
challenges/opportunities to men different to women or vice versa.  
4a). Concerns around: 
1. Loss of land?  
2. Employment opportunities (how equitable?) 
3. Representation (is there limited representation for women different from men?) 
4. Apportioning of sugar cane plots in the scheme?  
5. Changes to local customs/culture (e.g. women participation?) [Probe: how these affect 
local beneficiation processes]  
5. Do arrangements guiding scheme engagements/contracts present challenges to men different from 
women or vice versa?   
Household coping strategies and intra-household dynamics 
1. What are the livelihood related shocks experienced in this community? 
2. Which groups in the community are most affected by these shocks?  
3. Coping strategies for households during livelihood shocks (start first by getting a list of livelihood 
shocks) [ 
4. As a coping strategy, are there changes made to:  
• Household food consumption as a coping strategy?  
• Household education? 
• Household health seeking behaviour? 
• Household assets (e.g. selling)? 
5. What is the role of women different from men when household experience these shocks? How are these 
roles defined/determined?   
6. How has participation in sugar production affected:  
• Household material well-being? 
• Household relational well-being? 
• Household goals and aspirations?  
Labour, Food and Income Calendars  
1. Distribution of food throughout the year 
2. Distribution of income throughout the year  
3. When is there most demand for labour throughout the year?   
Social support networks 
1. Social support opportunities available for community members (Government, NGOs, private actors 
etc). 
2. Employment opportunities in this community? How easy/difficult is it to get employment in this 
area?  
3. Local traditions and practices regarding helping each other and sharing in times of need? Do women 
and men have different roles and relations in this regard?  
4. Do people receive support from the community/friends/neighbours when they need support? In 
what circumstances is support rendered? How common is this? 
5. Do people receive support from religious institutions? What is normally received and what are the 
procedures?  
6. Are there pre-existing community savings and credit mechanisms? How do these work? Have these 
changed overtimes and why?   
Main problems in the community/vulnerable groups  
1. What are the main problems faced by men/women in this community? 
2. Which of these are the most important/crucial ones?  
3. How do men/women deal with these problems?  
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Appendix 6.9: FGDs with Non-Sugar Producing Participants (Men or Women ONLY) 
Quality of Life  
1. What things do we need to have and do in order to live well in this community?  
2. Which of these are the most important?  
3. What do you think you need to have in order to achieve these? What pathways are open to them? 
Which ones are blocked? Why and how? 
4. Have your relationships with sugar growing individuals/households changed? How? How has this 
affected you?  
Knowledge on sugar growing and scheme participation in the community 
6. How do/did households decide NOT to grow sugar?  
7. Challenges to growing sugarcane.  
8. Challenges/opportunities associated with the way smallholders are organized  
9. Selection of sugarcane growers in the community 
10. Incentives sugar producing households/individuals receive that you don’t receive for being a non-
cane grower? 
11. What do you think about the way people were selected to participate in sugar schemes?  
12. Any complaints or concerns about sugar production in this area?  
Household coping strategies and intra-household dynamics 
7. Main economic activities and sources of income for non-cane growers 
8. What do you use the cash for?  
9. How are household spending decisions made about cash income? 
10. Livelihood related shocks experienced among non-cane growers. Groups most affected by these shocks  
11. Coping strategies for households during livelihood shocks  
12. As a coping strategy, are there changes made to:  
• Household food consumption as a coping strategy?  
• Household education? 
• Household health seeking behaviour? 
• Household assets (e.g. sale of assets)? 
13. What is the role of women different from men when household experience these shocks? How are these 
roles defined/determined?  
Labour, Food and Income Calendars  
14. Distribution of FOOD throughout the year 
15. Distribution of income throughout the year  
16. When is there most demand for labour throughout the year?   
Social support networks 
17. Social support opportunities for non-cane growers (e.g. Government, NGOs etc).  
Main problems in the community/vulnerable groups  
3. Main problems faced by this community 
4. Which of these are the most important/crucial ones?  
5. How do men/women deal with these problems? 
 
